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Abstract  
 
Environmental protection and poverty reduction are central issues in United Nations Millennium 
Development Goals. Both aspects have special importance in the Andes biodiversity “hot spot” 
where high rates of deforestation overlap with high levels of poverty. Peasant households use forest 
land as cheap means of production to increase their agricultural area in order to maintain or increase 
their income. Respect to the issues mentioned above, following research questions are relevant: i) 
What are the opportunity costs of the farming households to conserve the native Andes forest?, a 
production function approach was used to calculate the profitability and determinants of agricultural 
production. ii) Is current agricultural production working efficiently?, a stochastic frontier analysis 
was used to calculate technical efficiency and its determinants in the cattle production. Futhermore, 
iii) What is the best conservation instrument in order to achieve cost-efficiency and poverty 
alleviation?, different conservation instruments fostering a forest conversion ban, including 
payments for ecosystem services schemes, on cost-efficiency and poverty alleviation were also 
tested. 
 
In order to apply economic models, a socioeconomic sample of 130 households was collected during 
the farming season 2008 in the area of the UNESCO Biosphere Reserve “Podocarpus - El Condor”, 
south Ecuador.  
 
The most profitable land use found is extensive pasture-based cattle production (net profit 159 
USD/ha/yr in average) with huge heterogeneity among households. Factors influencing the gross 
margin and consequently profitability in cattle production are land size, labor, input expenses, 
ethnicity, altitude and access to technical assistance and formal credits. The production frontier 
models revealed that size of pasture, labor and costs of production monotonically have increased 
cattle production in the sampled farms. Also, the technical inefficiency model shows that the location 
of the farms (lowland), ethnicity (Mestizo ethnic) and accessibility of technical assistance increased 
the technical efficiency of cattle farms in the study area. The average technical efficiency of about 
70% was obtained from the analysis which implies a technical inefficiency level of about 30%. Of 
course such inefficiency could be reduced or minimized by providing technical assistance. The 
design of payment and contract attributes has a pronounced impact on the effectiveness as well as on 
the distributional impact of PES-type conservation instruments. Voluntary conservation payment 
instruments tend to be more cost-efficient than mandatory ones, if competitively low payments are 
offered. Such low offers are incompatible with poverty alleviation goals. Pronounced pro poor 
distributional impacts are possible, however, but the PES contracts will rather need higher payments 
per unit area (up to 300 USD/ha/yr) and need to be offered exclusively to the poorest households.  
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Introduction 
1. Research problem  
 
The main threat to the biodiversity in the Ecuadorian Andes biodiversity “hot spot” is 
deforestation (Socio Bosque 2010). South America has the largest forest area loss per year 
4.3 million ha/yr in the period 2000-2005 (FAO 2006) compared to deforestation in other 
world regions. According to FAO (2006), Ecuador has the highest deforestation rate 1.7% 
(198 000 ha/yr) annually in South America. Land use change from natural ecosystems to 
pastures was from 2.2 million hectares in the year 1978 increasing to 6 million hectares in 
1989 (Wunder 2000). The annual deforestation rate in the buffer zone of Podocarpus 
National Park is calculated 1.16% (Torracchi et al. quoted by Knoke 2009). Land use change 
is mainly to pasture land. 
 
One important economic reason to explain tropical deforestation process is that forest is a 
cheap input for agricultural production (Benhin 2006). The measure variable is the 
opportunity cost (Naidoo 2006). The private marginal benefits of agriculture are higher than 
forest. It is because calculations of the private marginal benefits do not include social 
benefits. Reasons why are not included all social benefits are market, policy, and 
institutional failures (Benhin 2006). 
 
Several driving forces are related with deforestation in Ecuador. Mosandl et al. (2008) point 
out some driving forces as low investment in education, land tenure insecurity, and an 
unsustainable economic system. Also, Wunder (2000) aggregates farmers look for short 
return of their investments. The driving forces of deforestation push strength with the 
agricultural national reforms in the early 60s which caused migration to the Amazon, timber 
extraction and cattle ranching in the 70s and 80s (Pohle & Gerique 2008). In the research 
area, cattle production has been main cause of deforestation (Wunder 1996) where the 
natural ecosystem has been change by slash and burn technique (Beck et al. 2008a, Beck et 
al. 2008b) and the current land use pattern is an extensive field-pasture-rotation system 
(Beck et al. 2008a). 
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2. Research area 
 
The research area is located in the south of Ecuador in the Biosphere Reserve “Podocarpus-
El Cóndor” located in the provinces of Loja and Zamora-Chinchipe (see Figure 1). The 
research area is part of the global biodiversity “hot spot” of the Andes Mountains (CIPRB 
2005, Brummitt & Lughadha 2003). The protected area “Corazón de Oro” (Area de Bosque 
y Vegetación Protectora Corazón de Oro; ABVPC) was established to the north of 
Podocarpus National Park (UNL 2005). It forms a part the buffer zone of the national park 
which is the core areas of the biosphere reserve (CIPRB 2005).  
 
The region is inhabited by people with heterogenic ethnic and socio-economic structures 
(Pohle 2009) and the majority of rural households are poor smallholders practicing pasture-
based cattle ranching (Beck 2008). The two ethnic groups (“Mestizos” and indigenous group 
“Saraguros”) are engaged into agricultural activities. The cattle‟s ranching is involved 
market economy. The arable crop production is involved subsistence economy on small plot 
near of households (Pohle & Gerique 2006, Pohle et. al 2009). Extensive cattle production is 
the main sources of the income but it is thought with low profitability. Peasants use fire as 
tool to open new pastures and regenerate old pastures (Pohle and Gerique 2008). Moreover, 
an additional source of income are small shops, off-farm labor (Pohle and Gerique 2008), 
and extraction of the timber (Pohle 2006). 
 
3. Objectives of the study 
 
The research aims to estimate different income options of agricultural landholders. It is 
important for the design of policies to promote forest protection. The research is part of the 
project C3.2 DFG Research Unit 816: Biodiversity and Sustainable Management of a 
Megadiverse Mountain Ecosystem in South Ecuador. The research has three specific 
objectives: 
 
1. Analysis of the profitability of agricultural production systems that later is used as 
proxy of opportunity cost of forest conservation. 
2. Investigation of the technical efficiency in cattle production and determinants of 
technical efficiency. 
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Evaluation of differing conservation instruments (ex-ante analysis) reducing a forest 
conversion in mountainous southern Ecuador with respect to cost-efficiency of conservation 
and to poverty alleviation. 
 
 
Figure 1: Research area in the Biosphere Reserve “Podocarpus-El Cóndor”, south of 
Ecuador 
 
4. Theoretical framework  
 
Smallholders of developing countries have characteristics of peasant households (Ellis 
1993). Peasant household has a context of market failures (i.e. high transaction cost, lack of 
access to information, credit constrain) and uncertainty (i.e. output prices and weather 
fluctuations) is non-optimal making decisions about technical and allocative efficiency 
resources by peasant (Ellis 1993). Also, peasants use their natural capital (i.e. wood 
extraction or land use intensification) as livelihood strategy to afford market failures and 
uncertainty (Barbier 2006). Furthermore, farmers make arrangements in the production (i.e. 
input use, family labor) and consumption (food) decisions (De Janvry & Sadoulet 2006). 
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Smallholder land use decision is influenced by internal and external factors of the 
production unit (Crissman et al. 2001, Angelsen & Kaimowitz 1999, Kaimowitz & Angelsen 
1998) Fig 2. The internal factors are farmer characteristics such as objectives, perceptions, 
and with capitals: financial, natural, human, physical and social capitals (Rakodi 1999, 
Bebbington 1999). External (exogenous) factors influences the decision making in 
smallholders are markets, world market prices, etc.  
 
 
Figure 2: Factors that influences the land use decision making of smallholder  
Source:Adapted of Crissman et al. (2001), Kaimowitz & Angelsen (1999), and Kaimowitz & Angelsen (1998). 
 
The framework indicate in the figure 2 is in relation with 3 objectives of the research. The 
research put emphasis on internal factors that have influence on farmer decision. The 
research excludes external factors that have little influences on farmer decisions. 
 
5. Outline of the dissertation 
 
This is an accumulative dissertation. The first chapter is entitled “Modelling smallholders 
production and agricultural income in the area of the Biosphere Reserve Podocarpus - El 
Condor”. This chapter is the base for the following chapters because it has all socio-
economic information compiled in the conducted survey in the research area. A summary 
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similar version is in the second chapter. It is entitled “Profitability of smallholder 
agriculture in the area of the Biosphere reserve Podocarpus – El Cóndor, Ecuador”. The 
importance of this paper is to calculate the profitability of the agricultural production as 
opportunity cost of forest conservation. A Cobb-Douglas production function approach is 
used to establish factors that influence profitability. It will be submitted to the Journal of 
Agriculture and Rural Development in the Subtropics and Tropics.  
 
The third chapter is “Technical efficiency and its determinants in cattle production in the 
Biosphere Reserve Podocarpus-El Cóndor, Ecuador”. This paper determines the technical 
efficiency among farmers and determinants of the cattle production. It will be submitted to 
Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture. 
 
The fourth chapter is entitled “Efficiency and Distributional impacts of protected area 
planning using PES schemes in the Biosphere Reserve Podocarpus - El Cóndor, Ecuador”. 
The paper investigates the effects of differing conservation instruments fostering a forest 
conversion ban in mountainous southern Ecuador including payment for ecosystem services 
schemes on cost-efficiency of conservation and poverty alleviation. It will be submitted to 
Ecological Economics. A similar version is on web site of the Fourth World Congress of 
Environmental and Resources Economists (http://www.wcere2010.org/). 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Scope and objectives 
 
Ecuador is a megadiverse country (Brehm et al. 2008), and the Ecuadorian are Andes one of 
the global biodiversity hotspots (Meyers et al. 2000; Brummitt & Lughadha 2003, Brehm 
2005). One important protected area is the Podocarpus National Park (PNP) located in the 
south Ecuadorian Andes (Barthlott et al. 1996). At the same time, PNP is part of the 
UNESCO Biosphere Reserve “Podocarpus-El Cóndor”.  
 
The main threat to the biodiversity in the Andes “hot spot” is deforestation. South America 
has the largest forest area loss per year (4.3 million ha/yr in the period 2000-2005) compared 
to other world regions. According to FAO (2006), Ecuador has the highest deforestation rate 
1.7% (198 000 ha/yr) annually in Latin America. Land use change from natural ecosystems 
to pastures increased from 2.2 million hectares in the year 1978 to 6 million hectares in 1989 
(Wunder 2000). The annual deforestation rate in the buffer zone of Podocarpus National 
Park was calculated as 1.16% (Torracchi et al. quoted by Knoke 2009). Local land use 
change is mainly to pasture land. 
 
This discussion paper describes in detail the agricultural production and income of 
smallholders in the PNP region land based on empirical survey data sampled in 2008. It 
serves as a background document with respect to more specific analysis (Maza 2010) and 
policy advice base on this analysis. The discussion paper presents three main results on 
smallholder agriculture in the research area: (i) econometric analysis of agricultural 
production, (ii) modeling the arable crop and cattle production systems with Cobb-Douglas 
production functions, and (iii) the structure of the household income. 
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2. Econometrics analysis of agricultural production  
 
The neoclassic theory of production offers tools for the analysis of the efficiency and 
productivity of firms (Coelli et al. 2005). Specifically, production theory studies seek to 
analyse the way how combinations of inputs are used to obtain outputs. Production function 
analysis is one of the main tools. 
 
2.1. Production function 
 
The production function is the relationship between specific levels of output q which can be 
obtained with different combinations of inputs Xi (Chambers 1988 p.8, Coelli et al. 2005 
p.12): 
)(xfq  , 
 
Four main properties of the production function are usually - but not in every single case - 
associated with economic production analyses (see Table 1): 
 
Table 1. Fundamental properties of the production function (source: Coelli et al. 2005 
p.12) 
 
Non-negativity: The quantitative value production q=f(x) is a finite, non-negative 
real number. 
Weak Essentiality: The production of positive output f(x) is impossible without the use 
of at least one input x. 
Non-decreasing in x 
(or monotonicity): 
Additional units of an input will not decrease output. If the 
production function is continuously differentiable, monotonicity 
implies that all marginal products are non-negative. 
Concave in x: If the production function is continuously differentiable, concavity 
implies that all marginal products are non-increasing resulting in 
the law of diminishing marginal productivity. 
 
Typical applications of production functions in econometric research includes (Fuss et al. 
1978 p.220-222) investigations on returns to scale, substitution factors of production, and 
analysis of technical change over the time. If a production function is not expressing the 
total output of a farm but output per ha, the monotonicity property may be lost.  
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2.2. Functional forms 
 
There are several functional forms available with different levels of complexity to estimate 
production function parameters. A detailed list of production functions is provided in Fuss et 
al. (1978 p. 238 - 239). For our analysis we choose the most common production functions, 
i.e. Cobb-Douglas and Translog production functions. 
 
2.2.1. Cobb-Douglas and Translog production functions 
a) Cobb-Douglas production function  
 
The Cobb-Douglas production function was proposed by Cobb & Douglas (1928) to 
establish the relationship between labour, capital, and output of a production. A formal 
representation is given by Nicholson (1998 p.319): 



n
i
ß
i
iXq
1
   with q=output, x =inputs, ß = input coefficient. 
The input coefficients of a Cobb-Douglas production function can be estimated after taking 
the logarithm of, both, the produced output and the input production factors. Some 
characteristics of Cobb-Douglas production function are the following. 
 
1. Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) if: 
1
1


n
i
i
  
2. In a CRS Cobb-Douglas production function, βi is the elasticity of q with regard to 
input Xi. Since 0≤ βi <1, each input has diminishing marginal productivity. 
 
b) Translog production function 
 
Translog or Transcendental logarithm is a generalization of the Cobb-Douglas production 
function. It was developed by Christensen et al. (1973 p.28) with the objective “to develop 
tests of the theory of production that do not employ additivity and homogeneity”, which 
requires a more flexible function form. A formal representation of the Translog production 
function is given by Nicholson (1998 p.320): 
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It should be noted that:  
 
1. The Cobb-Douglas production function is a special case of the Translog production 
function where ß0 = ßij= 0 for all i, j. 
2. The Translog production function and Cobb-Douglas production function assume 
any degree of returns to scale. If 
 
1
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for all i, the translog production function exhibits constant returns to scale. 
3. 
 
jiij
ßß 
, is an necessary equality of cross-partial derivatives. 
 
2.2.2 Criteria for choosing functional form  
 
Coelli et al. (2005 p.211-212) suggests a guide to choose a functional form following four 
basic principles. The functional form should be flexible, linear in the parameters, regular and 
parsimonious: 
 First order flexible means that a production function provides a first-order differential 
approximation to an arbitrary function at a single point. Second order flexible means 
that a second order approximation can be achieved. More flexibility requires more 
parameters. Thus, more flexible forms may face multicollinearity problems if 
explanatory variables are not independent. 
 Linear in the parameters is desirable as non-linear functional forms do sometimes 
not converge to the global optimum of the function in numerical estimation. It is an 
advantage of Cobb-Douglas or Translog production functions they are – after 
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logarithmizing – linear in parameters. Consequently, their parameters can be 
estimated with linear regression techniques. 
 Regular means that the functional form satisfies the economic regularity properties 
of non-negativity, weak essentiality, monotonicity and concavity (law of diminishing 
marginal productivity).  
 Parsimonious refers to the desirability to use the simplest functional form, i.e. with 
the fewest number of parameters that achieves the research objective. 
 
The final decision on the adequacy of a functional form will often be done after residual 
analysis, hypothesis testing, goodness-of-fit tests, and tests of predictive performance Coelli 
et al. (2005 p.212). Moreover, the model section problem between Cobb Douglas and 
Translog production functions can be approached with a “F” test (Wooldridge 2006). 
 
2.3. The Production decision 
 
The ideal objective of the firm is to produce with economic efficiency. Economic efficiency 
is a combination of technical and allocative efficiency (Ellis 1993 p. 65-81). The act by 
which the specific combination of the factors of production (inputs) is defined, can be called 
production decision. The production decision has two elements: the production technology 
and the selection of inputs themselves (Sadoulet & de Janvry 1995 p.61). The production 
technology is represented by a production function that represents the relationship between 
output(s) and inputs. The selection of inputs depends on firm objectives giving market 
prices.  
 
The firm objective can be represented in three different ways: cost-input minimization 
(Sadoulet & de Janvry 1995 p.66, Coelli et al. 2005 p.21), output maximization, or profit 
maximization (Sadoulet & de Janvry 1995 p.61, Coelli et al. 2005 p.32). These 
representations are fundamentally equivalent (principle of duality). 
 
2.4. Determinants of production 
 
The focus of our analysis is on the determinants of production at the level of the single farm. 
Determinants for agriculture production can be described as natural, physical, financial, 
human, social and political capital (Rakodi 1999). Thus, other determinants influence the 
 22 
efficiency of production in addition to land, labor and built capital. Alene et al. (2005) point 
out several typical such determinants for a developing country setting: 
 
 Social capital can positively impact on efficiency if farmers have access to new 
information, and could potentially be supported by other farmers or other economic 
agents. 
 Technical assistance and education can have positive impacts on production. 
 Land size can positively or negatively impact efficiency. Its effect depends on 
alternative sources of income, transaction cost of production, dependence on off-
farm labor opportunities, etc. 
 Age can impact the adoption of improved technology negatively or positively.  
 Ethnicity and off-farm employment can, both, have either positive or negative 
impacts. 
 Access to credit could have a positive impact (Dercon 2003, Udry 1996). Credit is 
necessary for increasing land and labor productivity (Zeller et al. 1998, Zeller et al. 
1997, Delgado 1995). 
 
Rahman & Kamrul (2008) and Sherlund et al. (2002) point out that the results of 
productivity and efficiency analyses can be biased if environmental conditions are not 
accounted for. Typical case include site-specific factors such as soil and topography, or 
climate variables (Antle & Capalbo 2001). Although these factors are not under the direct 
control of the farmer, they do have an obvious potential to influence production. For their 
influence on production follows a unimodal “optimum” pattern. For example, while a certain 
amount of soil moisture is optimal for most terrestrial crops, too much and too little reduces 
production. This response patterns violates the monotonicity and potentially the concavity 
characteristics often presupposed for economic production function analysis (see Table 1). 
The environmental factors can be combined into a site index, however, that displays a well-
behave functional relationship to production (see, e.g., Juhrbandt 2010). 
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3. Methodology 
3.1. Research area 
 
The research area is located in the south of Ecuador in the Biosphere Reserve “Podocarpus-
El Cóndor” in the provinces of Loja and Zamora-Chinchipe (see Figure 1). The research 
area is part of the global biodiversity “hot spot” of the Andes Mountains (CIPRB 2005, 
Brummitt & Lughadha 2003). The majority of rural households are poor smallholders 
practicing pasture-based cattle ranching (Beck 2008). The protected area “Corazón de Oro” 
(Area de Bosque y Vegetación Protectora Corazón de Oro; ABVPC) was established to the 
north of Podocarpus National Park. It forms a part the buffer zone of the national park, 
which is the core area of the UNESCO Biosphere Reserve.  
 
The annual deforestation rate in the buffer zone of PNP is calculated as 1.16%. As elsewhere 
in Ecuador, land use change is mainly to pasture land (Torracchi et al. quoted by Knoke 
2009). Peasants use fire to open new pastures and regenerate old pastures (Pohle and 
Gerique 2008). The main driver of deforestation is population growth. Other drivers are 
agrarian reform, new infrastructure (roads), land tenure system and agricultural income 
strategies (Pohle 2008).  
 
The region is inhabited mainly by two ethnic groups at least partly thought to display 
differing socio-economic characteristics (Pohle 2009). Both, the “Mestizos” settlers 
(colonos) as well as the indigenous “Saraguros” are engaged in agriculture (Beck 2008), 
mainly cattle ranching including diary production. The farms regularly market their 
products. The small amount of arable crop production is mostly subsistence production 
(Pohle et. al 2009). Thus, (extensive) cattle production is the main source of income. 
Alternative sources were known to include small shops, off-farm labor (Pohle and Gerique 
2008), and extraction of timber (Pohle 2006). 
 
3.2. Sampling procedure at village level 
 
Sampled Villages were selected with a weighted random method. The sample was designed 
to consist of 10 villages with 105 interviews to be administered in total (Table 2). In the 
field, it turned out that sufficient time and resources were available to expand the survey to 
16 villages and 130 valid interviews (for details, see Table 2). 
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Figure 2: Research area in the Biosphere Reserve “Podocarpus-El Cóndor”, south 
Ecuador 
 
Table 2: Villages and households covered (see also section 3.5) 
Province  Parroquia Village Number of 
interviews 
calculated 
according to 
design 
Number of 
Interviews 
actually 
conducted 
Number of 
interviews 
included in 
analysis 
Loja Jimbilla Jimbilla 16.6 5* 3 
Machala 8.3 7 7 
Jesus Maria 8.3 11 11 
Zamora Imbana El Cristal 8.3 10 10 
Tibio Alto 8 8** 7 
Imbana 8.3 9 9 
La Libertad 8.3 9 9 
La Unión 8 11 11 
Los Guabos 8 11 11 
San Juan del Oro 8.3 7 7 
Tambo Blanco 8.3 9 9 
Sabanilla  El Retorno  12 5 5 
El Tambo 6 6 
La Cascada 8 8 
Río Blanco 10 10 
2003 
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Zamora  El Limón (Chorrillos, 
San Rafael, and 
Victoria sectors) 
0 11 6*** 
Total 110 135 130 
* two interviews were excluded in the analysis (see explanation on 3.5 problematic data). 
** one interview was excluded because the farm was outside of aerial photo available for the research area 
***five farms were excluded because of  land use restrictions. 
 
3.3. Selection of the respondents 
 
The households in each village were selected by a modified snowball approach. Either our 
guide knew a farmer or his family, or a farmer who had been interviewed recommended us 
to other farmers. Farmers also acted as intermediaries to contact other farmers of deemed 
appropriate. The application of this approach was necessary because the field group (which 
included the first author) were considered as strangers by most villagers, and treated with 
suspicion. Particularly, inhabitants feared that  
 we were thieves, 
 the information we collected may end up in the hands of government institutions, 
which would either use it to  
- levy a new tax on the land of the inhabitants or to 
- reduce or cancel the payment of the subsidy basic social security payment Bono 
desarrollo humano
2
, or to 
- sanction prohibited land use change in the forest reserve. 
 
Without the sampling strategy taken, it would have been nearly impossible to obtain 
information as true as possible within an acceptable duration of the sampling campaign. 
 
3.4. Data collection, entry, and cleaning 
 
The data were collected through standardized formal questionnaires. An English language 
version of the questionnaire was designed in Germany in the winter of 2007 and then 
translated into Spanish. The design of the questionnaire benefited from a comparison of the 
                                                          
2 
Bono desarrollo humano is a based social security payment. The payment is a conditional cash subsidy of the 
Ecuadorian government of $ 30 per month per family. This payment is only for the very poor. The payment 
can be received by people who are over 65 years old, disabled, or poor single mother. It is conditional because 
the beneficiaries must have vaccination certificates, and certificates of study in the case of single mothers. 
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following successfully used questionnaires: Stability of Rainforest Margins (STORMA) and 
Integrated Silvopastoral Approaches to Ecosystem Management. 
 
The questionnaire we used, has the following structure. 
 
A. Household Characteristics 
 General characteristics of the properties operated by the farmer conatcted 
 Farmer family characteristics 
B. Land Use of the Faming Household  
 Land tenure regime 
 Land use types 
C. Arable Crop Production  
 Annual crop and permanent crop production 
 Selling and consumption of the production 
 Production cost 
 Equipment and infrastructure for arable crop 
 Paid labor 
D. Cattle Production  
 Herd structure  
 Changes in the herd inventory  
 Management of pastures  
 Production cost  
 Equipment  
 Labor spent for herding  
 Paid labor  
 Sale of dairy products 
 Selling and consumption of cattle products  
E. Forest Production  
 Selling forest production  
 Production cost – forest 
 Introduction of forest species 
F. Knowledge on Silvo-pasture Techniques  
G. Social Capital 
H. Technical Assistance  
I. Credit Participation 
J. Off-farm Income 
K. Technology Adoption  
 
The interviewers were trained for 2 days in the city of Loja (07/03/2008 and 10/03/2008) 
and taken for one day to the field (Imbana 08/03/2008). From 11/03/2008 to12/03/2008 the 
interviewers studied the questionnaire in detail under the supervision of the first author. 
Next, the survey instrument was pre-tested with two households, and the questionnaire 
further improved. The first interview of the main study was administered on 13/03/2008.  
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The interviews and land-use surveys were conducted (see Table 3) under the supervision of 
first author. The group was divided in two teams at the end of the first week in the field. 
During the first two weeks, the interviewers still had many questions because they were 
confronted with new situations: local measure units, new local names of species, new 
categories for off farm-income, etc.  
 
For some farmers, the questionnaire was too long. The interviewers reported this situation. 
In these cases, the interviews were divided into two parts. An acknowledgement gift (3 
USD/respondent) was presented to each interviewed farmer at the end of the interview. 
 
Table 3: Staff of field research study in Ecuador 
Background Responsibility  
Socio-Economics Coordinator (Byron Maza) 
Geology/ Geographic Information Systems – GIS.  Global Positioning System GIS 
Informatics Access data base programmer 
Environmental Management / Experience in land use 
project around Saraguro city. 
Team A 
Socioeconomic interviews.  
Environmental Management / Experience in land use 
project around Saraguro city. 
Team A 
Land use: verification and Global 
Position System (GPS). 
Management Environmental/ Experience 
socioeconomic component in Loja. 
Team B 
Socioeconomic interviews. 
Agricultural assistant  Team B 
Land use: verification and GPS 
points. 
Local guide.  
 
During the survey, the questionnaires were checked by the field coordinator before the data 
were stored by the coordinator in an Access database file. In case of doubt, interviewers 
were contacted and asked to confirm or correct the answers given. The information was 
checked two more times in Göttingen. Data cleaning includes examining missing values, 
wild codes, inconsistencies and extreme values (also see next section). 
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3.5. Problematic data 
 Jimbilla village 
 
A total of 24 interviews were planned for Jimbilla & Machala, two directly adjacent villages. 
The survey was stopped after the fifth interview, however. During fourth and fifth interview, 
it became apparent that the respective respondents did not collaborate in terms of a truthful 
representation of their farming household and production characteristics. These last two 
interviews were not included in the analysis, and the interviews terminated in these two 
villages.  
 
 El Tibio village 
 
In El Tibio Alto is inhabited by members of the Saraguro ethnics. Respondents appeared to 
strategically exaggerate or understate their endowments. Also, nobody claimed to extract 
wood from the forest. However, it was possible to see semi-processed wood ready to be 
sold, in the center of the village. In informal conversations, we found out that the inhabitants 
hated the protected area, in which their village was located. The residents of El Tibio Alto 
thought that the forest protected area (Bosque Protector Corazón de Oro) was to blame for 
their problems to obtain legal land titles. After an appropriate socialization of the 
background of our study, a confident relationship could be established that permitted the 
administration of the survey.  
 
Land use of each single farm was delimited by aerial photographs and sing Global 
Positioning System data (see section 3.6 for details). One interview was eliminated (El Tibio 
Alto #15) because the farm was outside the aerial photographs which did not cover extreme 
North-East part of the research area. 
 
 Farms near Zamora 
 
Five farms near the provincial capital Zamora were not included in the analysis. The farms 
are located in a place where a small hydro-electrical plant was being constructed. In this 
area, farmers were forbidden to continue with agriculture.  
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 Data on wood extraction 
 
Finally, it was not possible to obtain reliable data for wood extraction (section E of the 
questionnaire). As nearly all forest is located in protected areas, it is not permitted to extract 
wood by law. Respondents did not want to speak about this topic, or simply denied 
extracting wood. This behavior was not restricted to El Tibio Alto residents.  
 
3.6. Geo-data 
 
The geo-data on land use was collected by technicians (assistants) for each single farm. 
Aerial photographs available from Instituto Geográfico Militar (IGM 2003) at the scale 1: 
50,000 were printed. These photographs were used to delimit each farm in collaboration 
with the farmers. Later, technicians verified the land use using a global positioning system 
(GPS), and took additional GPS points to delimit different land uses.  
 
The geo-data were input into Arcview by a GIS expert in Loja. The information of each 
single polygon was checked one more time in Göttingen by the first author. 
 
3.7. Methodology used in the descriptive analysis 
 
Descriptive analysis includes measures of central tendency and measures of variability for 
continuous data. The measures of central tendency are mean and median. The measures of 
variability are standard deviation and range (maximum and minimum). For categorical data, 
we used frequencies. Table 4 shows variables sampled. The analysis was made with SPSS 
version 17.  
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of farms (capital and production characteristics) 
Component Variables 
Personal capital Number, gender , age, ethnicity, and education level of all household 
members 
Financial capital Access to credit, credit source and reason why farmers do not request 
formal credit 
Social capital Organization membership, meeting attendance, decision making on 
organization decisions, labor contribution to the organization, and 
money contribution to the organization 
Operational a) Land: tenure regime, farm origin, requested rental price for hectare 
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capital  of land (cattle or agriculture), farm size per household, land use 
distribution (forest, pastures, and arable crops), percent of grass and 
crops 
b) Herd: structure (number, age, race and sex of animals) 
Income sources a) Arable crop: amount sold, amount consumed, labor (hired and 
family) expenses per hectare 
b) Cattle: dairy production (sold and consumed), animals (sold and 
consumed), life weight increment, labor (hired and family) and cash 
input expenses per hectare 
c) Off-farm income: poor income subsidy, off-farm employment 
Technology 
adoption  
Tree species introduced to the farm, place where the trees were 
planted, why farmer is satisfied with pasture grass species adopted, 
potential trees species adoption 
Technical 
assistance  
Topics of technical assistance received in the last year, changes in the 
farms as effect of technical assistance, level of satisfaction with and 
future topics of technical assistance 
 
Regarding potential technology adoption, farmers were asked if they were willing to 
introduce new species. Cesalpinia spinosa (“Tara” or “Guarango”) was selected as a 
specimen species. Promising planting experiments in other regions of Southern Ecuador 
(Loja province) have already been carried out with Cesalpinia spinosa (GTT, 2007). Tara is 
a shrub or a small tree, around 5 m high planted in altitudes up to 2800 m. As a nitrogen-
fixer, Tara can contribute to an enhanced pasture. Tara starts to yield fruit at age three to five 
and reaches a maximum yield of up to 40 kg/yr/tree after 10 years. Trees can be harvested 
until they reach the age of about 65 years, above which they do not bear much fruit. The 
uses from the processed seed range from a colorant to hydro-colloids (tannins) (Nieto & 
Barona 2007, Barona & Ortiz 2007). 
 
At a conservative yield estimation of 10 kg/yr for a young Tara tree, assuming a market 
price of 0.60 US$/kg and a planting demand of about 600 trees/ha, the accumulated 
establishment costs (plant 0.10 USD/tree, management 0.10 USD/tree, labor 4 USD/tree) are 
approximated 1500-2000 US$/ha (interest rate 8%). After 4-6 years the plantation breaks 
even. Later, attractive net profits are prognosticated (Nieto & Barona 2007, Barona & Ortiz 
2007). 
 
During the interview, farmers were introduced to planting Tara. Different silvopastoral uses, 
such as living fences, or pure plantations were explained using graphs and monetary values. 
After the explanation, we asked: Would you like to plant one hectare, it is 625 plants, of 
Guarango? 
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3.7.1. Herd 
 
The data collected for the cattle herd did not directly include data on life weight increments. 
Such increments are an important source of income that is not captured by the questionnaire. 
The reported sale of animals did not exactly track life weight increments although the 
sampled farmers were mostly able to report the life weights at sale. Thus, we included a 
section that explains this income component relating to the structure and growth of the herd.  
 
In order to calculate the life weight increment of the herd, we first need to assign life 
weights at beginning and end of the year to the cattle of each farm. These inventory data are 
approximated by establishing a relation between the life weights of the animals sold and the 
characteristics of the animals. First, we tested 8 different regressions in order to predict the 
life weight of the animals sold. Each equation has a different arrangement of explanatory 
variables. The variables were coded using effect coding (see Table 5). 
 
Table 5: Characteristic of regressions to predict life weight of individual cattle 
Explanatory variables Equation characteristics 
Formula 1.  
Race and Age.  
No interaction 
Effect coding 
Adj R
2
 =  0.5055 
5 explanatory variables, all variables significant  
Formula 2.  
Interaction between two races 
and three age classes. 
Effect coding 
Adj R
2
 =  0.5121 
9 explanatory variables, 2 variables are non-significant 
Formula 3.  
Race, Age, and Sex.  
No interaction. 
Effect coding 
Adj R
2
 =  0.5115 
6 explanatory variables, one variable non-significant 
Formula 4.  
Race, Age, Sex, and Mean 
altitude,  
No interaction. 
Effect coding 
Adj R
2
=  0.5831 
7 explanatory variables,  one variable non-significant 
Formula 5.  
Mean altitude, interaction 
between race, age and sex.  
Effect coding 
Adj R
2
 =  0.5027 
20 explanatory variables, seven variables non-significant 
Formula 5.1.  
Interaction between race, age 
and sex. 
Effect coding 
Adj R
2
 =  0.5069 
18 explanatory variables, seven variables non-significant 
(for details, see Table 15) 
Formula 6.  
Mean altitude and interaction 
between race and age. 
Effect coding 
Adj R
2
 =  0.5038 
11 explanatory variables,  four variables non-significant  
Formula 7.  
Interaction between race and 
age 
Effect coding: 0, mean altitude,- mean altitude 
Adj R
2
 =  0.4594 
9 explanatory variables, two variables non-significant 
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Formula 8.  
Interaction between race, age 
and sex 
Effect coding: 0, mean altitude,- mean altitude 
Adj R
2
 =  0.588 
18 explanatory variables, one variables non-significant 
All significant at α =0.05 
 
We selected equation 5.1 to predict the cattle life weights. It includes the interaction between 
race, age and sex of different animals. It does not have the maximum adj. R
2
 (0.506) but has 
a clear interpretation of the coefficients. Using equation 5.1, we predicted animal life 
weights at the beginning and end of one year. The resulting calculation was also used to 
calculate the stocking rate expressed in Tropical Livestock Unit (1TLU= 250 kg life weight) 
and Animal Units AU (1UA = 400 kg life weight) of the farm. 
 
The predicted life weight was used to calculate the annual weight increments according to 
Figure 3. Phase I represents the life weight increment from January to July. During Phase II 
newly born animals are added to the herd. Phase III represents the life weight increment 
between July – December. Phases I and III represent the weight increment on the whole 
year. We assume that animals with sex female and more than 3 years old have zero life 
weight increment per year. The consumption and selling of animals as well as death and 
purchases are ignored for the calculation of the life weight increment of the herd. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Model of life weight increment  
Cattle Stock 
STOCKJAN STOCKJUL STOCKDEC 
+ ½ weight + ½ weight 
JAN JUL DEC 
Phase I Phase III 
Birth 
Selling 
Consumed 
Death 
Buying 
Phase II 
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3.8. Methodology used in the causal analysis 
 
All output values used in the causal analysis are expressed as an output intensity, i.e. as 
output/ha/yr. In effect we accept a violation of the monotonicity property. We gain, however, 
direct insights into the returns to scale of the farms with respect to the size of their land 
holding. This is of particular importance if small farms are involved in illegal or at least 
unwarranted deforestation activities. 
 
3.8.1. Arable crop production 
 
The gross income per year and hectare includes consumed and sold arable crop production. 
We did not include the production from “home gardens” because it is not in our research 
scope. Variable cost includes hired labor and cash input cost. Fixed costs include family 
labor and depreciation of (rudimentary) tools. Variable costs were subtracted from gross 
income to calculate gross margin. Next, fixed cost was subtracted from gross margin to 
calculate net profits of each household (See Table 6). 
 
Table 6: Formulas used to calculate net-profit in arable crop production per year 
(n=130) 
Variable Formula 
Empirical Gross 
Income 
                                                                    
i:number of household 
Market prices for consumed amount are the average prices of all households of sold 
production   
Gross Margin                                               
i:number of household 
Empirical 
Variable Cost 
                                                      
i:number of household 
Empirical Fixed 
Costs 
                                                                    
i:number of household 
The Off-farm agricultural wage is used as average wage in fixed cost 
Net Profit          -     
i:number of household 
 
3.8.2. Cattle production 
 
The gross income per year includes dairy production (consumed and sold), sold and 
consumed animals, and life weight increment (see Herd section). He selected strategy to 
represent the inventory changes to the herd as well as income and costs from the commercial 
and subsistence use of the cattle will require further refinement in future analyses. The used 
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cattle income model assumes that the herd grows in spite of deaths, sales and auto-
consumption. The variable cost includes hired labor and cash input cost. The fixed costs 
include family labor and depreciation of (rudimentary) tools. Next, the variable cost was 
subtracted from gross income to calculate gross margins. Fixed costs were subtracted from 
gross margins to calculate the net-profit of each household. The formulas used are shown in 
Table 7. 
 
Table 7: Formulas used to calculate the production in cattle 
Variable Formula 
Empirical Gross 
Income  









































icePr_Market
*Increment_Weight_Life
icePr_Market*
Animals_Consumed
and_Sold_Amount
icePr_Market
*Dairy_Consumed
_and_Sold_Amount
GI
i
iii
 i:number of household 
Dairy includes sold and consumed dairy products 
Market prices for consumed amount are the average prices of all households of sold 
production  
Gross Margin                                                
i:number of household 
Empirical 
Variable Cost  
                                                      
i:number of household 
Input cost not include buying animals 
Empirical Fixed 
Costs  
                                                                    
i:number of household 
The average Off-farm agricultural wage is used as average wage in fixed cost 
Net Profit          -     
i:number of household 
 
3.8.3. Econometric estimation of production functions 
 
Several steps were necessary to assess the profitability of the arable crops and cattle 
production. First, we calculated the empirical gross income
3
 from the sampled data (amount 
sold plus consumed valued at market prices). Subtracting variable costs, the empirical gross 
margin was calculated. Finally, net profit was expressed calculated as gross margin minus 
fixed costs (see sections above). 
 
In order to extract summarized information on agricultural production at the single farming 
household level, we fitted a Cobb-Douglas production function to predict household gross 
income, gross margin, and net profit. These production functions are an important result to 
                                                          
3 Gross Income is the value of the production in monetary terms (Zeller & Schwarze 2006). 
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be exported to other sub-projects within our research group for the dynamic modelling of 
farmer decision making.  
 
We also considered using a Translog production function. The problem of model selection 
(functional form) between Cobb Douglas and Translog was based on the following criteria: 
- resulting equation gives significant explanatory variables,  
- no problem with multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity, 
- superior performance in “F” test of Cobb-Douglas (restricted model) versus Translog 
(unrestricted model, i.e. including the interaction and squared terms). 
 
“F” test 
 Arable crop production: Cobb-Douglas versus Translog 
- Dependent variable: gross income 
- Explanatory variables: Land, labor and input expenses 
Ho: Interaction terms have no effect on output  
F calculated = 3.23 
F (6,42) critical  =  2.324   at α = 0.05 
F calculated >Fcritical  = reject Ho 
F is significant, we cannot reject Ho 
 
 Cattle production: Cobb-Douglas versus Translog 
- Dependent variable: gross income 
- Explanatory variables: Land, labor, input expenses, altitude, ethnicity, technical 
assistance and credit. 
Ho: Interaction terms have no effect on y  
F calculated = 5.69 
F (6,116 ) critical =  2.1  at α = 0.05 
F calculated > Fcritical :reject Ho.  
 F is significant; we cannot reject the Ho 
 
In both cases, the Ho (interaction terms do not have an effect) could not be rejected. Still, the 
Cobb-Douglas functional form was selected. The Cobb-Douglas production function gives 
us more significant explanatory variables in arable crop and cattle production than Translog.   
Much importantly, the Translog production function had a problem with multicollinearity in 
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arable crop production (Annex 3) and cattle production (Annex 4). With severe 
multicollinearity present, the relative importance of the predictors cannot be ascertained 
well. Thus we selected the less flexible but well-performing Cobb-Douglas production 
function. In addition to gross income, gross margin and net profit were tested as dependent 
variables with the Cobb-Douglas production function. Gross income was clearly the best 
predicted dependent variable and used for the following calculations (see in results Tables 
24 and 27).  
 
Land, labor, input expenses, altitude (minimum, maximum and average) of pasture land, 
ethnicity, technical assistance, access to formal credit, household-head age, education level 
of household-head, part of an organization, cost distance (minimum, mean and maximum) of 
farms to markets, and off-farm income were tested as explanatory variables. The regressions 
were run with STATA 9.0. Finally, multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity were evaluated 
for arable crops and cattle production functions.  
 
Our study includes environmental production conditions, i.e. the site-specific variables 
altitude and locality in the production function. The topographic factor is represented by 
altitude. Locality is a dummy variable differentiating between farms close to the inter-
provincial road from Loja to Zamora in Sabanilla village, and the more remote “upland” 
farms. In addition to other soil conditions and a somewhat lower altitude, the main 
difference of the Sabanilla farms is their much improved market access. Several of these 
farms directly deliver milk to Loja. In sum, it is assumed that the Sabanilla “lowland” 
farmers are more productive that the “upland” farmers.  
 
Multicollinearity happens when two or more variables are correlated, inter alia, because of 
the inappropriate uses of dummy variables, variables computed by other variables or if two 
variables are dependent on a third variable. The consequences are: greater standard error and 
bigger confidence intervals, the “t” statistic values tend to be smaller, and it is harder to 
reject the null hypothesis when the multicollinearity is present. However, multicollinearity 
does not cause bias in the estimation of central tendencies (Wooldridge 2006). The Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) is used to test multicollinearity (Stata version 9 command VIF). 
 
Heteroskedasticity means that the error term of the regression is not constant. The error 
increases when the value of the independent variables increase. Heteroskedasticity can be 
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caused by the sampling strategy, by subpopulation differences, interaction effects or model 
misspecification. Heteroskedasticity does not causes biased parameter estimation but it does 
not provides the estimate with the smallest variance. Standard errors are biased (Wooldridge 
2006). For detecting heteroskedasticity, the Breusch-Pragan/Cook-Weisberg test is 
available. The null hypothesis is “error variance is constant” (no heteroscasdicity) and the 
alternative hypothesis is “error variance is a multiplicative function of one or more 
variables” (Wooldridge 2006). The command “hettest” in Stata version 9 is used test for 
heteroskedasticity. If heteroskedasticity is detected, we use robust standard errors that 
address the problem of biased standard errors (Kohler & Kreuter 2005, Wooldridge 2006).  
 
Based on the predicted gross income, gross margins were calculated by subtracting variable 
costs. Finally, net profits were obtained by subtracting fixed costs including household labor 
from gross margins (Zeller & Schwarze 2006). The formulas are described below in detail 
for arable crop and cattle production. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive analysis of factors that influence land use decisions 
4.1.1. Personal capital 
 
Households of the sample consist of 85% Mestizos and 15% Saraguros (see Table 8). The 
average number of household members is the 4.1, 53 % are male and 47% female. The self-
reported illiteracy rate in the region is 12.5%, and 7.7% for the household head (see Table 
9). 36.5% of all individuals and 46.9% of household heads completed at least the primary 
school. 3.7 % of all household members and 3.1% of the household head completed 
secondary school.  
 
Table 8: Household composition 
 Statistics Number Members Age (Year) 
Male Female Household Male Female Household 
Mean 2.2 1.9 4.1 30.2 28.6 29.5 
Median 2.0 2.0 4.0 27.0 24.0 25.0 
Standard deviation 1.5 1.5 2.4 21.3 20.8 21.0 
Minimum 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Maximum 7 6 10 80 88 88 
Observations 285 252 537 285 252 537 
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Table 9: Education level 
Education level Total household Head household 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Without education 67 12.5 10 7.7 
Partial primary school 164 30.5 38 29.2 
Completed primary school 196 36.5 61 46.9 
Partial secondary school 63 11.7 9 6.9 
Completed secondary school 20 3.7 4 3.1 
Partial university 16 3.0 3 2.3 
Completed university 11 2.0 5 3.8 
Total  537 100.0 130 100.0 
 
4.1.2. Financial capital 
 
While 6 households received a loan for less than one year, 43 households received a loan 
with a duration of more than one year. The the average amount of the short term credit is 
1425 USD at 4.8% annual interest rate (see Table 10). Longer credits have a mean amount 
of 4012 USD at 7.3 % annual interest rate and a mean duration of 3.4 years. 
 
Table 10: Credit characteristics 
Statistics Less One Year More one Year 
Amount  
(USD) 
Interest 
Rate (%) 
Duration 
(Months) 
Amount  
(USD) 
Interest  
Rate 
(%) 
Term  
(Months) 
Observation 8 8 8 43 43 43 
Mean 1425 4.8 7.5 4012 7.3 41.3 
Median 1500 5.0 7.5 4800 5.0 36.0 
standard deviation 989 3.3 4.3 1770 3.4 15.9 
Minimum 100 2.0 1.0 1000 4.0 12.0 
Maximum 3000 12.0 12.0 10000 18.0 60.0 
 
The main source of credit in the “less one year” category is the Cooperative of Saving and 
Credit. In the “more one year” term, it is the governmental bank “Banco Nacional de 
Fomento” (see Table 11). There is an informal credit market that we were unable to record 
as informal credit it is considered illegal in Ecuador. Informal credit usually has very high 
interest rates and can be obtained without collateral or conformance with to official financial 
solvency standards.  
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Table 11: Credit source 
Source 
  
Less One Year 
Frequency Percent 
No request credit 122 93.8 
Saving association, communal bank 2 1.5 
Cooperative of saving and credit 4 3.1 
Lender 2 1.5 
Total 130 100.0 
Source More One Year 
No request credit 87 66.9 
Cooperative of saving and credit 7 5.4 
Lender 1 0.8 
Merchant 1 0.8 
Banco Nacional de Fomento 34 26.2 
Total 130 100.0 
 
With the funds obtained, farmers mainly buy animals. Many farmers did not take out formal 
credit. Farmers mentioned the following reasons: high interest rates (25%), no need for 
credit (23%), fear to lose property (17%), and lack of a formal land title (15%).  
 
4.1.3. Social capital  
 
Results show that 56% of the households did not take part in any organization. 40% take 
part in farmer organizations (see Table 12). 9.6% of the farmers are a member of the 
agricultural & livestock association Trabajadores Autónomos La Dolorosa and Jesús del 
Gran Poder, 6.6% are a member of the ecological association Amigos de la Naturaleza, 
5.9% of the neighbourhood committee Comité pro-mejoras del Barrio, 5.1% of the saving 
association Nina Pacari, 4.4% of the livestock association Organización Campesino 
Quichua y Los Hermanos, and 3.7% of a woman association Las Orquideas. 
 
Finally, the members of sampled households are somewhat active in the decision making 
process in their organizations. They spent is 6.5 times per year in average in meeting 
attendance in farmer organization. Finally, the respondents were asked how much labor they 
spent on the organization (8.2 Day/yr on average), and how much money they contributed, 
(10.2 USD/yr on average) in farmer organization. 
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Table 12: Meeting attendance, decision making, labor contribution, and money contribution 
Organization Statistic Meeting attendance 
(number/yr) 
Decision 
making* 
Labor 
contribution 
(Day/Yr) 
Money 
contribution 
(USD/Yr) Frequency Percent 
No 
organization 
Number of 
observations 
76 56 ----- ----- ----- 
Farmer 
organization 
  
Number of 
observations 
54 40 ----- ----- ----- 
Average 6.5 ----- 2.0 8.2 10.2 
Other 
organization 
  
Number of 
observations 
6 4 ----- ----- ----- 
Average 5.5 ----- 2.7 10.2 38.0 
*1=not very active, 2=somewhat active, 3=very active 
 
4.1.4. Operational capital 
a)  Land use  
 
Of the 175 farms
4
 owned by the analyzed 130 households, 75% (132 farms) have legal land 
titles. Moreover, it is reported that 76% of the farms were bought, 17% obtained by heritage, 
4% obtained by donation and only 1.1% obtained by forest cleaning. Furthermore, 
respondents were asked: What is the value to rent one hectare of your farm? The mean value 
was 67 USD/month (median: 40 USD/month). Higher values are reported from the Sabanilla 
region where farms are designated mainly to market milk production.  
 
Farmers had 40.4 ha land on average (median 23.4 ha, standard deviation 44.9 ha). The 
minimum area reported was 1.7 ha, and the maximum 260.6 ha. 28% of households had less 
than 10 ha and only 12% more that 80 ha (Figure 4). The land use distribution shows that 
54.0% (2820 ha) were forest land, and 45.3% (2398 ha) were pastures. Arable crops only 
represented 0.6% of the area (see Figure 5).  
 
The arable crop production is dominated by a traditional mix of Zea mays and Phaseolus 
vulgaris (56.5% in area terms), which is used for subsistence purposes (see Table 13). Home 
gardens (10.9%) are a source of medicinal and food plants. Other important agricultural 
crops are Zea mays (9.1%), Musa spp. (8.6%) and Saccharum officinarum (8.5%). 
                                                          
4
 Some households have more one farm. In some cases, the land tenure regime differs. 
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Figure 4: Farm size per household 
 
Figure 5: Land use distribution  
 
Most forest is native forest (97.8%, 2757 ha). Furthermore, there are plantations of 
Eucalyptus globulus (0.2%) and Pinnus patula (0.2%).  
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Table 13: Land use distribution by category  
Land use Area (ha) Percent 
Arable crop      
Association Zea mays & Phaseolus vulgaris 17.33 56.5 
Home garden 3.35 10.9 
Zea mays 2.78 9.1 
Musa sp. 2.63 8.6 
Saccharum officinarum 2.60 8.5 
Prunus sp. 0.90 2.9 
Other crops 1.10 3.6 
Total area arable crop 30.69 100.0 
Forest      
Native Forest 2757.20 97.8 
Natural regeneration 53.82 1.9 
Forest plantation Eucalyptus globules 4.73 0.2 
Forest plantation Pinnus patula 4.70 0.2 
Total Area Forest 2820.45 100.0 
Pasture      
Setaria sphacelata 1275.90 53.2 
Sporobulus indicus  481.36 20.1 
Pasture associated with trees  296.28 12.4 
Degraded pasture dominated by  Pteridium aquilinum 102.86 4.3 
Melinis minutiflora 95.29 4.0 
Holcus lanatus, Pennisetum clandestinum, Calamagrostis  sp., 
Tripsacum laxum, other pastures 
146.67 6.1 
Total Area Pasture 2398.36 100.0 
Other kinds of land use 7.54 100.0 
 
Most pasture is planted by the two grass species Setaria sphacelata “Mequerón” (53.2%) 
and Sporobulus indicus “Morocha” (20.1%). “Mequerón” is preferred by 49% and 
“Morocha” by 25% of farmers. “Mequerón” is preferred by farmers as it controls fern 
infestation of the pasture. “Morocha” is preferred because it is preferred by cattle.  
 
One important pasture category is “pasture associated with trees” (12.4%), i.e. a silvo-
pastoral system.  
 
b) Herd 
 
Regression equation 5.1 was chosen to predict life weight (see Table 14). Most of the 
variables (10 variables) are significant at α = 0.05, and the model explains (R2=0.57) 57% of 
life weight. The animal stocking rate in the study area is 0.37 AU per ha in average. This 
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value is below the average of 1.4 AU per ha reported for the cattle dual-purpose (milk and 
meat) production system in Tropical America (Pearson de Vaccaro, 1986). 
 
Table 14: Regression used to predict life weight  
Dependent variable  Unit  
Life weight animal    Kg 
Explanatory variables  
Interaction between 
Race, Age and Sex 
Race: Holstein, Criolla and Mixed 
Age: <1 year, between 2 and 3 years, >3 years 
Sex: Male and Female 
Dummy 
Factor Estimate Std. Error t value P>|t| 
Intercept 149.5952    5.653427     26.46    0.000      
Holstein1male -81.41183    23.07943     - 3.53    0.001     
Holstein1female -104.1452    27.98231     - 3.72    0.000     
Holstein2male 20.85483    27.98231      0.75    0.458     
Holstein2female 43.58817    23.07943      1.89    0.062     
Holstein3male 103.2448    20.18627      5.11    0.000      
Holstein3female 73.88817    23.07943      3.20    0.002      
Criolla1male -92.78516    39.16705     -2.37    0.020     
Criolla1female -104.1452    39.16705     -2.66    0.009     
Criolla2male -19.87231     15.7018     -1.27    0.209     
Criolla2female 3.812335    14.82307      0.26    0.798     
Criolla3male 44.10234    10.34727      4.26    0.000      
Criolla3female 32.1266    10.96904           2.93    0.004      
Mixed1male -47.32516    23.07943     -2.05    0.043      
Mixed1female Dropped* 
Mixed2male 5.704836     16.8021      0.34    0.735     
Mixed2female -1.870163     16.8021     -0.11    0.912     
Mixed3male 75.40261    10.74295      7.02    0.000       
Mixed3female Base Group 
SS Model = 230279.214     
(df: 16 ) 
SS Residual= 170237.643  
(df: 100) 
SS Total= 400516.857       
(df: 116) 
Number of observ.   =  117 
F(16,   100  )           =   8.45 
Prob > F                  =  0.0000 
R
2
        =  0.5750 
Adj R
2
 =  0.5069 
Root MSE         =  41.26 
*The variable term is dropped because there is not data. 
 
Table 15: Stocking rate 
  
Observation 
TLU*  AU**  TLU/ha  AU/ha  
130 130 130 130 
Mean           9.06            5.66                       0.60                0.37  
Median           5.54            3.46                       0.51                   0.32  
Standard deviation            9.19            5.74                       0.37                    0.23  
Minimum           0.60            0.37                         0.06                    0.04  
Maximum         50.26          31.41                       1.68                    1.05  
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Percentile 25           2.63            1.64                       0.33                    0.20  
50           5.54            3.46                       0.51                    0.32  
75         11.95            7.47                       0.81                    0.51  
*Tropical Livestock Unit (TLU): 1TLU = 250 kg life weight 
**Animal Unit (AU): 1AU = 400 kg life weight  
 
Additional to the stocking rate, herd structure (number of animals) per race, age and sex is 
calculated. The predominant race is “Criolla” 47% (Figure 6). The race “Holstein”, with the 
least percentage 17.5%, is predominant in the “Sabanilla”. 
 
The average production of milk our sample is about 3.7 liter per cow-day. The predominant 
age group is the category “more 3 years” with 36%. 61% of the cattle are female. 
 
 
Figure 6: Herd structure per race, age and sex 
 
4.1.5. Production 
a) Arable crop production 
 
Family labor input in arable crop production is higher (72.1 person-days/ha) than hired input 
labor (8.4 person-days/ha). The average cash input is 178 USD/ha (see Table 16).  
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Table 16: Labor and expenses per hectare of arable crop production 
Statistic Family Labor  
(person-
days/ha) 
Hired Labor 
(person-
days/ha) 
Total Labor 
(person-
days/ha) 
Cash 
input 
Expenses 
(USD/ha) 
Hired labor 
wage 
(USD/day) 
Number of 
observations 
52 52 52 52 43 
Average  72.10 8.41 80.52 177.96 8.46 
Deviation standard  55.57 13.63 63.04 190.36 0.96 
Percentile 25 38.46 .00 44.52 44.25 8 
50 64.03 3.71 71.38 111.20 8 
75 89.31 11.39 100.52 241.85 8 
 
b) Cattle production 
 
The family labor investment on cattle production in average is higher (2.3 person-days/ha) 
than hired labor (1.69 person-days/ha). The average cash input is 12.18 USD/ha (see Table 
17).  
Tale 17: Labor and expenses per hectare of cattle 
Statistic Labor 
Management 
Pasture  
(person-days 
/ha) 
Family 
Labor 
(person-
days /ha) 
Hired  
Labor  
(person-
days /ha) 
Total  
Labor  
(person-days 
/ha) 
Cash 
Input 
Expenses 
(USD/ha) 
Hired 
labor 
wage 
(USD/day) 
Number of 
observations 
130 130 130 130 130 29 
Mean 6.87 17.76 1.92 19.68 12.18 6.24 
Deviation Standar 8.37 19.11 6.10 20.93 18.13 1.97 
Percentile 25 2.04 5.84 .00 6.78 2.46 5 
50 3.98 10.19 .00 12.49 5.81 7 
75 8.99 21.57 .00 24.16 13.67 7 
 
c) Off-Farm Income 
 
In the sample, 88% of the households have off-farm income. Mean and median off-farm 
income per household are 227 and 122 USD/month respectively (Table 18). Average off-
farm income per member of the household is 55 USD/person/month. The average off-farm 
agricultural wage is 4.75 USD/day. 
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Table 18: Household Off-Farm income 
Statistic Off-farm income 
(USD/month) 
Agriculture Off-farm wage 
(USD/day) 
Number of observations 130 38 
Mean 227.4 4.75 
Standard deviation 288.8 1.24 
Percentile 25 30 4 
50 122 4.8 
75 340 4.8 
 
The most frequent source of off-farm income is the national social security payment (“Bono 
Desarrollo Humano”) with 35% (see Figure 7). Substantial off-farm income comes from off 
farm work (17%), and from operating small merchant businesses (11%). 
 
 
Figure 7: Source of household Off-Farm income  
 
4.1.6. Technology adoption 
 
This section is about three topics related to technology adoption. The first is related to 
introduction of tree species. Second, farmers were asked about the introduction of improved 
pasture on their farms. Third, respondents were asked about potential technology adoption of 
Caesalpinea spinosa (Tara/Guarango). 
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a) Introduction of tree species 
 
32% farmers (41 farmers) had introduced forest tree species in the last year. The most 
frequently adopted species were Pinus patula (26%), Alnus acuminata (16%), Eucalyptus 
globulus (15%) Cuppressus macrocarpa (13%). These species are for wood use (See Table 
19).  
 
Table 19: Introduction tree species 
Specie Famer sown trees Origen Use 
Frequency Percent 
Pinus patula 20 26.3 Exotic Wood species 
Alnus acuminate 12 15.8 Native  Wood species 
Eucalyptus globules 11 14.5 Exotic Wood species 
Cuppressus macrocarpa 10 13.2 Exotic Wood species 
Juglans neotropica 6 7.9 Native  Wood species 
Prunus persica 3 3.9 Exotic Fruit species 
Erythrina edulis 2 2.6 Native Fruit species 
Tabebuia chrysantha 2 2.6 Native Wood species 
Inga spp. 1 1.3 Native Fruit species 
Nectandra laurel 1 1.3 Native Wood species 
Ficus spp. 1 1.3 Native ------------ 
Persea Americana 1 1.3 Native Fruit species 
Grias peruviana 1 1.3 Native Fruit species 
Brugmansia candida 1 1.3 Exotic --------------- 
Malus domestica 1 1.3 Exotic Fruit species 
Prunus serotina 1 1.3 Exotic Fruit species 
Citrus sinensis 1 1.3 Exotic Fruit species 
Syzygium jambos 1 1.3 Exotic Fruit species 
Observations  76 100.0     
 
Trees were most often planted as life fences 67% (Table 20). Life fences delimit properties, 
need little repair, and do not reduce pasture size. On average, farmers introduced 128 trees. 
83% of farmers who planted trees did so their by own initiative, and only 17% by a 
technician‟s advice. 61% of the farmers expect to obtain wood, 10% to improve cattle 
husbandry, and 10% to obtain fuel wood. 88% of respondents are satisfied with their trees. 
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Table 20: Place where the trees were planted 
Forest specie Sowing place 
in the pastures 
(spread trees) 
Life 
fences 
In the 
mountain 
Near 
to the 
river 
Homogeneous 
Forest 
plantation 
Replace 
trees 
died 
Total  
Pinus patula 2 15 3 0 0 0 20 
Alnus acuminate 2 10 0 0 0 0 12 
Eucalyptus globules 0 9 1 0 1 0 11 
Cuppressus macrocarpa 2 7 1 0 0 0 10 
Juglans neotropica 2 2 0 1 0 1 6 
Prunus persica 1 0 0 0 2 0 3 
Erythrina edulis 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 
Tabebuia chrysantha 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 
Inga spp. 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Nectandra laurel 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Ficus spp. 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Brugmansia candida 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Malus domestica 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Persea Americana 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Prunus serotina 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Citrus sinensis 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Grias peruviana 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Syzygium jambos 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Observation 14 51 5 1 4 1 76 
 
Farmers would like to plant 144 trees per farmer in the near future on average. The species 
preferred to plant are: Pinus patula 31%, Alnus acuminata 19%, Eucalyptus globulus 11%, 
Prunus persica 7.1%, Cuppressus macrocarpa 7.1%, Juglans neotropica 5.7%, Persea 
americana 4.3%. 
 
b) Improved pasture 
 
Setaria sphacelata “Mequerón” (49%) and Sporobulus indicus “Morocha” (25%) were 
reported as most important species of pastures grasses planted. The other two important 
species mentioned were Pennisetum clandestinum (12%), Melinus minutiflora (6%). 98% of 
the farmers are satisfied with their pasture grasses planted. Farmers are satisfied for two 
main reasons: browsing preference by cattle 55% and fern control 36% (Table 21). 
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Table 21: Reasons of satisfaction with the pasture adopted 
Pasture species Reasons for satisfaction Total 
No 
opinion 
Fern 
control 
Preference 
by cattle 
Fast 
growth 
Fodder 
to small 
domestic 
animals 
Setaria sphacelata  0 76 27 10 0 113 
Sporobulus indicus 1 5 49 3 0 58 
Pennisetum clandestinum  1 1 22 5 0 29 
Melinus minutiflora  0 0 14 1 0 15 
Holcus lanatus  0 1 9 0 0 10 
Chloris gayana  1 0 2 0 0 3 
Paspalum candidum  0 0 2 0 0 2 
Urochloa brizantha  0 0 1 0 0 1 
Tripsacum laxum  0 0 0 0 1 1 
Introduced Pasture: 
Tanzania 
0 0 1 0 0 1 
Total  3 83 127 19 1 233 
 
c) Potential technology adoption 
 
24% of the farmers liked the idea to plant Tara, 76% did not like it. The first reason given by 
farmers to reject Tara was that the land was destined for pastures. Cattle was considered 
more profitable (28%). 15% of farmers mentioned that they did have not enough money to 
establish the plantation, 13% mentioned that not enough labor was available, 11% 
considered it insecure to plant this tree. 
 
If farmers liked the idea of planting Tara, the contract type “The institution gives you the 
plants and buys your production at a fixed price” has most approval (43%). The next best 
contract is “You buy the plants and you sell the production on the market” (32%). “The 
institution gives you the plants and you sell the production on the market” is preferred by 
14%. “Farmer buys the plant and sell the production to one institution or merchant” is 
preferred by 11%. 
 
4.1.7. Technical assistance 
 
Only 22% of the farmers received technical assistance. Of these, most received assistance 
from their farmer organization, and less than one third from a governmental organization. In 
93% of the cases, assistance was initiated by the farmer organization or governmental 
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institution. The assistance was without cost for farmers. 54% of the farmers who received 
assistance have been started to work with some farmer organization or governmental 
institution since 3 years and 18% since 2 years ago. In 93% of the cases, assistance was 
given to head of the household.  
 
Technical assistance was related to cattle production (36%), reforestation (18%), raising 
small domestic animals (18%), farm administration (14%), vegetable production (11%), and 
rights of the Saraguros (4%). Of the farmers receiving assistance, 23% of the farmers did not 
introduce any change, 13% introduced conservation practices, 13% changed management 
farm, 11% introduced sanitary management of cattle, 9% fight against parasites, 7% planting 
techniques and 5% new crops.  
 
Furthermore, 93% of respondents were satisfied with the technical assistance. However, 
23% of farmers said they did not obtain expected results, 18% improved the prices of their 
products, 13% reduced production cost, 13% achieved higher yield security, and 11% 
improved of soil fertility. Near all farmers would like to receive future technical assistance. 
The main topics they were interested in were cattle reproduction management 33%, pasture 
management 23% and new crops 12%. 
 
4.2. Causal analysis  
4.2.1. Arable crop production function 
 
The descriptive statistics of dependent and explanatory variables of arable crop production is 
presented in Table 22. Full explanatory variables tested are show in Annex 1. Data from 52 
households were used to predict gross income with one extreme data point eliminated for the 
calculation of gross margins and net profits.  
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Table 22: Descriptive statistics of dependent and explanatory variables of arable crop 
production (n=52). 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Gross income (USD/ha/yr) 521.14 478.62 51.70 2465.01 
Arable crop area (ha) 0.51 0.64 0.03 4.00 
Total labor input (man-days/yr) 28.60 27.85 2.50 116.00 
Input expenses (USD/yr) 59.32 59.30 1.37 270.51 
  
The explanatory variables of gross income - arable crop area, labour and input expenses - are 
significant at α = 0.05 (see Table 23). Land has a negative effect on gross income per 
hectarea. This means that small areas of arable crop are used more intensively. Labour and 
input expenses have a positive impact.  
 
The coefficient of determination (R
2
) between original and predicted gross income is 0.6 
(see Figure 8). The Variation Inflation Factors VIF is 3.21, i.e. is below the VIF value 10. 
Heteroskedasticity was not detected with the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for linear 
heteroskedasticity does not reject the null hypothesis (Ho: Constant variance) with prob > 
chi
2
 = 0.8632.  
 
Table 23: Arable crop production function 
Dependent variable Variable label 
lnGrossIncome Natural logarithm of gross income (USD/ha/year) 
Explanatory variable  
lnLand Natural logarithm arable crop area (hectare) 
lnLabor Natural logarithm labor (person_day) 
lnInputExpenses Natural logarithm of input cost + depreciation of rudimentary 
tools + hired labor (USD/year) 
Factor Estimate Std. Error t value P>|t| 
Intercept 1.635742    0.601552      2.72    0.009      
lnLand -0.6637674    0.1374833     - 4.83    0.000     
lnLabor 0.3771867    0.1548355      2.44    0.019      
lnInputExpenses 0.6711692    0.0733388      9.15    0.000       
SS Model: 32.9713942       (df: 3 ) 
SS Residual: 13.7421615     (df: 48) 
SS Total: 46.7135557          (df: 51 ) 
Number of observ. =  52 
F(  3,    48)          =   38.39 
Prob > F             =  0.0000 
R
2
            = 0.7058 
Adj R
2
     = 0.6874 
Root MSE = 0.53507 
Multicollinearity Test 
Mean Variation Inflation Factors VIF independent variables: 3.21 
Rule: VIF greater 10 are generally seem as indicate of severe multicollinearity 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for linear heteroskedasticity  
Ho: Constant variance 
chi
2
(1)         =     0.03 
Prob > chi
2
  =   0.8632               Result: No reject  Ho: Constant variance 
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Figure 8: Gross Income Original vs. Predicted 
 
Average gross income is 448 USD/ha/yr, average gross margin 280 USD/ha/year, and 
average net profit is -43 USD/ha/year (see Table 24). 
 
Table 24: Gross income, gross margin and net profit of arable crop 
Statistic USD/ha/year 
Gross Income  Gross Margin  Net Profit 
Observation 52 51 51 
Average 448.33 280.10 -43.16 
Standard deviation 296.08 222.13 221.64 
Minimum 46.82 -104.79 -550.90 
Maximum 1272.25 991.08 510.20 
Percentile 25 229.79 134.91 -165.87 
50 388.55 232.83 -55.50 
75 622.54 370.43 96.78 
 
4.2.2. Cattle production function  
 
The descriptive statistics of dependent and explanatory variables of cattle production are 
presented in Table 25. A list of explanatory variables tested is presented in Annex 2. With 
the Variation Inflation Factor VIF = 1.36. VIF values auf 10 and above are generally seem 
as an indication of severe multicollinearity. There is evidence of heteroskedasticity: The test 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for linear heteroskedasticity rejects the null hypothesis 
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(Ho: Constant variance) with prob > chi
2
 = 0.0001. As a consequence, we use robust 
standard errors to assess the significance of regression coefficients. 
 
Table 25: Descriptive statistics of dependent and explanatory variables of cattle 
production (n=30) 
Variable  Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Gross Income (USD/ha/yr) 289.21 197.11 0.10 1149.24 
Total Labor (person-days/year) 159.46 96.84 19.40 647.50 
Pasture Area (ha) 18.34 17.06 0.81 82.81 
Mean Altitude of Pasture (m a.s.l.) 1996 263 1261 2668 
Input Expenses (USD/yr) 341.95 607.94 2.50 4178.10 
Ethnicity (1="mestizo", 0="saraguro") 0.85 0.36 0 1 
Technical Asisstence (Dummy) 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Access to Credit (Dummy) 0.39 0.49 0 1 
 
The regression of a linearized Cobb Douglas cattle production function shows a casual 
relationship between gross income and the explanatory variables pasture area, labor, input 
expenses, and minimum altitude at P <= 0.05, and for technical assistance with P = 0.086 
(see Table 26). The coefficient of determination between original gross income and 
predicted gross margin is R
2
: 0.49 (see Figure 9).  
 
Land has a negative coefficient on arable crop income per hectare. I.e. with each additional 
hectare of pasture, gross income per ha is reduced. The investment of labor in cattle 
production system has a positive impact on gross income/ha. For each additional person-day 
there is an increment in gross income/ha.  
 
The variable altitude has a negative impact on gross income. It means that farmers located at 
the lower altitudes are more productive in comparison to farmers located at higher altitudes. 
The simultaneously tested locality variable was less significant. It was decided not included 
both variables simultaneous to avoid multicollinearity. 
 
The variable ethnicity shows a positive impact on gross income. With the mestizo farms 
(dummy coding: 1) displaying a higher gross income. Also, technical assistance has a 
positive impact as well as formal credit. 
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Table 26: Cattle production function 
Dependent variable (y) Variable label Unit 
 Logarithm GrossIncome  Natural logarithm of gross income  USD/ha/year 
Explanatory variable (x)   
Logarithm  Land Natural logarithm pasture area Hectare 
Logarithm  Labor Natural logarithm family labor  Person_day 
Logarithm InputExpenses Natural logarithm of (input cost + depreciation of 
rudimentary tools + hired labor)  
USD 
Minimum altitude Minimum altitude of the pasture area m a.s.l 
Ethnicity  Ethnicity of the household. Mestizo=1, 
Saraguro=0 
Dummy 
Technical assistance Receive technical assistance. Yes = 1, NO = 0 Dummy 
Credit Access to formal credit. Yes = 1, NO = 0 Dummy 
Factor Estimate Std. Error t value P>|t| 
Intercept 2.88193    0.7783147      3.70    0.000      
lnLand -0.6727434     0.090531     -7.43    0.000     
lnLabor 0.9027063   0.1307558      6.90    0.000      
lnInput Expenses 0.2179001    0.0522234      4.17    0.000      
Minimum altitude  -0.001009    0.0002962     -3.41    0.001     
Ethnicity 0.4525599    0.1954111      2.32    0.022      
Technical assistance  0.3395173 0.1736333      1.96    0.053     
Credit 0.2451793    0.1418492      1.73    0.086     
SS Model:    58.3223284      (df: 7) 
SS Residual: 71.384202       (df: 122) 
SS Total:     129.70653        (df: 129) 
Numb. of observ.= 130 
F(7,   122  )       =14.24 
Prob > F         = 0.0000 
R
2
           = 0.4496 
Adj R
2
    =  0.4181 
Root MSE =  0.76493 
Multicollinearity Test 
Mean Variation Inflation Factors VIF independent variables: 1.36 
Rule: VIF greater 10 are generally seem as indicate of severe multicollinearity 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for linear heteroskedasticity  
Ho: Constant variance            chi
2
(1)= 125.95 
Prob > chi
2
  =      0.0001     Result: reject  Ho: Constant variance 
Dealing Heteroskedasticity 
Factor Robust Estimate Robust Std. Error t value P>|t| 
Intercept 2.88193    1.04179 2.77 0.007 
lnLand -0.6727434     0.0587007 -11.46 0.000 
lnLabor 0.9027063   0.276375 3.27 0.001 
lnInput Expenses 0.2179001    0.0363353 6.00 0.000 
Minimum altitude  -0.001009    0.0003826 -2.64 0.009 
Ethnicity 0.4525599    0.3119859 1.45 0.149 
Technical 
assistance  
0.3395173 0.1958981 1.73 0.086 
Credit 0.2451793    .1602379 1.53 0.129 
Number of obs =   130    
F(7, 122)  = 24.16   Prob > F=0.000 
R
2
                    =  0.4496 
Root MSE       =  0.76493 
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Figure 9: Emprical vs. gross income from cattle production incl. diary predicted by a 
Cobb Douglas production function (n=130). 
 
The predicted gross income of each single household was used to calculate the gross 
margins and net profits (Table 27). The average gross income is 268 USD/ha/year, gross 
margin 244 USD/ha/year, and net profit 159 USD/ha/year. Our results show that pasture-
based cattle production is more profitable than arable agriculture.  
 
Table 27: Gross income, gross margin and net profit of cattle production 
Statistic USD/ha/year 
Gross Income Gross Margin Net Profit 
Observation 130 130 130 
Average 268.06     244.54 158.96 
Standard deviation 188.28    161.71 119.70 
Minimum 26.97    24.19 -79.08 
Maximum 1205.39 865.44 579.32 
Percentile 25 143.10        129.99 70.55 
50 210.70                       193.81 123.70 
75 361.69 336.80 227.99 
 
4.3. Total Income 
 
In this section, we analyse the contribution of arable crop, cattle and off-farm income to the 
total income of the households. On average, 333 USD/yr is derived from arable crop 
production, 4687 USD/yr from cattle production, and 1608 USD/yr from off-farm income. 
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Cattle production accounts of 70.4%, off-farm for 25.7%, and arable agricultural for 3.9% of 
total household income (See Table 28). Moreover, cattle production accounts for the largest 
share of total household income for all quintiles of the income distribution (see Figure 10). 
 
Table 28: Contribution of the arable-crop, cattle, off-farm to the total income income 
per farm and year (n=130) 
Statistic Total Arable crop 
Income 
Cattle Income Off-farm Income 
USD/Year USD/Year Percent USD/Year Percent USD/Year Percent 
Average 6429.95 333.70 3.92 4687.86 70.38 1608.61 25.70 
Standard 
deviation 
6788.09 566.62 11.42 5527.08 27.55 3114.39 26.07 
Minimum 378.18 9.09 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 44716.59 2319.33 73.56 29578.62 100 19800 95.19 
Percentile 25 2181.17 28.64 0 1211.40 50.59 360 5.01 
50 4288.15 81.82 0 2686.29 79.16 360 16.57 
75 7421.10 310.52 1.86 6157.17 94.54 1500 40.25 
 
 
Figure 10: Contribution of the arable crop production, cattle and dairy production and 
off-farm income to the total household income of the sampled farms (n=130) 
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5. Discussion 
 
Data on profitability of agricultural production are given by Wunder (2000) for the wider 
region in Ecuador, and by Knoke et al. (2009) for the local research area. Neither study 
gives data on the heterogeneity of farm profitability, however. In this study, we fill this  
information gap.  
 
The snowball sampling approach was better than a random sampling approach in the 
research area. Peasant households tended to exaggerate or understate farm and production 
characteristics as strategy of personal protection potentially inducing strategic bias. The 
snowball approach reduces strategic bias likely to be present when sensitivity information or 
financial information was to be disclosed as a more trustful relation with respondents could 
be achieved from the beginning. Still, the non-random sampling requires that the descriptive 
statistics presented need to be treated with caution. Likewise, the representation of cattle 
income as a function of growth increments and sales of cattle, will need refinements that 
potentially affect the conclusions presented. 
 
Arable crop production represents 3.9% only of the total household income, and it is less 
profitable on average than cattle production (160 USD/ha/yr). Arable crops are restricted to 
small plots near to houses mainly for auto-consumption. In other side, pasture-based cattle 
and dairy production accounts for 70.4% of total household income. Our results show that 
cattle production is a financially profitable land use. The also show that there is considerable 
heterogeneity in cattle-derived net profits.  
 
Family labour has a strong influence on profitability. Compared to gross margins (280 
USD/ha/yr), net profits of arable crop agriculture are reduced drastically when it family 
labour is accounted for (-43 USD/ha/yr). The gross margin in cattle switches from 245 
USD/ha/yr to 160 USD/ha/yr. As consequence of accounting for family labour, some net 
profits for individual farms in cattle production are negative. The incorporation of family 
labour as a fixed cost component using observed market prices of agricultural labour may 
not be a fully realistic assumption, though. If the local labour market is not perfect,  “excess 
labour” at the farming household level is likely incorporated into the own agricultural 
activities. 
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The average cattle ranching net profit is 160 USD/ha/yr. This value is lower than the net 
profit 244 USD/ha/yr (adjusted for inflation
5
) reported by Wunder
6
 (2000) for the 
Ecuadorian Andes. Our value is higher than the net profit reported by Knoke
7
 et al. (2009) 
for research area of about ~100 USD/ha/yr.  
 
The cattle production analysis suggests that several factors that influence production outputs 
per hectare. The Cobb-Douglas production function analysis found that lower altitude of the 
farm, “Mestizo” ethnic of the household head, as well as access to technical assistance and 
to credit results in has higher gross incomes. One reason for the observed differences may be 
found in the better market access of the Mestizos farms, which are often better connected to 
the local markets in Loja and Zamora cities. On the contrary, the ethnic “Saraguro” farms 
are virtually all located far from local markets. Also, the land conditions (i.e. less steep 
slopes as case of “Sabanilla” region) may be better for “Saraguro” farmers. 
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Annex 
 
Annex 1: Descriptive statistics of dependent and explanatory variables of arable crop 
production. 
Variable  Observ. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Gross Income (USD/ha/yr) 52 521.14 478.62 51.70 2465.01 
Gross Margin (USD/ha/yr) 52 284.66 222.39 -104.79 991.08 
Net Profit (USD/ha/yr) 52 -71.45 299.60 -1513.92 510.20 
Total Arable crop area (ha) 52 0.51 0.64 0.03 4.00 
Total Labor (man-days/yr) 52 28.60 27.85 2.50 116.00 
Input Expenses (USD/yr) 52 59.32 59.30 1.37 270.51 
Total Area (ha) 52 29.25 32.20 1.52 139.34 
Ratio arable crop area/Total Area 52 0.04 0.06 0.001 0.32 
Ethnicity (1="mestizo", 0="saraguro") 52 0.81 0.40 0 1 
Age of Head-household between (year) 52 53.90 12.09 26 88 
Scholarity Head-household (year) 52 4.2 3.37 0 15 
Off-Farm Household Income between 1124 - 
6000 (USD/Year) 
52 0.40 0.50 0 1 
Off-Farm Household Income> 6000 
(USD/Year) 
52 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Technical Asisstence (Dummy) 52 0.23 0.43 0 1 
Household is part of Organization (Dummy) 52 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Access to Credit (Dummy) 52 0.29 0.46 0 1 
Logarithm of Gross Income 52 5.84 0.96 3.95 7.81 
Logarithm of Arable Crop Area 52 -1.20 1.07 -3.61 1.39 
Logarithm of Total Labor 52 2.91 0.98 0.92 4.75 
Logarithm of Input Expenses 52 3.45 1.34 0.31 5.60 
 
Annex 2: Descriptive statistics of dependent and explanatory variables of cattle 
production 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Gross Income (USD/ha/yr) 130 289.21 197.11 0.10 1149.24 
Total Pasture Area (ha) 130 18.34 17.06 0.81 82.81 
Total Labor (person-days/yr) 130 159.46 96.84 19.40 647.50 
Input Expenses (USD/yr) 130 341.95 607.94 2.50 4178.10 
Locality (1 =PACO, 0 = Sabanilla) 130 0.73 0.45 0 1 
Total Pasture Area minus Degraded Pasture (ha) 130 17.52 16.79 0.57 82.81 
Mequeron Pasture (Dummy) 130 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Mequeron Pasture + Morocha Pasture (Dummy) 130 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Agroforestry Pasture  (Dummy) 130 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Other kind of Pastures (Dummy) 130 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Morocha Pasture (%) 130 30.41 37.32 0.00 100.00 
Mequerón Pasture (%) 130 44.58 37.91 0.00 100.00 
Agroforestry Pasture (%) 130 9.88 22.80 0.00 100.00 
Degraded Pasture (%) 130 5.24 11.81 0.00 86.50 
Melinis Pasture (%) 130 3.12 10.49 0.00 74.70 
Penisetum Pasture (%) 130 2.61 11.82 0.00 100.00 
Other kind of Pastures (%) 130 4.17 13.56 -0.40 76.10 
*Mean Altitude of Pasture (m a.s.l.) 130 1996 263 1261 2668 
*Minimun Altitute of Pasture (m a.s.l.) 130 1800 252 1080 2360 
*Maximun Altitute of Pasture (m a.s.l.) 130 2190 301 1469 2880 
Ethnicity (1="mestizo", 0="saraguro") 130 0.85 0.36 0 1 
Age of Head-household between (year) 52 53.90 12.09 26 88 
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Scholarity Head-household (year) 52 4.2 3.37 0 15 
Off-Farm Household Income between 1124 - 
6000 (USD/Year) 
130 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Off-Farm Household Income> 6000 (USD/Year) 130 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Technical Asisstence (Dummy) 130 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Household is part of Organization (Dummy) 130 0.42 0.49 0 1 
Access to Credit (Dummy) 130 0.39 0.49 0 1 
**Minimum Cost Distance 130 1013.43 2046.57 0.00 9550.48 
**Maximun Cost Distance 130 21520.09 22205.88 1531.87 102541.80 
**Mean Cost Distance 130 9418.75 7917.67 681.63 37732.58 
Improved Pasture (Years) 130 3.62 9.19 0 58 
Logarithm of Gross Income 130 5.37 1.00 -2.30 7.05 
Logarithm of Pasture Area 130 2.46 1.01 -0.21 4.42 
Logarithm of Total Labor 130 4.89 0.63 2.97 6.47 
Logarithm of Input Expenses 130 4.57 1.67 0.92 8.34 
*Source: IGM 2003 
**Source: Eichhorn 2009 
 
Annex 3: Translog production function of arable crop production 
Source SS df MS Number of obs =  52 
F(  9,    42)       = 18.52 
Prob > F           = 0.0000 
R
2
                     = 0.7987 
Adj R
2
              = 0.7556 
Root MSE        = .47313 
Model 37.3118105 9 4.14575672 
Residual 9.40174522 42 0.223851077 
Total 46.7135557 51 0.915952072 
    
lnYinc Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|  
Log (Land) -1.33571 1.214044 -1.1 0.278   
Log (Land* Land) -0.0625 0.136084 -0.46 0.648   
Log (Labor) 0.131573 1.473253 0.09 0.929   
Log (Labor* Labor) 0.005872 0.210002 0.03 0.978   
Log (Input Expenses) 0.087459 0.677766 0.13 0.898   
Log (Input Expenses*Input Expenses) 0.059765 0.082034 0.73 0.47   
Log (Land *Labor) 0.158951 0.278546 0.57 0.571   
Log (Land *Input Expenses) 0.004008 0.163055 0.02 0.981   
Log (Labor *Input Expenses) 0.097465 0.150047 0.65 0.52   
Cons 2.218222 2.895879 0.77 0.448   
MULTICOLLINEARITY TRANSLOG 
Mean VIF:   215.10  
Rule: VIF greater 10 are generally seem as indicate of severe multicollinearity 
 
Annex 4: Translog production function of cattle production 
Source SS Df MS Number of obs =     130 
F( 13,   116) =   12.06 
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
R
2
                =  0.5748 
Adj R
2
         =  0.5272 
Root MSE   =  .68952 
Model 74.5555651     13 5.73504347            
Residual 55.1509653    116 0.475439356            
Total 129.70653       129 1.00547698            
    
lnYinc Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|  
Log (Land) -2.1157 0.8093 -2.61 0.010   
Log (Land * Land) -0.0521 0.0857 -0.61 0.545   
Log (Labor) 6.6835 1.3064 5.12 0.000   
Log (Labor * Labor) -0.6377 0.1583 -4.03 0.000   
Log (InputExp) 1.6015 0.4795 3.34 0.001   
Log (InputExp * InputExp) -0.0633 0.0311 -2.03 0.044   
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Log (Land *Labor) 0.3773 0.1927 1.96 0.053   
Log (Land*InputExp) -0.0264 0.0721 -0.37 0.715   
Log (Labor*InputExp) -0.1438 0.1149 -1.25 0.213   
Altitudmin -0.0011 0.0003 -3.61 0.000   
Ethnicity 0.5510 0.1823 3.02 0.003   
Technic 0.2993 0.1576 1.90 0.060   
Credit 0.1997 0.1299 1.54 0.127   
_cons -11.8086 3.0966 -3.81 0.000   
MULTICOLLINEARITY TRANSLOG 
Mean VIF: 129.32 
Rule: VIF greater 10 are generally seem as indicative of severe multicollinearity 
 
Annex 4. Annual inflation of Ecuador 
Year 
Annual inflation of 
Ecuador in %* 
Index =100 Net Profit adjusted to 
inflation (USD/ha/yr) 
2000 96.1 196.1 125** 
2001 22.4 240.0 153 
2002 9.7 263.3 168 
2003 9.35 287.9 184 
2004 1.95 293.5 187 
2005 4.36 306.3 195 
2006 3.11 315.9 201 
2007 3.32 326.4 208 
2008 8.83 355.2 226 
2009 4.31 370.5 236 
´09.2010 3.44 383.2 244 
*Source: Banco Central del Ecuador 
**Wunder (2000) reports 125 USD/ha/year for cattle ranching in the fourth year of the 
deforestation cycle, at 5% discount rate 
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Abstract 
 
The UNESCO Biosphere Reserve “Podocarpus-El Cóndor” is part of the Andes biodiversity 
“hot spot” suffering from deforestation caused mainly by agricultural production. This paper 
analyzes the profitability of local arable crops and cattle production systems. The 
profitability analysis is interesting not only for agricultural development reasons but also 
because it provides proxies for the opportunity cost of local farmers faced with conservation 
demands. We use a Cobb-Douglas production function to determine factors that influence 
farming profitability. The econometric model is based on socio-economic data of 130 
peasant households. Arable crops are found in small plots only, designated mainly to 
subsistence production. A pasture-based cattle production system dominates production. We 
used an empirically estimated cattle growth equation to predict life weight increments with 
the explanatory variables race, age and sex of the animals. Cattle production yields an 
average net income of 160 USD/ha/yr. Determinants of gross income are land (p<0.001), 
labor (p<0.002), input expenses (p<0.001), altitude (p=0.013), ethnicity (p=0.155), and 
access to technical assistance (p=0.088) and to credit (p=0.131). 
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1. Introduction 
 
Ecuador is a megadiverse country (Brehm et al. 2008) including the Ecuadorian Andes, one 
of the global biodiversity hotspots (Meyers et al. 2000; Brummitt & Lughadha 2003, Brehm 
2005). One important protected area is “Podocarpus National Park” (PNP) located in the 
south Ecuadorian Andes (Barthlott et al. 1996). At the same time, the PNP is part of the 
UNESCO Biosphere Reserve “Podocarpus-El Cóndor”.  
 
The main threat to the biodiversity in the Andes hot spot is deforestation. South America has 
the largest forest area loss per year (4.3 million ha/yr in the period 2000-2005) as compared 
to deforestation in other world regions. According to FAO (2006), Ecuador has the highest 
net deforestation rate 1.7% (198 000 ha/yr) annually in South America. Land use change 
from natural ecosystems to pastures increased from 2.2 million hectares in 1978 in to 6 
million hectares in 1989 (Wunder 2000). The annual deforestation rate in the buffer zone of 
PNP is calculated as 1.16% (Torracchi et al. quoted by Knoke 2009). Land use change is 
mainly to pasture land.  
 
Several factors influence deforestation in the Ecuadorian Andes. Wunder (2000) points out 
that deforestation in the Ecuadorian Andes is the outcome of increasing demand for meat 
and dairy products. Moreover, deforestation is encouraged by a combination of population 
growth, improved infrastructure, and urban income. Also, farmers look for short term returns 
of their agriculture investments. In the research area, cattle production has been the main 
cause of deforestation (Wunder 1996) with the natural ecosystem being changed by slash 
and burn processes (Beck et al. 2008a, Beck et al. 2008b). The current land use pattern is an 
extensive field-pasture-rotation system (Beck et al. 2008a). Adams (2009), comments that 
the causes of agricultural frontier expansion in the buffer zone of PNP is misguided land-
use, poor implantation and enforcement of conservation policies, a desire for cattle 
production, and the perception by farmers that forest land is abundant. Adams proposes 
agricultural intensification as a solution to the deforestation problem. 
 
Forest conservation and socio-economic impacts of conservation on concerned peasant 
households need to be balanced (Bawa & Seidler 1998, Chazdon 1998). Different 
approaches have been implemented to balance forest conservation and socio-economic 
demands including forest management (Mosandl et al. 2008), agroforestry systems (Miller 
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& Nair 2006), payments for ecosystem services (Wunder 2005, Wunder 2007, FAO 2007, 
Engel et al. 2009), or diversification of land use options (Knoke et al. 2009a).  
 
A central tool to analyze the economic burden of increased conservation land demands is 
opportunity cost analysis (Naidoo et al. 2006). Opportunity cost is the possible income that 
is lost by using the next-best choice of using a productive resource (Naidoo et al. 2006). In 
the context of forest conservation, the opportunity cost of conversion can be approximated 
by the balance between private gains of deforestation and a private gain from forest uses 
(Chomitz et al. 2005). Opportunity cost analysis helps policy makers to evaluate 
environmental protection vs. investment projects (Azzoni & Isai 1994), and to allocate 
conservation budgets in a cost-effective manner (Chomitz et al. 2005, Naidoo et al. 2006, 
Bode et al. 2008, Carwardine et al. 2008, Bryan et al. 2009).  
 
There are different approaches to calculate the opportunity costs: 
 Net present value (NPV) is the present value of future cash flows originated by an 
investment (Naidoo & Adamowicz 2005, pp. 492). For example: 
o Wunder (2000) uses a NPV approach to calculate the benefits of timber 
extraction as well as arable crop production and cattle ranching as the 
opportunity cost of forest conservation of Ecuadorian Andes forests. 
o  Naidoo & Adamowicz (2005) use a NPV approach to estimate land values as 
opportunity costs of land uses in transitional landscapes in Paraguay. 
 A revealed preference approach revels decision making preferences estimated based on 
real land use (Bockstael and Freeman 2005, pp.538). For example: 
o Kelsey et al. (2008) used an auction approach to revealed preferences by creating 
markets for payments for soil erosion control in Indonesia. 
o Chomitz et al. (2005) use the hedonic land value approach to estimate the 
opportunity cost of biodiversity conservation on South Bahia, Brazil. Land price 
is a function of climate, soil properties, and market access. 
 Stated preference approaches reveal decision-making preferences estimates based on 
hypothetical choices (Bockstael and Freeman 2005, pp.539). One popular stated 
preference approach is contingent valuation (Carson & Hanemann 2005). 
 
Wunder (2000) and Knoke (2009) calculate the opportunity cost of forest conservation in 
Ecuador. Wunder (2000) uses the NPV approach to calculate net revenues (profitability) of 
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deforestation over a deforestation cycle of 15 years. He uses cost and revenue data of one-
hectare plots obtained by secondary information. The values are net of capital and labor cost 
(i.e. hired labor, household labor, purchased inputs, loan payments).  
 
During the deforestation cycle, the income for timber extraction, agriculture and cattle 
production decreases over time. For example, cattle production is valued as 125 USD/ha in 
the seventh year while profitability decreases to 24.24 USD/ha in the fifteenth year at 5% 
discount rate. Knoke et al. (2009) calculate NPV of cattle pasture in the buffer zone of PNP. 
The average NPV is 70 USD/ha/yr (with a range from 20 to 130 USD/ha/yr) with a discount 
rate of 5% at a 20 year period. The revenue data is derived from local farmer milk 
production. The cost data are not explained at any detail. 
 
Against this background of pressing conservation problems but scare data, the paper 
analyzes the profitability of local arable crops and cattle production systems. The 
profitability analysis is interesting not only for agricultural development reason, but also 
because it provides proxies for the opportunity cost of local farmers faced with conservation 
demands. 
 
2. Methodology 
2.1. Research area 
 
The research area is located in the south of Ecuador in the Biosphere Reserve “Podocarpus-
El Cóndor” located in the provinces of Loja and Zamora-Chinchipe (see Figure 1). The 
research area is part of the global biodiversity “hot spot” of the Andes Mountains (CIPRB 
2005, Brummitt & Lughadha 2003). The majority of rural households are poor smallholders 
practicing pasture-based cattle ranching (Beck 2008). The protected area “Corazón de Oro” 
(Area de Bosque y Vegetación Protectora Corazón de Oro; ABVPC) was established to the 
north of PNP. The protected area “Corazón de Oro” forms a part of the buffer zone of the 
national park which is the core area of the UNESCO Biosphere Reserve. The annual 
deforestation rate in the buffer zone of PNP is calculated 1.16% (Torracchi et al. quoted by 
Knoke 2009), and the land use change is mainly to pasture land. . 
 
The region is inhabited by people with heterogenic ethnic and socio-economic 
characteristics (Pohle 2009). The majority of rural households are poor smallholders 
 68 
practicing pasture-based cattle ranching (Pohle 2008). The two ethnic groups (“Mestizos” 
and indigenous group “Saraguros”) are engaged into agricultural activities. Cattle ranching 
is integrated into the market economy. Arable crop production near homesteads is mainly for 
subsistence purposes on small plots (Pohle & Gerique 2006, Pohle et. al 2009). Extensive 
cattle production is the main sources of the income. Peasants use fire as a tool to open new 
pastures and regenerate old pastures (Pohle and Gerique 2008). Moreover, an additional 
source of income are small shops, off-farm labor (Pohle and Gerique 2008), and extraction 
of timber (Pohle 2006). 
 
2.2. Sampling 
 
In the ABVPC and a narrow corridor between ABVPC and PNP, a socio-economic 
household and farming survey was conducted March to June 2008 (n=130). About 24% of 
all local households took part in the survey. The primary survey villages were selected 
randomly and proportional to household numbers. The number of households per village 
roughly reflects village size. The selection of households in the villages could not be 
conducted using a random selection. Because of the sensitive economic information to be 
disclosed during the interview, we relied on snowball sampling and information of key 
informants in order to approach as much a “representative” sample as possible. The land use 
on each farm was surveyed by personal interviews; the location of the plots was 
independently delimited on aerial photographs (IGM 2003), and ground-truthed using GPS 
measurements.  
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Figure 1: Research area in the Biosphere Reserve “Podocarpus-El Cóndor”, South 
Ecuador 
 
2.3. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 shows descriptive values roughly according to the different kinds of household 
capital. The analysis was made with SPSS version 17.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of variables 
Component Variables 
Personal capital Family members, age, ethnicity, education level 
Financial capital Access to credit, credit source and reason why farmers do not request 
formal credit 
Social capital Organization membership, organization meeting attendance, 
participation in organization decision-making, labor contribution to the 
organization, money contribution to the organization 
Operational 
capital  
 Land: tenure regime, farm origin, requested rental price for one 
hectare of land (cattle or agriculture), farm size per household, 
land use distribution (forest, pastures, and arable crop), and 
percent of grass and crops specie, farmer pasture preference 
2003 
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 Herd: structure and stock 
Income & Cost 
sources 
d) Arable crop: amount sold, amount consumed, labor (hired and 
family) expenses per hectare 
e) Cattle: dairy production (sold and consumed), animals (sold and 
consumed), life weight increment, labor (hired and family) and 
expenses per hectare 
f) Off-farm income 
Labor and expenses were sampled independently and used in estimation 
for both production systems 
 
2.4. Profitability of the arable crops and cattle production 
 
First, we calculate gross income/ha/yr
8
, gross margin/ha/yr and net profits/ha/yr for each 
farmer based directly on the empirical survey data. The gross income includes dairy 
production (consumed and sold), sold and consumed animals, and life weight increments. 
He selected strategy to represent the inventory changes to the herd as well as income and 
costs from the commercial and subsistence use of the cattle will require further refinement in 
future analyses. The used cattle income model assumes that the herd grows in spite of 
deaths, sales and auto-consumption. The variable cost includes hired labor and cash input 
cost.  
 
In order to extract summarized information on agricultural production at the single farming 
household level and to analyse influences in production, we fitted a Cobb-Douglas 
production function to the gross income, gross margin, and net profit data. A Cobb-Douglas 
function form was tested against a Translog formulation. Although F-tests indicated that the 
additional interaction terms of the independent variables in the Translog had an explanatory 
power, we chose the more simple Cobb-Douglas production function as it yielded more 
significant predictors, could be more easily interpreted, and avoided the multicollinearity 
problems in arable crop production (Annex 1) and cattle production (Annex 4) found for the 
Translog models. Gross income, gross margin and net profit were tested as dependent 
variables (see in results Tables 24 and 27). Gross income performed best, and the gross 
income Cobb-Douglas model was accordingly used for econometric analysis. 
 
After the decision for using a Cobb-Douglas functional form we made, gross income was 
predicted using the empirical gross income data and several explanatory variables. Second, 
                                                          
8 
Gross Income is the value of the production in monetary terms (Zeller & Schwarze 2006) 
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surveyed variable costs were subtracted from predicted gross income (= gross margin). 
Finally, net profits were obtained by subtracting surveyed fixed costs including household 
labor (Zeller & Schwarze 2006). The formulas are described below in detail for arable crop 
(Table 2) and cattle production (Table 3). 
 
Land, labor, input expenses, altitude (minimum, maximum and average) of pasture land, 
ethnicity, technical assistance, access to formal credit, age and education of the household 
head, membership in organizations, cost distance (minimum, mean and maximum) of farms 
to markets, and off-farm income were tested as explanatory variables. The analysis also 
included environmental conditions, i.e., altitude and locality. The topographic factor is 
represented by altitude. The locality is a representation of soil conditions and market access. 
Climate variables were not included. The regressions were run with STATA 9.0. Finally, 
multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity were evaluated.  
 
If we use a production function produced by OLS linear regression in optimization 
modelling, the standard regression constant poses a problem. With a regression constant, 
even zero input will result in a certain output. This is a clear violation of the weak 
essentiality assumption in economic production analysis. Thus, it is the ideal case when the 
regression constant is near close to zero and not significant. But, if the regression is not 
close to zero and significant, it may be necessary to use an regression model without a 
constant term. Alternatively, additional restrictions may need to be imposed to the 
formulation of the optimization problem to secure that impossible production results can 
avoided.  
 
Multicollinearity makes it difficult to ascertain the relative and absolute influence of affected 
variables on the dependent variable. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is used to test for  
multicollinearity (Stata command VIF). Heteroskedasticity can lead to biased standard errors 
(Wooldridge 2006). For detecting heteroskedasticity, the Breusch-Pragan/Cook-Weisberg 
test is used (command “hettest” in Stata version 9). If heteroskedasticity is detected, we use 
Robust Standard Errors that address the problem of biased standard errors (Kohler & 
Kreuter 2005, Wooldridge 2006). 
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a) Arable crop production 
 
Gross income/ha/yr includes consumed and sold arable crop production. We did not include 
the production from the small “home gardens”. Variable cost includes hired labor and cash 
input cost. Fixed costs include family labor and depreciation of (rudimentary) tools. Variable 
cost was subtracted from gross income to calculate gross margin. Next, fixed cost was 
subtracted from gross margin to calculate net profits of each household (See Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Formulas used to calculate net-profit in arable crop production per year 
(n=130) 
Variable Formula 
Empirical Gross 
Income 
                                                                    
i:number of household 
Market prices for consumed amount are the average prices of all households of sold 
production   
Gross Margin                                               
i:number of household 
Empirical 
Variable Cost 
                                                      
i:number of household 
Empirical Fixed 
Costs 
                                                                    
i:number of household 
The Off-farm agricultural wage is used as average wage in fixed cost 
Net Profit          -     
i:number of household 
 
b) Cattle production 
 
Gross income/ha/yr includes dairy production (consumed and sold), sold and consumed 
animals, and life weight increment (see Herd section Chapter I). The variable cost includes 
hired labor and cash input cost. The fixed costs include family labor and depreciation of 
(rudimentary) tools. Next, the variable cost was subtracted from gross income to calculate to 
gross margin and fixed cost was subtracted from gross margin to calculate the net-profit of 
each household. The formulas used are shown in Table 3. 
 
  
 73 
Table 3: Formulas used to calculate net-profit in cattle production per year (n=130) 
 
Variable Formula 
Empirical Gross 
Income  









































icePr_Market
*Increment_Weight_Life
icePr_Market*
Animals_Consumed
and_Sold_Amount
icePr_Market
*Dairy_Consumed
_and_Sold_Amount
GI
i
iii
 i:number of household 
Dairy includes sold and consumed dairy products 
Market prices for consumed amount are the average prices of all households of sold 
production  
Gross Margin                                                
i:number of household 
Empirical 
Variable Cost  
                                                      
i:number of household 
Empirical Fixed 
Costs  
                                                                    
i:number of household 
The average Off-farm agricultural wage is used as average wage in fixed cost 
Net Profit          -     
i:number of household 
 
Finally, we calculated the marginal effect of inputs on gross income. To calculate the 
marginal effect of each input, we used the average of the output and inputs in order to 
represent the average farm characteristics on arable crop and cattle production. Using the 
coefficients of the Cobb-Douglas production function and the average of the explanatory 
variables, we calculated the average gross income of the average farm. The marginal effect 
of land, labor and input expenses was calculated with the difference between the gross 
income of this mean farm, and the incorporation of one unit more of the input withj keeping 
all other inputs constant (“ceteris paribus”).  
 
3. Results 
3.1. Personal, financial and social capitals 
 
The sample consist of 85% “Mestizo” and 15% “Saraguro” (indigenous group) ethnic 
households. The average number of household members is the 4.1 (see Table 4), mean age is 
29.5 years, 30.2 years for male and 28.6 years for female household members. The self-
reported illiteracy rate in the region is 12.5%, and 7.7% for the household head. 36.5% of all 
individuals and 46.9% of household heads completed at least primary school. 3.7 % of all 
household members and 3.1% of the household heads completed secondary school. 
 
In the sample, 88% of the households have off-farm income. The mean and median off-farm 
income per household are 227 and 122 USD/month respectively. The average off-farm 
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income per member of the household is 55 USD/person/month. The average off-farm 
agricultural wage is 4.75 USD/day.  
 
The most frequent source of off-farm income is the national social security payment “Bono 
de Desarrollo humano” (35%). The payment is a conditional cash subsidy of $ 30 per month 
per each very poor family. The payment can be received by people who are over 65 years 
old, disabled, or poor single mother. It is conditional because the beneficiaries must have 
vaccination certificates and certificates of study in the case of single mothers. Substantial of 
off-farm income also comes from off-farm work (17%), and owned merchant businesses 
(11%).  
 
In reference to financial capital, 39% of the households had taken out formal credit. There is 
an informal credit market not covered because informal credit is illegal under Ecuadorian 
law. With respect to social capital, only 40% of the households take part in farmer 
organizations.  
 
Table 4: Statistics of personal, financial and social capitals 
Personal capital Average Standard 
Deviation 
Percent 
Number of household members  4.1 2.4  
Age of household members 29.5 21  
Off-farm income  227 288  
Off-farm income source:    
- “Bono Desarrollo Humano”   35 
- Agricultural temporary work.   17 
Ethnicity:    85 
- “Mestizo”   15 
- “Saraguro”    
Education level of the members of the household:    
- Without education    12.5 
- Completed primary school   36.5 
- Completed secondary school   3.7 
Financial Capital    
Access to credit:    
- less on year 1425 985  
- more on year 4102 1770  
Interet rate to access to credit:    
- less on year 4.8 3.3  
- more on year 7.3 3.4  
Reason why farmers do not request formal credit:    
- - High interest rate    25 
- - Expenses come agricultural   23 
- - Adverse to loss their properties   17 
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Social capital    
Organization membership   44 
Meeting attendance   40 
Labor contribution to the farmer organization (man-
days/yr) 
8.2   
Money contribution farmer organization (USD/yr) 10   
 
3.2. Operational capital 
Tenure and land use 
 
Of the 175 farms
9
 owned by 130 sampled households, 75% (132 farms) have a legal 
ownership title and 25% (43 farms) have not such title. Moreover, respondents reported that 
76% of the farms were bought, 17% obtained by heritage, 4% obtained by donation, and 
only 1.1% obtained by forest cleaning. Furthermore, the respondents were asked: What is 
the value to rent one hectare of your farm? The mean value stated was 67 USD/month. The 
higher values were reported from the Sabanilla region. Sabanilla village is at rather low 
altitude close to the main road Loja-Zamora, where the farms are designated mainly to 
commercial milk production. Farmers have 40.4 ha land on average, the median is 23.4 ha. 
The minimum area reported is 1.7 ha and the maximum 260.6 ha. 28% of households have 
less than 10 ha and only 12% more than 80 ha (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: Distribution of farm size per household 
                                                          
9 
Some households (n=130) have more one farm (175 farms). In some cases, the farms have different land 
tenure regimes. 
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In our sample, 54.0% (2820 ha) of the farm land surveyed is forest land, 45.3% (2398 ha) is 
pasture land. Arable crops only represent 0.6% of the area (Figure 3 and Table 5). Arable 
crop land use is dominated by an association of Zea mays and Phaseolus vulgaris (56.5%), 
which is used for subsistence purposes (see Table 5). The forest land is dominated by native 
forest 97.8% (2757 ha). There are a few plantations of exotics such as Eucalyptus globulus 
(0.2%) or Pinnus patula (0.2%). The pasture land is planted mainly to the grass species 
Setaria sphacelata “Mequerón” (53.2%) or Sporobulus indicus “Morocha” (20.1%). More 
than 12% of the pastures are stocked with at least some trees so that they could be called an 
agroforestry system (Bhagwat et al. 2008).  
 
 
Figure 3: Land use distribution  
 
Herd 
 
The animal stocking in the research area is 0.37 Animal Units/ha (0.6 TLU/ha). This value is 
below the average of 1.4 AU/ha reported for dual-purpose cattle (milk and meat) production 
systems in Tropical America (Pearson de Vaccaro, 1986). In the herd structure (Figure 4), 
the predominant race is “Criolla” with 47%. The race “Holstein” (17.5%), is predominant in 
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Table 5: Land use distribution by category  
Land use Area (ha) Percent 
Arable crop     
Association Zea mays & Phaseolus vulgaris 17.33 56.5 
Home garden 3.35 10.9 
Zea mays 2.78 9.1 
Musa sp. 2.63 8.6 
Saccharum officinarum 2.60 8.5 
Prunus sp. 0.90 2.9 
Other crops 1.10 3.6 
Total Area Arable crop 30.69 100.0 
Forest      
Native Forest 2757.20 97.8 
Natural regeneration 53.82 1.9 
Forest plantation Eucalyptus globules 4.73 0.2 
Forest plantation Pinus patula 4.70 0.2 
Total Area Forest 2820.45 100.0 
Pasture      
Setaria sphacelata 1275.90 53.2 
Sporobulus indicus  481.36 20.1 
Pasture associate with trees  296.28 12.4 
Degraded pasture dominated by  Pteridium aquilinum (bracken fern) 102.86 4.3 
Melinis minutiflora 95.29 4.0 
Holcus lanatus, Pennisetum clandestinum, Calamagrostis  sp., 
Tripsacum laxum, other pastures 
146.67 6.1 
Total Area Pasture 2398.36 100.0 
Other  kind of land use (construction, road, camp) 7.54 100.0 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Herd structure per race, age and sex 
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3.4. Arable crop production function 
 
The best production function obtained is has a Cobb-Douglas functional form with gross 
income as dependent variable (R
2
: 0.94). With gross margin as the dependent variable, a R
2
 
of only 0.75 is achieved (for Translog results, see Annex 1). There are many negatives net-
profit values. For these, it was not possible to estimate the production function as the 
logarithm could not be taken. The descriptive statistics of dependent and explanatory 
variables used to calculate the production function are shown in Table 6. The explanatory 
variables total arable of crop area and input expenses are significant p<0.05, total labour of 
arable crop p=0.5 (Table 7). Land, labour and input expenses have a positive effect in the 
gross income. 
 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics of dependent and explanatory variables of farming 
households  
Variable  Observ. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
*Gross Income (USD/yr) 52 94.95 93.07 9.09 386.36 
*Gross Margin (USD/yr) 52 39.62 47.59 2.00 274.09 
*Net Profit (USD/yr) 52 -100.40 99.33 -399.24 4.84 
Total Arable crop area (ha) 52 0.51 0.64 0.03 4.00 
Total Labor (man-days/yr) 52 28.60 27.85 2.50 116.00 
Input Expenses (USD/yr) 52 59.32 59.30 1.37 270.51 
Total Area (ha) 52 29.25 32.20 1.52 139.34 
Ratio arable crop area/Total Area 52 0.04 0.06 0.001 0.32 
Ethnicity (1="Mestizo", 0="Saraguro") 52 0.81 0.40 0 1 
Age of  household head (year) 52 53.90 12.09 26 88 
Years of schooling household head (year) 52 4.2 3.37 0 15 
Total Off-farm household income (USD/yr)  52 2201.77 2920.38 0 12024 
Technical Assistance (Dummy), yes =1 52 0.23 0.43 0 1 
Household is part of Organization (Dummy), 
yes =1 
52 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Access to Credit (Dummy), yes =1 52 0.29 0.46 0 1 
Log ( Empirical Gross Income) 52 5.84 0.96 3.95 7.81 
Log (Arable Crop Area) 52 -1.20 1.07 -3.61 1.39 
Log (Total Labor) 52 2.91 0.98 0.92 4.75 
Log (Input Expenses) 52 3.45 1.34 0.31 5.60 
* The values of gross income, gross margin and net-profit are empirical values. 
 
There is no multicollinearity problem (VIF 3.21<10). There is also no evidence of 
heteroskedasticity as the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for linear heteroskedasticity 
does not reject the null hypothesis of constant error variance (prob>chi
2
:0.99). The value of 
the regression constant is equivalent to 12.79 USD/yr (= log 2.548922). This does not have 
any substantial impact on gross income prediction (see also Annex 2 for the results of an 
alternative regression model without constant term). 
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Table 7: Arable crop production function
10
 
Factor Estimate of 
population 
Std. Error t value P>|t| 
Intercept 2.548922 0.275024 9.27 0.000 
Logarithm  Land 0.313634 0.062856 4.99 0.000 
Logarithm  Labor 0.044776 0.070789 0.63 0.530 
Logarithm  Input Expenses 0.519201 0.033529 15.48 0.000 
SS Model: 47.8883999 (df:3) 
SS Residual: 2.87243287 (df:48) 
SS Total: 50.7608327 (df: 51) 
Number of observ.: 52  
F(  3,    48): 266.75 
Prob > F: 0.0000  
R
2
: 0.9434  
Adj R
2
: 0.9399 
Root MSE  :0.24463 
Multicollinearity Test 
Mean Variation Inflation Factors VIF independent variables: 3.21 
Rule: VIF greater 10 generally seems as indicate of severe multicollinearity 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for linear heteroskedasticity  
Ho: Constant variance 
chi
2
(1)         =     0.00 
Prob > chi
2
  =   0.9937               Result: no reject  Ho: Constant variance 
 
The predicted gross income for arable crops was used to calculate gross margins (subtracting 
original variable cost) and net profits (subtracting original fixed cost). The average of gross 
income for arable crop was 243 USD/ha/yr., gross margin 79 USD/ha/yr and net profit -276 
USD/ha/yr (Table 8).  
 
Table 8: Profitability of arable crop production function on USD/ha/yr, n=130 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
Gross Income Original 251.87 194.99 
Gross Income Predicted 243.08 171.23 
Gross Margin Original 88.19 42.29 
Gross Margin Predicted (subtracted 
original variable cost) 
79.41 38.12 
Net Profit Original -267.91 253.89 
Net Profit Predicted (subtracted original 
fixed cost) 
-276.70 262.59 
 
  
                                                          
10
 The null hypothesis of constant return to scale is rejected F calculated : 12.04 > F (1.126) critical  = 4.04 at α= 0.05 
 
 
 80 
3.5. Cattle production function 
 
The best production function is a Cobb-Douglas production function. Translog results are 
reported in Annex 4. For the Cobb-Douglas production function with gross income as the 
dependent variable, R
2=
0.68. For gross margin (R
2=
0.62) and net profit (R
2=
0.34) the values 
were lower. The coefficient of determination between original and predicted gross income is 
0.49. The descriptive statistics used to calculate the Cobb-Douglas production function are 
shown in Table 9.  
 
Table 9: Descriptive statistics of dependent and explanatory variables of farming 
households.  
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
*Gross Income (USD/yr) 130 4687.84 5527.06 0 29579 
*Gross Margin (USD/yr) 130 4236.92 5130.20 0 28210 
*Net Profit (USD/yr) 130 3465.15 4914.10 0 27196 
Total Pasture Area (ha) 130 18.34 17.06 0.81 82.81 
Total Labor (man-days/yr) 130 159.46 96.84 19.40 647.50 
Input Expenses (USD/yr) 130 341.95 607.94 2.50 4178.10 
Log (Gross Income) 130 5.37 1.00 -2.30 7.05 
Log (Pasture Area) 130 2.46 1.01 -0.21 4.42 
Log (Total Labor) 130 4.89 0.63 2.97 6.47 
Log (Input Expenses) 130 4.57 1.67 0.92 8.34 
Locality (1 = high land, 0 = lowland) 130 0.73 0.45 0 1 
Mequeron Pasture (Dummy) 130 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Mequeron Pasture + Morocha Pasture 
(Dummy) 
130 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Agroforestry Pasture  (Dummy) 130 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Other kind of Pastures (Dummy) 130 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Morocha Pasture (%) 130 30.41 37.32 0.00 100.00 
Mequerón Pasture (%) 130 44.58 37.91 0.00 100.00 
Agroforestry Pasture (%) 130 9.88 22.80 0.00 100.00 
Degraded Pasture (%) 130 5.24 11.81 0.00 86.50 
Melinis Pasture (%) 130 3.12 10.49 0.00 74.70 
Pennisetum Pasture (%) 130 2.61 11.82 0.00 100.00 
Other kind of Pastures (%) 130 4.17 13.56 -0.40 76.10 
**Mean Altitude of pasture (m a.s.l.) 130 1996 263 1261 2668 
**Minimum Altitude of pasture (m a.s.l.) 130 1800 252 1080 2360 
**Maximum Altitude of pasture (m a.s.l.) 130 2190 301 1469 2880 
Total Area of farm (ha) 130 40.37 44.99 1.52 260 
Stocking rate animals (Tropical Livestock 
Units) 
130 9.06 9.19 0.60 50.26 
Animal Units/Total Area 130 0.18 0.10 0.01 0.47 
Ethnicity (1="Mestizo", 0="Saraguro") 130 0.85 0.36 0 1 
Age of Head-household between (year) 130 52.32 13.73 23 88 
Years of schooling household head (year) 130 5.51 3.91 0 18 
Total Off-farm Household (USD/yr.) 130 2723.69 3468.07 0 19800 
Technical Asisstance (Dummy) 130 0.22 0.41 0 1 
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Household is part of Organization (Dummy) 130 0.42 0.49 0 1 
Access to Credit (Dummy) 130 0.39 0.49 0 1 
***Minimun Cost Distance 130 1013 2046 0 9550 
***Maximun Cost Distance 130 21520 22205 1531 102541 
***Mean Cost Distance 130 9418 7917 681 37732 
* Based on empirically sample 
** Source: IGM 2003 
*** Source: Eichhorn 2009 
 
The cattle production function shows a significant relationship between Gross Income and 
the explanatory variables Total Pasture Area, Total Labor Cattle, Input Expenses Cattle, 
Minimum Altitude Pasture at p<0.05 (Table 10). As expected, land, labor, and input 
expenses have a positive impact on gross income. Most labor resources came from family 
labor (78%). 
 
Table 10: Cattle production function
11
 
Factor Estimate of 
population 
Std. Error t value P>|t| 
Intercept 2.783633 0.8183377 3.40 0.001 
Logarithm Land 0.3244224 0.0951863 3.41 0.001 
Logarithm Labor 0.9306134 0.1374796 6.77 0.000 
Logarithm Input Expenses 0.2174619 0.0549089 3.96 0.000 
Minimum altitude  -0.0010468 0.0003115 -3.36 0.001 
Ethnicity 0.4829716 0.2054597 2.35 0.020 
Technical assistance  0.3541327 0.1825619 1.94 0.055 
Access to Credit 0.2579407 0.1491435 1.73 0.086 
SS Model: 168.744801     (df: 7) 
SS Residual:78.9144844 (df: 122) 
SS Total: 247.659286    (df: 129 ) 
Numb. of observ.: 130 
F(7,   122  ): 37.37 
Prob > F : 0.0000 
R
2
: 0.6814 
Adj R
2
:0.6631   
Root MSE: 0.80426   
Multicollinearity Test 
Mean Variation Inflation Factors VIF independent variables: 1.36 
Rule: VIF greater 10 are generally seem as indicate of severe multicollinearity 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for linear heteroskedasticity  
Ho: Constant variance             
chi
2
(1)         =  171.36    
Prob > chi
2
  =  0.0000    Result: reject  Ho: Constant variance 
Dealing Heteroskedasticity with Robust Standard Error 
Factor Robust Estimate Robust Std. 
Error 
t value P>|t| 
Intercept 2.783633 1.119741 2.49 0.014 
Log (Land) 0.3244224 0.0603147 5.38 0.000 
Log (Labor) 0.9306134 0.2997896 3.10 0.002 
Log (Input Expenses) 0.2174619 0.0367893 5.91 0.000 
Minimum altitude  -0.0010468 0.0004137 -2.53 0.013 
Ethnicity 0.4829716 0.3374781 1.43 0.155 
Technical assistance  0.3541327 0.2061023 1.72 0.088 
                                                          
11
 The null hypothesis of constant return to scale is rejected F calculate : 19,9 > F (1,126) critical  = 3,9 at α 0.05 
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Access to credit 0.2579407 0.1695159 1.52 0.131 
Number of obs.:   130    
F(7, 122  ): 33.78        Prob > F: 0.0000 
R
2
: 0.6814  
Root MSE: 0.80426 
 
Altitude has a negative impact on gross income. It means that farmers located in the lower 
region “Sabanilla region” are more productive in comparison with farmers located in higher 
altitudes. This interpretation agrees with a “Local” dummy variable that was also tested but 
turned to be out to be less significant. The variable “ethnicity” shows a positive impact on 
gross income. It means there are differences in the production between “Mestizos” and 
“Saraguros”. A farm owned by “Mestizo” has a higher gross income. Farmers with access to 
technical assistance have higher production on average. Finally, access to formal credit also 
has a positive impact on production. 
 
In reference to the value of the intercept, it is equivalent to 16.18 USD/ha/yr (= log 
2.783633) which does not have big impact on gross income prediction. A regression model 
without a constant term is reported in Annex 5. 
 
The predicted gross income of each single household was used to calculate the gross 
margins and net profits per hectare (Figure 5). The average of predicted gross income is 269 
USD/ha/yr, the gross margin is 245 USD/ha/yr and the net profit is 160 USD/ha/yr. 
 
Figure 5: Gross income, gross margin and net profit of cattle production (n=130) 
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4. Discussion 
 
Studies about profitability of agricultural production are given by Wunder (2000) for the 
Ecuadorian Andes, and by Knoke et al. (2009) for the local research area. There is a gap of 
the information about of heterogeneity of farm agricultural profitability, however. In this 
study, we fill this gap information. We analyze the profitability of local arable crops and 
cattle production systems.   
 
Given the restricted resources of the study, the snowball sampling approach used has likely 
performed better than a random sampling approach. Peasant households  in the research area 
tended to exaggerate or understate their farm or production characteristics as a strategy of 
“personal protection” potentially leading to substantial strategic bias. In this sense, the 
snowball approach reduces strategic bias likely to be present when sensitivity information or 
financial information was to be disclosed. Still, statistical representativeness cannot be 
claimed for the sample. The non-random sampling requires that descriptive statistic 
presented needs to be treated with caution. Likewise, the representation of cattle income as a 
function of growth increments and sales of cattle, will need refinements that potentially 
affect the conclusions presented.  
 
The arable crop production represents 3.9% of the total household income and it is less 
profitable (-276 USD/ha/yr) on average than cattle production (160 USD/ha/yr). Arable 
crops are restricted to small plots near to houses mainly for auto-consumption. In other side, 
pasture-based production accounts for 70.4% of total household income. 
 
Family labour has a strong influence on profitability of arable crop and cattle production. 
The net profit calculations are reduced drastically when family labour valued at actual 
agricultural wage rates are included as fixed costs. The gross margin in arable crop switches 
from 79 USD/ha/yr to -276 USD/ha/yr. The gross margin in cattle switches from 245 
USD/ha/yr to 160 USD/ha/yr. As a consequence, some negative values on net profit of cattle 
production show up. The wage rate applied may have been too high as farmers actually 
report difficulties in finding off-farm employment.  
 
Our results show that cattle production is the more profitable land use. But it also has a 
substantial heterogeneity in the net profits. The average cattle ranching net profit is 160 
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USD/ha/yr. This value is lower than net profit of 208 USD/ha/yr (adjusted for inflation
12
) 
reported by Wunder
13
 (2000) for Ecuadorian Andes. Our values differ from values reported 
by Wunder (2000) because Wunder values are base on information given by experts in the 
field. Also, our value (160 USD/ha/yr) is higher than the ~100 USD/ha/yr net profit reported 
by Knoke
14
 et al. (2009) for research area. Our values may differ from values reported by 
Knoke et al. (2000) because Knoke et al. have a smaller sample, and have used a different 
algorithm to calculate income.  
 
Our main contribution is to show the huge heterogeneity present in our sample. For instance, 
70 USD/ha/yr (percentile 25), 123 USD/ha/yr (percentile 50) and 227 USD/ha/yr (percentile 
75). The heterogeneity of profitability of cattle production has biodiversity policy 
implications, for example in the distributional impacts and efficiency of payments for forest 
conservation (Details in chapter III) or alternative conservation measures (Wunder 2005). 
 
The cattle production analysis suggests that several factors influence profitability. Cobb-
Douglas production function determined significant factors that affect gross income which 
directly affects profitability. A farmer who lives in lowlands, is of “Mestizo” ethnic, has 
access to technical assistance and credit has higher gross margin than a farmer who lives in 
uplands, is of “Saraguro” ethnic, and without access to technical assistance and credit. One 
reason for differences on profitability may be that the “Mestizos” are more connected with 
the local markets in Loja and Zamora cities. On the contrary, the ethnic group “Saraguros” is 
located far from local markets.  
 
One hectare more arable crop land increases gross income by 148.6 USD/yr. Because of the 
problematic terrain, a substantial extension of arable agriculture may not be possible. One 
man-day more of labor increases gross income by 0.38 USD/yr. The marginal effect of labor 
is less that average wage (4 USD/day) reported for our sample. It means that there is too 
much labor available for arable crop production. One USD/yr of input expenses increases 
gross income by 2.12 USD/yr. It means that the investment on inputs appears very low.  
                                                          
12
 The value was adjusted with the formula:  Future amount = Present value * (1+ % inflation) ^ number of 
years.  The reference adjusted value is for 2007 (Annex 7). The survey was conducted at the beginning of 2008 
and the data information corresponds to 2007. Ecuador adopted the dollar as official currency since 2000. 
13 
Wunder (2000) reports 125 USD/ha/year for cattle ranching, at 5% discount rate, in the fourth year of 
deforestation cycle. It is not explicit how was valued the labor. 
14 
It is not explicit how was valued and incorporated the labor. 
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Marginal effect of one hectare more of pasture land is an increase in gross income by 4.75 
USD/yr. This is much less than for arable land. One man-day more of labor increases gross 
income by 1.56 USD/yr. The marginal effect of labor is still less that the average wage rate 
paid (4 USD/day) for our sample – but it is much higher than compared to arable agriculture. 
One USD/yr of input expenses only increases gross income by 0.17 USD/yr. This means 
that the investment in cash inputs may already be high given the principle constraints of the 
current production technology.  
 
In the face of severe nature conservation concerns in the area coinciding with severe 
poverty, it is a challenge to improve the profitability of local peasant households per hectare 
(intensification). Contrary to the ideas expressed by Adams (2009) who argues for an 
intensification of the land use system, our results indicate only limited room for successful 
intensification with the current production technologies. The relatively best results may be 
achieved if some of the pasture land could be converted to arable agriculture without 
inducing additional resource conservation concerns. Also a higher cash investment into 
arable agriculture appears promising with rate of return potentially in excess of 100% p.a. 
Furthermore, access to technical assistance and to formal credit may improve cattle 
production. Using robust standard errors, the significance of predictors is closer to and in 
excess of 0.1 that below 0.05, however.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In spite of the two caveats on statistical representativeness and more detailed analyses 
needed on the representation of cattle income as a function of growth increments and sales 
of cattle, it is save to say that pasture-based cattle production is a profitable land use in the 
research area with huge heterogeneity present among the households. The heterogeneity of 
profitability has biodiversity policy implications with the implementation of conservation 
instruments in terms of the efficiency and distributive impacts. Our results suggest that the 
average net profit of cattle production is 160 USD/ha/yr. Factors that influence the gross 
margin and consequently the profitability on cattle production are land size, labor, input 
expenses, ethnicity, altitude and access to technical assistance and formal credit. While 
agricultural intensification in the face of serious conservation and poverty concerns has been 
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suggested to be of high priority, our results indicate only limited scope for short-term 
improvements in this regard.  
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Annex 
Annex 1: Translog production function of arable crop production 
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 52  
F(  9, 42)          = 114.39 
Prob > F           = 0.0000 
R
2
                     = 0.9608 
Adj R
2
              = 0.9524 
Root MSE       = 0.21765 
Model 48.7712082 9 5.41902313 
Residual 1.98962458 42 0.047372014 
Total 50.7608327 51 0.995310446 
 
 
   
lnYinc Coef. Std. Err. T P>|t| 
Log (Land) 1.150176 0.5584907 2.06 0.046 
Log (Land* Land) 0.0932267 0.0626022 1.49 0.144 
Log (Labor) -0.102593 0.6777332 -0.15 0.880 
Log (Labor*Labor) 0.0282609 0.0966063 0.29 0.771 
Log (Input Expenses) -0.3281227 0.3117892 -1.05 0.299 
Log (Input Expenses* Input Expenses) 0.1118358 0.0377375 2.96 0.005 
Log (Land*Labor) -0.0248112 0.1281381 -0.19 0.847 
Log (Land* Input Expenses) -0.1507898 0.0750093 -2.01 0.051 
 Log (Labor* Input Expenses) -0.0142654 0.0690254 -0.21 0.837 
Cons 4.46646 1.332177 3.35 0.002 
Multicollinearity Test 
Mean Variation Inflation Factors VIF independent variables: 215.10 
Rule: VIF greater 10 are generally seem as indicate of severe multicollinearity 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for linear heteroskedasticity  
Ho: Constant variance             
chi
2
(1)         = 1.22 
Prob > chi
2
  =  0.2698 Result: no-reject  Ho: Constant variance 
 
Annex 2: Cobb-Douglas production function of arable crop production, no-constant 
Source SS df MS Number of obs =  52 
F(  3, 49)          = 1865.60 
Prob > F           = 0.0000 
R
2
                     = 0.9913 
Adj R
2
              = 0.9908 
Root MSE        = 0.40438 
Model 915.209161 3 305.06972 
Residual 8.01263966 49 0.163523258 
Total 923.221801 52 17.7542654 
    
lnYinc Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 
Log (Land) -0.2185276 0.0422711 -5.17 0.000 
Log (Labor) 0.5961288 0.0634236 9.40 0.000 
Log (Input Expenses) 0.5968248 0.0536694 11.12 0.000 
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Annex 3: Profitability of arable crop production function on USD/ha/yr, n=130 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
Gross Income Original 251.87 194.99 
Gross Income Predicted 243.08 171.23 
Gross Margin Original 88.19 42.29 
Gross Margin Predicted 79.41 38.12 
Net Profit Original -267.91 253.89 
Net Profit Predicted -276.70 262.59 
 
Annex 4: Translog production function of cattle production 
Source SS df MS Number of obs  =  130    
F( 13,   116)      =   27.79 
Prob > F            =  0.0000 
R
2
                      =  0.7570 
Adj R
2
               =  0.7277 
Root MSE         =  0.7203 
Model 187.473718 13 14.4210601 
Residual 60.1855049 116 0.51884056 
Total 247.659286 129 1.91983943 
    
lnYinc Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 
Log (Land) -1.137849 0.8454288 -1.35 0.181 
Log (Land * Land) -0.0532652 0.0895247 -0.59 0.553 
Log (Labor) 7.160135 1.364678 5.25 0.000 
Log (Labor * Labor) -0.6773137 0.1653561 -4.10 0.000 
Log (Input Expenses) 1.716794 0.5008759 3.43 0.001 
Log (Input Expenses * Input Expenses) -0.0633378 0.0324923 -1.95 0.054 
Log (Land * Labor) 0.3858954 0.2013116 1.92 0.058 
Log (Land * Input Expenses) -0.0295603 0.0753097 -0.39 0.695 
Log (Labor * Input Expenses) -0.1650532 0.1199973 -1.38 0.172 
Minimum altitude -0.0010858 0.0003081 -3.52 0.001 
Ethnicity 0.5810878 0.19044 3.05 0.003 
Technical assistance 0.3120468 0.1646701 1.89 0.061 
Access to credit 0.2096489 0.1357097 1.54 0.125 
Cons. -13.22283 3.234814 -4.09 0.000 
Multicollinearity Test 
Mean Variation Inflation Factors VIF independent variables: 129.32 
Rule: VIF greater 10 are generally seem as indicate of severe multicollinearity 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for linear heteroskedasticity  
Ho: Constant variance             
chi
2
(1)         = 148.63               Prob > chi
2
  =  0.0000    Result: reject  Ho: Constant variance 
 
Annex 5: Cobb-Douglas production function of cattle production, no-constant 
Source SS df MS Number of obs =  130 
F(  7, 123)       = 1653.70 
Prob > F           = 0.0000 
R
2
                     = 0.9895 
Adj R
2
              = 0.9889 
Root MSE        = 0.8381 
Model 8131.25346 7 1161.60764 
Residual 86.3988648 123 0.702429795 
Total 8217.65233 130 63.2127102 
    
lnYinc Coef. Std. Err. T P>|t| 
Log (Land) 0.330193 0.0991764 3.33 0.001 
Log (Labor) 1.175509 0.1220502 9.36 0.000 
Log (Input Expenses) 0.251016 0.0562888 4.46 0.000 
Minimum altitude  -0.000350 0.0002446 -1.43 0.155 
Ethnicity 0.611408 0.2104598 2.91 0.004 
Technical assistance  0.453236 0.1878068 2.41 0.017 
Access to credit 0.292064 0.1550682 1.88 0.062 
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Annex 6: Profitability of cattle production function on USD/ha/yr, n=130 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
Gross Income Original 289.25 197.13 
Gross Income Predicted 269.17 193.08 
Gross Margin Original 265.71 179.01 
Gross Margin Predicted 245.69 166.35 
Net Profit Original 181.47 150.99 
Net Profit Predicted 160.10 124.76 
 
Annex 7. Annual inflation of Ecuador 
Year 
Annual inflation of 
Ecuador in %* 
Index =100 Net Profit adjusted to 
inflation (USD/ha/yr) 
2000 96.1 196.1 125** 
2001 22.4 240.0 153 
2002 9.7 263.3 168 
2003 9.35 287.9 184 
2004 1.95 293.5 187 
2005 4.36 306.3 195 
2006 3.11 315.9 201 
2007 3.32 326.4 208 
2008 8.83 355.2 226 
2009 4.31 370.5 236 
09.2010 3.44 383.2 244 
*Source: Banco Central del Ecuador 
**Wunder (2000) reports 125 USD/ha/year for cattle ranching in the fourth year of the 
deforestation cycle, at 5% discount rate 
 
Annex 8. Maginal effects of inputs on gross margin 
Input Agriculture (USD/yr) Cattle (USD/yr) 
Land 148.602 4.759 
Labor 0.381 1.570 
Input expenses 2.128 0.171 
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Abstract 
 
Technical efficiency analysis helps to identify policy options for improving rural agricultural 
livelihoods and, them, may helps to alleviate production conservations conflicts. This paper 
investigates determinants of the technical efficiency in the Biosphere Reserve “Podocarpus-
El Cóndor”, South Ecuadorian. The study employs data from 130 farming households 
obtained by survey carried out in the 2008 farming season. The study employs stochastic 
frontier production model of pasture-based cattle and dairy production. Our findings reveal 
that output increased monotonically with size of pasture (p=0.0179), labor (p=0.0001), and 
costs of input (p=0.0153). An average technical efficiency of about 70% was achieved by 
local farmers. Technical efficiency was higher for lowland than for upland farms. Lowland 
farms are more frequently owned by members of the “Mestizo” ethnic group. Upland has 
high presence of “Saraguro” farms, often receive technical assistance. The policy 
implication from the findings suggests that the output of cattle production could be increased 
by 30% provision of technical assistance to the farmers.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Cattle production is an important sector of the Ecuadorian agricultural economy. According 
to the last National Agricultural Census (2000) statistics, there are 427,514 production units 
in the country with a total of 4,486,020 animals. The cattle production sector in Ecuador is 
characterized by an extensive dual-purpose cattle system of meat (cattle fattening) and milk 
(dairy) production (National Agricultural Census 2000).  
 
The technological level of cattle production in Ecuador is yet to be increased. In a 
representative sample of four provinces from the country quoted by Paredes (2009), it is 
obvious that 86.5% of the production units operate under a traditional or low technology 
system, 10.1% with intermediate technology and 3.4% by modern technology.  
 
The increase in cattle production in Ecuador has been be associated with the increase in the 
associated factor inputs such as pasture area, animals, and labor usage, the productivity of 
cattle production in the selected study area is far below the average national value across 
most of the regions in the country (Paredes 2009). For example, the average national level of 
the milk production is about 4.5 liter per cow-day (Paredes 2009). 
 
Zamora (2009) identified several problems related to the pastures and cattle production units 
in Ecuador. According to the author, the priority problems of pasture management include 
the following: i) genetic material of pasture producing low protein fodder, ii) poor 
agronomic management pastures, iii) slow adoption and diffusion of technological 
improvements. Also the author identified the main problems of priority in cattle production 
as: i) inadequate use of bovine races, ii) high prices of veterinary supply, iii) poor cattle 
management, and  iv) lack of value added to the final product.  
 
In this paper, we investigate determinants of the technical efficiency in Cattle production in 
the south of Ecuador. The frontier efficiency analysis represents a best practice technology 
against which the efficiency of production units can be measured producing a production 
model (Battese, 1992).  To the best of our knowledge there is only one study (Bailey et al. 
1989) that has investigated technical efficiency in Ecuadorian dairy farm. Bailey et al. 
(1989) did not the determinants in cattle production. In face of the strategic role of the 
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Ecuadorian cattle sector as well as its conservation implications, there is more empirical 
studies are clearly called for. 
 
At Latin American level, studies focus in determining the technical efficiency on farms with 
high technological level (machinery). Moreira and Bravo (2009) on the meta-analysis of 5 
studies with a focus on the technical efficiency of dairy farms in the Latin America 
determine on 73.2% the average of technical efficiency of the farms. Moreira (2006) in his 
study of technical efficiency of dairy farms, he found technical efficiency of 87.0%, 84.9%, 
and 81.1% for Argentina, Chile and Uruguay respectively. Also, Bravo et al. (2007) on the 
meta-analysis determine 77.9% the technical average efficiency of agricultural sector in the 
Latin America.  
 
The remaining part of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews efficiency 
measurement techniques. Section 3 describes the methodology including a description of the 
study area, the sampling technique as well as the variables specifications. Results are 
presented and discussed in section 4 while section 5 offers concluding remarks and policy 
implications from the findings. 
 
2. Review of efficiency measurement techniques 
 
Since Farrell‟s (1957) seminal paper on the measurement of efficiency, there has been a 
growing interest in the methodology and its applications to real life situations (Thiam et al. 
2001). Farrell introduced a method to decompose the overall (economic) efficiency of a 
production unit into technical and allocative components. The author defined technical 
efficiency (TE) as the firm‟s ability to produce maximum output given a set of input bundles 
and technology. Allocative efficiency (AE) was defined as a measure of the firm‟s success 
in choosing the optimal input proportions. Finally, he defined economic efficiency as the 
product of technical and allocative efficiencies which describes the ability of producers to 
achieve both technical and allocative efficiencies. 
  
Empirically, two approaches have been developed for measuring the efficiency of 
production units. The parametric approach uses econometric models such as stochastic 
frontier analysis (SFA). The non-parametric approach is more widely restricted in form of 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) based on mathematical programming models. The 
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econometricians‟ criticism of DEA is based on the fact that DEA cannot differentiate 
between the random variation and other sources of statistical noise in efficiency unlike SFA. 
The advantages and limitations of both approaches are extensively discussed in Kumbhakar 
and Lovell (2000) and Coelli et al. (2005). The present study employs SFA because of its 
frequenty use in the analysis of efficiency and productivity in agricultural development 
studies. Hence, the subsequent discussion focuses on this methodology.  
 
Stochastic frontier analysis models were independently developed by Aigner et al. (1977) 
and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). The basic SFA function model founded on a 
cross-sectional data set can be specified as: 
  
 i i iln y    ln f X ; e                   (1) 
where, yi denotes the value of the production of the i-th farm (i=1,….N); Xi is a (1xk, 
k:columns) vector of the associated inputs;  is a (jx1, j=rows) vector of unknown  
parameters to be estimated, and f represents the functional form. The error term ie  = vi – ui 
is composed of two components. vi  
represents random error (statistical noise/ measurement 
error) distributed symmetrically. u i  is the asymmetric error term, assumed to be 
independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) ( u i >1). u i captures technical inefficiency, 
and is independent of vi . 
 
The technical efficiency of firms could be estimated using the Jondrow et al. (1982) 
approach as 
 21
i
i i
i
e
e
E u e  =  
e
                              (2) 
where i
e    
is the density of the standard normal distribution,  i
e    
is the 
cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution,  i ie = v  - u  
is as earlier 
defined and  
1
2 2 2
u v =  +     is the square root of the sum of the variance of v and u.  
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Once conditional estimates of 
iu  have been obtained, Jondrow et al. (1982) calculate the 
technical efficiency of each producer as: 
 i i iTE  = 1- E u e            (3) 
The objective of the frontier analysis is not only to serve as a benchmark against which the 
efficiency of production units is estimated, but also to identify underlying causes of 
deviation from the frontier technology or determinants of efficiency among the producing 
units (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). 
 
Earlier approaches to incorporate the determinants of technical efficiency levels in the 
frontier analysis adopted a two-stage approach (Pitt and Lee 1981; Kalirajan 1981). This 
approach has been criticized because the i.i.d assumption of iu  is violated in the two-stage 
approach in which predicted efficiencies are assumed to have a functional relationship with 
the exogenous variables (Kumbhakar and Lovell 2000; and Coelli et al. 2005). 
 
The shortcoming in the two-stage approach led to the development of a single step approach 
by Kumbhakar et al. (1991).  The authors proposed the single stage approach model where 
the determinants of the efficiency levels, the variables in a stochastic production frontier and 
the technical efficiency scores are estimated simultaneously. The single-stage approach was 
parameterized such that the mean of the pre-truncated distribution of the inefficiency error 
term (
i
  ) is to be a function of exogenous variables. This model can be implicitly specified 
as:  
 
i 0 j ij
  Z                                      (4) 
where i   is the firm-specific mean technical inefficiency, zij is the matrix of exogenous 
variables that determines technical inefficiency, and 
j
  is a vector of the parameters to be 
estimated. In this formula, a negative sign of an element of the 
j
  -vector indicates a 
variable with a positive influence on technical efficiency. 
 
Recent studies show that allowing the variance of ui to be a function of exogenous variables 
could possibly be explored to investigate technical inefficiency effects while correcting for 
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possible heteroskedasticity in the inefficiency term ui (Caudill and Ford 1993; Caudill et al. 
1995; Kumbhakar and Lovell 2000). The heteroskedasticity investigation of technical 
inefficiency effects according to these authors can be implicitly specified as: 
 
  2  = g ;ui ki kZ           (5) 
where, 2
ui  denotes the variance of ui, zk is the matrix of exogenous variables that determines 
technical inefficiency and  k is a vector of parameters to be estimated. Also in the Eqn.5, a 
negative sign of an element of the  k -vector indicates that the variable has a positive 
influence on technical efficiency. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Study area and Sampling procedure 
 
The research area is located in the south of Ecuador in the UNESCO Biosphere Reserve 
“Podocarpus-El Cóndor” located in the provinces of Loja and Zamora-Chinchipe (see Figure 
1). The research area is part of the global biodiversity “hot spot” of the Andes Mountains 
(CIPRB 2005, Brummitt & Lughadha 2003). The majority of rural households are poor 
smallholders practicing pasture-based cattle ranching (Beck 2008). The protected area 
“Corazón de Oro” (Area de Bosque y Vegetacion Protectora Corazón de Oro; ABVPC) was 
established to the north of Podocarpus National Park. It forms part of the buffer zone of the 
national park, which is the core area of the Biosphere Reserve.  
 
In the ABVPC and a narrow corridor between ABVPC and the national park, a socio-
economic household and farming survey was conducted in the farming season 2008 
(n=130). About 24% of all local households took part in the survey. The survey villages 
were selected randomly and proportional to household numbers. The number of households 
per village reflects roughly village size. The selection of households in the villages could not 
be conducted using a random selection. Because of the sensitive financial information to be 
disclosed during the interview, we relied on snowball sampling and information of key 
informants in order to approach as much a 'representative' sample as possible. The land use 
on each farm was surveyed by personal interviews; the location of the plots was 
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independently delimited on aerial photographs (IGM 2003) and ground-truthed using GPS 
data.  
 
There is no communal property land in our sample. All land is under private ownership. 
53.7% (2795 ha) of the land of the surveyed farms is forest; 45.5% (2391 ha) is pasture. 
Most farmers produce milk and other dairy products (curd/cheese). Only a small portion 
produces milk exclusively. Crop production is mainly for subsistence purposes and covers 
only 0.6% of the area. Arable crop plots are very small or even part of home gardens. 
Pasture-based production accounts for 70.4% of total household incomes, off-farm income 
for 25.7% and arable crops for 3.9% of total household incomes.  
 
For some of the households having access to more remote areas of forest, timber also may 
contribute to household income. As timber felling is an illicit activity in the ABVPC, the 
extent to which this is the case could not be quantified. The quality of the remaining 
mountain forest trees is low, however, and indicators for large-scale commercial felling 
operations could not be found during fieldwork. This suggests that timber felling mainly 
contributes to subsistence consumption. However, we assume that there is some timber 
extraction in the villages of the highest, most north-eastern parts of the ABVPC, which were 
(by chance) not included in the sample. The importance of fuel wood extraction or of other 
forms of non-timber forest product utilization is small. Most households use domestic gas 
which is highly subsidized by the state. Against this background, the following focus on 
pasture-based dairy and cattle production covers the overwhelming share of local income 
from primary production. 
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Figure 1: Map showing the study area 
 
3.2. Determinants of technical inefficiency 
 
Determinants of technical inefficiency identify reasons for production differences across 
production units (farmer/households). SFA quantifies the influence of determinants on the 
production differences (Battese & Coelli 1995).  
 
Empirical evidence is show by Bravo-Ureta & Pinheiro (1993), they determine socio-
economic factors relate to technical efficiency in developing countries in the agriculture 
sector. They report several factors: income, education, age, literacy, experience, formal and 
non-formal education, credit, farm size, management policies, extension (visits, hours), 
irrigation, fertilizer, off-farm income, off-farm employment, region (locality). Alene et al. 
(2005) in their study in one developing country (Indonesia) point out several determinants 
that impact on efficiency age, social capital, technical assistance, education, ethnicity, off-
farm employment, access to credit. Ortega et al. (2007) reported impact of socio-economic 
and technical variables on technical efficiency of dual-purpose cattle system in Venezuela. 
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The factors reported are education, breeding system, land tenure, stocking rate, credit, 
technical assistance, location, production system, experience, farm size and production, 
capital investment.  More recently, Ogundary (2010) in his meta-analysis of technical 
efficiency studies in one developing country in agriculture identified policy variables on 
technical efficiency. He found positive and negative effects of age, experience, credit, 
extension, household size, education, gender and membership in cooperative societies.  
 
In bases on the above review and our knowledge of research area, and previous analysis 
presented in the chapters I, II, variables that likely influence in efficiency are: size of 
pasture, minimum altitude of pasture land, locality, ethnicity, technical assistance and access 
to formal credit. 
 
3.3. Variable definition 
 
The information collected during the survey includes: gross income from the sale and 
consumption of dairy products, weight increment
15
 of the cattle and sale of cattle (both in 
USD), size of pastures in hectare, labor usage (family and hired labor) in man-days and costs 
of production. The cost of production includes cash expenditures on salt, animal vaccination, 
expenditure on veterinary services, and depreciation on the fixed inputs.  
 
Other information collected includes the number of the farmers receiving technical 
assistance (dummy variable; respondent has access to a technical assistance from 
government and non-government organizations), access to formal credit (dummy variable; 
farmer has access to formal credit), and ethnicity (dummy variable; 1= “Mestizo” ethnic 
group; 0=“Saraguro” ethnic group), location of the farm (Dummy variable; 1= “upland”; 
0=“lowland”). The altitude of pasture land (meters above the sea level) was obtained from 
digital elevation model. Table A of the appendix contains the summary statistics of variables 
are subsequently used in SFA. 
 
  
                                                          
15
 The life weight is predicted with a regression where the dependent variable is the life weight and explanatory 
variables are race, age, and sex. Most of the variables (10 variables) are significant at α = 0.05 and the model 
explain (R
2
=0.57) 57% of life weight (see details Chapter II, herd section). 
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3.4. The empirical model specification 
 
The production technology of the cattle farmers in Ecuador is represented in the present 
study using a translog functional form for three inputs as: 
 
                    
 
 
 
   
 
 
   
           
 
   
           
 
 
where ln : natural logarithm; iy : gross income from cattle production for the ith farmer in 
USD; X1: size of pasture in hectares; X2: both hired and family labour in man-days and X3: 
the production costs. 
 
 
vit is normally distributed with 
 20 viN ,  while ui is assumed to be half-normally 
distributed as  20 uiN ,  with  2  =  q , ;ui is pi iZ D  following the tradicional assumption of 
literature. 
 
The heteroskedascity specification of the variance of the inefficiency term (ui) of Eqn.5 was 
found to be robust (there is not problem of heteroskedasticity in the inefficiency term) for 
modeling the determinants of the technical efficiency of cattle production in the study area
16
.   
 
Following the traditional technical inefficiency effects model in the literature, the variance 
of the inefficiency error is modeled as a function of the farms/farmers‟ socio-economic 
variables as
17
 
 
  
                                                                                          (7) 
 
where 2u  represents the variance of the one-sided error term (ui). 
                                                          
16 Earlier the mean inefficiency specification of Eqn. 4 was employed to relate the farmers/farms specific characteristics to 
the efficiency level of the respondents. However, most of the parameters were found to be insignificant in this model 
specification.  
17 We included both altitude and location because dropping one for another affect robustness of the estimates. The location 
(lowland and upland) captures some information of the altitude of the pasture land. However, the main difference is the 
excellent market access of lowland farms while are located between on the main inter-provincial road connects the 
province capitals of Loja and Zamora.    
(7) 
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The maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of Eqn. 3, 6 and 7 are jointly estimated 
using Ox 4.02 (Doornik, 2006), specifically, the SFAMB package (Brümmer, 2001). The 
estimation used in this paper Chapter (maximum likelihood) is a different approach than the 
estimation used (OLS) in the chapter I, II. 
 
Whenever production technology of production units is described by flexible production 
functions such as the translog functional forms, it is important to check whether the 
estimated elasticities (coefficients of the inputs) are theoretically consistent (Sauer et al. 
2006). A production function is globally consistent when providing regularity conditions for 
the inputs in the production model (Chamber 1988). One condition is monotonicity (i.e., 
positive elasticities). Furthermore, the curvature property of the inputs needs to be tested. 
 
Accordingly, a concavity test was constructed using the Hessian matrix (H) for each of the 
inputs at the sample mean as presented in the third row of table 3. The 3 variable inputs were 
included in the translog frontier function of Eqn.6. It implies that 3 Hessian matrices (H) are 
expected to be constructed with the following conditions (H1 ≤0), (H2 ≥0), and (H3 ≤0) 
before concavity could be fulfilled (for details see Sauer et al. 2006).  
 
3.5. Hypotheses testing 
 
A generalized likelihood ratio test of hypotheses of interest is presented in table 1. The first 
null hypothesis, which specifies that the Cobb-Douglas frontier functional form is an 
adequate representation of the data, is rejected. This implies that the translog frontier 
functional form (Eqn.6) is appropriate for the dataset. Similar results were found by Moreira 
(2006), translog is the most appropriate functional form for dairy farms of Argentina, Chile 
and Uruguay. The second null hypothesis of constant returns to scale is rejected. The third 
null hypothesis which specifies that inefficiency effects are absent from the model is 
strongly rejected, indicating that OLS is not an adequate representation of the dataset. The 
fourth hypothesis which specifies that the coefficients of the explanatory variables in the 
inefficiency model are simultaneously zero is also rejected. The implication of this is that six 
variables included in the inefficiency component have a joint significant contribution in 
explaining the inefficiency effects associated with the value of the output for the sampled 
farmers.  
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Table 1: Generalized likelihood-ratio tests, n =130 
Null hypotheses LR Df χ2(0.05) Decision 
H01:βjk=0 
H02:∑βjk=1 
H03:γi=0;αi=0 
H04: α1 … α6=0 
17.88 
18.42 
78.36 
52.94 
6 
4 
7 
6 
12.6 
9.5 
13.4* 
12.6 
Reject 
Reject  
Reject  
Reject  
* This value is obtained from table of Kodde and Palm (1986) with degree of freedom (df) equals q, where q is parameters 
of inefficiency. 
 
Table 2 presents the result of the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of 
selected translog frontier model of Eqn.6. However, prior to the estimation, the variables of 
the frontier model were divided by their respective sample mean. The implication of this is 
that the coefficients of the first order elasticity of the translog frontier directly serve as the 
measure of the output elasticity of the inputs (Coelli 2005).  
 
We found that the monotonicity condition (i.e., positive elasticities) is fulfilled with greater 
of cases are not violated. Monotonicity in the inputs at individual sample points is violated 
in about 7%, 18%, and 9% of the elasticity of pasture, labour and costs of inputs, 
respectively as presented in the second row of table 3.  The percent of cases of monoticity 
violated are lower than the empiral result reported by Ogundary (2010), it is usumed that 
monoticity condition is fulfill on great percent. Besides this, the concavity test of curvature 
of the inputs carried is described below. We found that H1= -0.124 fulfilled the condition of 
curvature [due to the way our estimated parameters were arranged in table 2, this value is 
equal to the first principal minors or simply the second-order derivatives for size of pasture], 
H2 = 0.218 (fulfilled), while H3 = 0.003 (failed to be fulfilled)
18
. Based on these results, we 
concluded that the curvature property of the inputs required for the sufficient condition in 
the production function is fulfilled. The condition is fulfill at the sample mean with respect 
to the size of pasture and labor while this could not be fulfilled in costs of productions in the 
study. It is means that quasi-concavity condition is achieved. 
 
  
                                                          
18 Technically, a fulfillment of the concavity condition implies a fulfillment of the quasi-concavity condition (but quasi-
concavity does not imply concavity).  
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4. Results and discussions  
4.1. Estimates of production frontier: output elasticity of the inputs 
 
Based on the results presented in the upper panel of table 2, it is obvious that the elasticities 
of the three considered inputs in the regression were positive and significantly different from 
zero at least at the 10% level of significance. However, labour was found to have the highest 
elasticities with a value of 0.653. This is followed by the size of pasture (0.244) and costs of 
production (0.137). The implication of this is that labour is an important input in the 
Ecuadorian cattle production. Our results differ from Ortega et al. (2007) where veterinary 
machinery is an important input in the dual-purpose cattle system in Venezuela. This result 
cleary reflects the low technological machinery level of cattle-based agriculture in our 
sample even judged against Latin American standars. 
 
The return to scale (RTS) which is the summation of the output elasticity (= 1.034) of the 
inputs in the regression is presented in the first row of table 3. The null hypothesis of 
constant returns to scale is rejected (second hypothesis in Table 1). Increasing return to scale 
was found by Moreira (2006), 1.176 Argentina, 1.100 Chile, 1.09 Uruguay. The extensive 
system in the local research area is overwhelming the labor (rudimentary technology). It is 
impossible with a higher technology or higher capital on input to obtain an increment on 
returns to scale in the same proportion. It means that technical efficiency it is not to much 
relate with the technology. We expect maybe more substantial returns to scale, which interns 
suggest that technical efficiency analysis is only one bit of the result.  
 
The result RTS (= 1.034) shows that for an average cattle farm in the study area, increasing 
returns to scale (IRTS) characterized their production process
19
. The implication of this is 
that an average cattle farm in the study area is in stage I of the production curve. Hence, at 
this stage the cattle farm can be expected to increase the use of the inputs in order to reach 
an optimum point of production since addition to the production inputs would lead to more 
than proportional addition to the output due to IRTS observed. 
 
 
  
                                                          
19
 Earlier under the test of hypotheses of interest, we observed that a constant return to scale is rejected. 
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Table 2:  Production frontier estimates 
Constant  Parameters  Coefficients t-value 
Frontier estimates 
Constant  
ln(size of pasture) 
ln(labour) 
ln(costs of inputs) 
0.5[ln(size of pasture)]
2
 
0.5[ln(labour)]
2
 
0.5[ln(costs of inputs)]
2 
ln(size of pasture)x ln(labour) 
ln(size of pasture) x ln(costs of inputs) 
ln(labour) x ln(costs of inputs) 
 
δ0 
β1 
β2 
β3 
β11 
β22 
β33 
β12 
β13 
β23 
 
 0.5557 
 0.2441 
 0.6526 
 0.1368 
-0.1242 
-0.7468 
-0.1028 
 0.3536 
-0.0398 
 0.1121 
 
3.23* 
2.40** 
5.13* 
2.46** 
1.01 
2.95* 
2.52** 
2.49** 
0.72 
1.43 
Inefficiency estimates 
Constant 
ln(size of pasture) 
Altitude (minimum) 
Location 
Ethnicity 
Technical assistance 
Credit 
 
ω0 
α1 
α2 
α3 
α4 
α5 
α6 
 
-0.5926 
-0.2816 
 0.2702 
 0.6356 
-0.9443 
-0.4964 
-0.3431 
 
0.59 
1.25 
0.26 
1.71* 
2.22** 
1.85* 
0.97 
Variance parameters 
Log likelihood 
Gamma 
Number of parameters 
Number of observation 
 
LL 
γ 
- 
- 
 
-103.133 
0.755 
18 
130 
*,**, and *** indicates that the variables are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Table 3: Returns to scale and test of theoretical consistency  
Variables  Size of pasture Labour Costs of inputs RTS 
Elasticities  0.244 0.653 0.137 1.034 
Violation of monotonicity  9 (7%) 23 (18%) 11 (9%)  
Concavity tests -0.124 (fulfilled) 0.218 (fulfilled) 0.003 (failed)  
 
4.3. Determinants of technical efficiency level 
 
Since the aim of the frontier analysis entails, among other things, the identification of the 
causes of the technical efficiency among the production units, the lower panel of table 2 
presents the estimated coefficients in the explanatory variables in the model for the technical 
inefficiency effects. The results show that among the six variables considered in the 
inefficiency model, “location of the farm” significantly increased the variance of the 
technical efficiency level of the cattle production in the study area. Also, we observed that 
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“ethnicity and technical assistance” significantly decreased the variance of the technical 
inefficiency level of the cattle production in the study area. 
 
Because of the way these variables are specified, location of the study (upland=1; 
lowland=0) is interpreted as follows. The significance of this variable implies that farms 
located in the upland appear to have lower technical efficiency levels in comparison to farms 
located in the lowland region of the country. This result conforms to observation on the 
ground in the study area. For example, the upland region is characterized by steep sloping 
mountain while the lowland region is characterized by less slope which makes the rearing of 
animal more easy. The steep slope makes it difficult for the farmer to freely graze their 
animal which might possibly affect their efficiency and productivity level. Moreover, 
farmers from lowland region have better market access than farmers located in upland 
region.  
 
The negative impact of ethnicity (Mestizo=1; Saraguro=0) on the variance of technical 
inefficiency is an indication that technical efficiency of Mestizo farmers is higher 
comparative to Saraguro farmers. This observation conforms to the situation on the ground 
in the sampled area which indicates that Mestizo ethnic farmers because of their location 
along a major highway and secondary roads in the region have access to the infrastructural 
facilities. Over the correlation between “Mestizos” & lowland (better market access), there 
are also coincidences with other “Mestizo” characteristics which are better educated and 
better land tenure conditions.  
 
The negative coefficient of technical assistance (yes=1; no=0) implies that farmers with 
technical assistance have higher technical efficiency compared to farmers with no technical 
assistance. 
 
Although, we observed in the study that size of pasture and access to credit nominally 
decreased the variance of the technical inefficiency of the farmers, these variables are 
significantly different from zero.  
 
  
 107 
4.4. Technical efficiencies  
 
Table 4 present the summary statistics of estimated technical efficiency estimates while the 
histogram of the estimated technical efficiency of the farms is presented in the figure A of 
appendix to further shed light on the distribution of the estimated efficiencies.  
 
The first row of table 4 shows that the predicted technical efficiencies of the pooled sample 
differ substantially among the farmers, ranging between 0.0006 and 0.9287, with the mean 
efficiency of 0.7003. The implication of this substantial difference in the predicted technical 
efficiencies across the farms implies that there is need for proactive policies to address the 
low efficiency level in the cattle production. 
 
To give a better indication of the distribution of the technical efficiencies, a histogram which 
shows the distribution of the predicted technical efficiencies is presented on the left hand 
side of figure A of the appendix. However, it is obvious from the figure that the sample 
frequency indicates a clustering of technical efficiencies in the region 0.65-0.75 efficiency 
range. The average technical efficiency of 70% from the study implies that there is a 
considerable room for effecting improvement in the technical efficiency level as about 30% 
level of inefficiency level is observed in the study area. Comparatively, we observed that the 
average technical efficiency from the present study is below from the 73.2% obtained by 
Moreira and Bravo (2009) on the meta-analysis of 5 studies with a focus on the technical 
efficiency of dairy farms in the Latin America. Moreover, Moreira (2006) in his study of 
technical efficiency of dairy farms, he found technical efficiency of 87.0%, 84.9%, and 
81.1% for Argentina, Chile and Uruguay respectively. Also, Bravo et al. (2007) on the meta-
analysis determine 77.9% the technical average efficiency of agricultural sector in the Latin 
America. 
 
Besides this, we also observed that the present average technical efficiency is quite below 
the average technical efficiency of 78.1% reported by Bailey et al. (1989) on the technical 
efficiency of the dairy farms in Ecuador. It is only work on technical efficiency on dairy 
farms reported for Ecuador. 
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The predicted technical efficiency was related across the location of the study (i.e., upland 
versus lowland farmers), ethnicity of the farmer‟s (i.e., Mestizo versus Saraguro farmers), 
technical assistance (the farmers that received technical assistance versus those that did not), 
and credit (i.e., farmers that received credit versus those that did not) (Table 4). Such 
differentiation is essential to further shed light on the performance of the farms across the 
farms/farmers characteristics from the study. 
 
Table 4: Summary statics of estimated technical efficiency  
Statistics  Estimated  technical efficiency and sample size 
Pooled sample 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
Maximum 
Minimum 
Sample size 
 
0.7003 
0.1709 
0.9287 
0.0006 
130 
Location 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
Maximum 
Minimum 
Sample size 
Upland  
0.6409 
0.1610 
0.8699 
0.0006 
95 
Lowland  
0.8614 
0.0503 
0.9287 
0.6958 
35 
Ethnicity 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
Maximum 
Minimum 
Sample size 
Mestizo 
0.7318 
0.1475 
0.9287 
0.3211 
110 
Saraguro 
0.5268 
0.1899 
0.7515 
0.0006 
20 
Technical assistance 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
Maximum 
Minimum 
Sample size 
Yes 
0.7818 
0.1129 
0.9287 
0.4135 
28 
No 
0.6779 
0.1776 
0.9213 
0.0006 
102 
Access to credit 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
Maximum 
Minimum 
Sample size 
Yes 
0.7204 
0.1684 
0.9287 
0.3020 
51 
No 
0.6873 
0.1722 
0.8971 
0.0006 
79 
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Figure 2: Average of determinants of the technical efficiency 
 
5. Conclusions and policy implications from the findings  
 
This study outlines the technical efficiency level and its determinants in the cattle production 
based on farm level data sampled in farming season 2008. A total of 130 farming 
households were considered for the analysis. The translog stochastic frontier production 
function was found appropriate for the dataset used for the investigation. 
 
The snowball sampling approach is a better than a random sampling approach in the 
research area. Peasant households exaggerate or minimize their ownership as strategy of 
“personal protection” (strategic bias). There is a reason: They have unfulfilled promises or 
bad experiences from politicians, governmental institutions, or past researchers. In this 
sense, the snowball approach reduces strategic bias likely to be present when sensitivity 
information or financial information was to be disclosed.  
 
The production frontier models reveal that size of pasture, labour and costs of production 
monotonically increased cattle production in the sampled farms. Also, the technical 
inefficiency model shows that location of the farms (lowland), ethnicity (Mestizo ethic) and 
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access to technical assistance increased the technical efficiency of cattle farms in the study 
area. 
 
The farmer localization has a positive impact on efficiency. The big difference is not 
capturated with the current variables, that is the market access variable. A road between 
“Sabanilla” and “Tibio” (inhabitat by Saraguros ethnic) is planned. Saraguros will enable a 
dramatically market access which is according to our results. In other hand, Eichhorn (2009) 
suggests that there is high probability of the pasture land increment (deforestation) with the 
new road. 
 
For the institution of public and private policy design, we suggested that policy relevance of 
the provision of technical assistance should be seriously looked into in the cattle production. 
Farmers would like to receive technical assistance mainly on management reproduction 
cattle, pasture management, and work conservation practices. Although we are aware from 
our survey that rudimentary (low technology) system characterized cattle production in the 
sample, nonetheless, increased technical assistance from both public and private 
stakeholders in the cattle production in Ecuador will go a long way in repositioning the 
industry in the country and in the Latin American region at large.  
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Appendix 
Table A: Summary statics of variables in stochastic frontier model 
Variables  Units Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Gross Income  from cattle  
Size of pasture  
Labour 
Costs of inputs 
Altitude 
Location (upland=1;lowland=0) 
Ethnicity (Mestizo=1;Saraguro=0) 
 Technical assistance (yes=1;No=0) 
Credit(yes= 1; No= 0) 
USD 
Hectare 
Mandays 
US 
Count 
Dummy 
Dummy 
Dummy 
Dummy 
4,687.87 
18.34 
159.56 
341.95 
1,800.67 
0.731 
0.846 
0.215 
0.392 
5,527.07 
17.06 
96.84 
607.94 
252.06 
0.445 
0.362 
0.413 
0.490 
0.19 
0.81 
19.4 
2.50 
1,080 
0 
0 
0 
0 
29,578.53 
82.81 
647.50 
4,178.10 
2,360 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
 
 
Figure A: Distribution of the estimated technical efficiency 
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Abstract 
 
Ecuador is one of the countries with the richest biodiversity globally. 18% of the national 
territory are protected areas. Still, Ecuador has the highest annual deforestation rate in South 
America with much land being converted to pastures and crop land. Payment for Ecosystem 
Services schemes (PES) are an incentive-based alternative to a "command and control"-type 
establishment of protected areas. They are voluntary transactions between a buyer and a 
seller referring to a well defined ecosystem service. PES have been applied in Latin America 
to biodiversity protection, water supply protection, and carbon sequestration.  
 
This paper investigates the effects of differing conservation instruments fostering a forest 
conversion ban in mountainous southern Ecuador on cost-efficiency of conservation and on 
poverty alleviation. The instruments differ with respect to being either mandatory or 
voluntary, and if all farmers are compensated by the same fixed payment rate per hectare or 
if the compensation equals individual opportunity cost stipulated to be known by the analyst. 
Such schemes can be approximated by the auctioning of PES contracts. Additionally, a 
dedicated 'pro-poor' PES was designed restricting payments at a fixed rate to the poorest 
households. In all cases, a fixed budget of ~25,000 USD/yr is distributed. Empirical 
opportunity cost data stem from a sample of 130 local farming households living at the 
northern edge of the Biosphere Reserve “Podocarpus-El Cóndor” in southern Ecuador.  
 
As expected, a voluntary PES paying just the opportunity costs can cover most of the 
relevant forest area (305 ha; 36%). In contrast, a mandatory approach covering all farms and 
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compensating at an average opportunity cost of 156 USD/ha/yr only secures 136 ha. This 
approach also fares worst with respect to poverty alleviation with most payments being 
dispensed to the relatively least poor farmers and even the GINI coefficient rising slightly to 
0.488. Voluntary approaches fare better in this respect with a maximum contribution to 
household incomes of about 10% for the three poorest household quintiles and GINI 
coefficients of ~0.477. If payments are restricted to these quintiles at rates between 150 and 
300 USD/ha/yr, only 168 to 84 ha forest are covered but the GINI coefficients drops to 0.47-
0.462. While mandatory approaches appear worst, we conclude that severe trade-offs 
between cost efficiency and poverty alleviation are likely to impact PES application in the 
study area.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Ecuador is one of the countries with the richest biodiversity in the world (Myers & 
Mittermeier 2000, Brummitt & Lughadha 2003). Command and control regulation has been 
the most popular instrument to protect natural ecosystems (Engel et al. 2008). This is also 
the case in Ecuador where 18.6% of the national territory have been declared protected areas 
(Rivera 2005). However, command and control instruments have not been effective to stop 
the conversion from forest to alternative land uses, mainly to pastures and crop land 
(Wunder 2000): Ecuador has the highest annual deforestation rate in South America with 
1.7% (198, 000 ha; FAO 2006).  
 
Among several alternative conservation instruments, Payments for Ecosystem Service (PES) 
schemes are an attractive option (Wunder 2005). PES are voluntary conservation contracts 
between a buyer and seller of the service. Under the contract, a provider is required to secure 
the provisioning of a well-defined ecosystem service (Wunder 2005). If the service - for 
example forest protection - is not supplied, the payment is withheld. This effect can increase 
cost-efficiency. Particularly high efficiency is expected in “user financed” PES, where the 
concerned stakeholders are directly involved. Here, the actual user of the ecosystem service, 
for example a downstream water utility company, is the buyer.. However, “government 
financed” PES may at times be the only option as governments can more effectively reduce 
transaction costs and institute rules to avoid free-riding (Engel et al. 2008).  
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PES have been recommended not only for potential efficiency gains compared to command 
and control instruments but also because they can be an instrument of poverty alleviation 
(Wunder & Albán 2008) For example, PES can provide cash income to poor land holders, and 
can contribute to income diversification for them (Ferraro & Kiss 2002). In contrast, the 
mandatory establishment of protected areas without compensation as well as land utilization 
taxes are likely to have negative distributional consequences for poor people (Engel et al. 
2008). In particular, PES may help to alleviate poverty when the poorest potential providers 
of the ecosystem services have the lowest opportunity cost of ecosystem service supply 
(Jack et al. 2008a). However, trade-offs may exist between the double goals of increasing 
conservation efficiency and poverty alleviation (Jack et al. 2008a). Thus, there is the need 
for studies that shed light on these aspects of a promising, market-based conservation 
instrument (Engel et al. 2008, Börner et al. 2010).  
 
In the following methodology section, we first review existing literature on the efficiency 
and on distributional impacts of PES. Next, the case study area is introduced and the 
calculation of the efficiency and distributional impacts explained. After presenting the main 
results, the validity and relevance of the results are discussed.  
 
2. Background  
2.1.  Opportunity cost and efficiency 
 
The integration of cost considerations increases the efficiency of conservation planning (c.f. 
Naidoo & Adamowicz 2005). For example, the evaluation of a large-scale governmental 
PES in Costa Rica concluded that the provisioning of ecosystem services could potentially 
be doubled if more was known about the participation costs of the addressed land owners 
including opportunity costs (Wünscher et al. 2008). Opportunity cost is that part of an 
income that is lost if some restriction enforces switching to an alternative, financially 
second-best course of income generation. With valid and reliable information on the 
opportunity cost structure of a set of landholders, the principal of a PES scheme could make 
very cost-efficient individualized offers for participation to the different land owners. In the 
relevant cases here, opportunity cost is the lost income if regulation or the contractual 
restrictions of a PES enforce some kind of conservation land use (cf., Azzoni & Isai 1994, 
Chomitz et al. 2005). In sum, reports based on actual performance data as well as theoretical 
arguments support the notion that consideration of the opportunity costs of conservation 
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born by participating land holders is a basic and critical element in PES design (cf. Pagiola 
et al. 2005, Adams et al. 2010).  
 
There are several ways to assess opportunity cost. In the most direct approach, landholders 
are surveyed and their production economic setting is analyzed. Such surveys are expensive 
to administer and analyze, however. Furthermore, respondents may answer strategically in 
order to bias overall survey results or optimize their standing in future contract negotiations 
(asymmetric information). Finally, a purely financial survey does not include non-market 
utility components that, nevertheless, may influence land use decisions (Jack et al. 2008b, 
Wünscher et al. 2008).  
 
An alternative to survey information is the utilization of auctions for allocating conservation 
contracts to private landholders. Auctions perform well in cases of asymmetric information 
and can integrate non-financial considerations on part of the land holders which are 
otherwise difficult to capture (Latacz-Lohmann & Van der Hamsvoort 1997, Latacz-
Lohmann & Schilizzi 2005, Jack et al. 2008b). So far, there are no experiences with an 
auction approach for PES in Ecuador but several international case studies are available. 
Examples include the “BushTender” and “EcoTender” programs in Australia (Latacz-
Lohmann & Schilizzi 2005), or “The Conservation Reserve Program” in the USA (Kirwan 
et al. 2005). The only published study on a PES offered through an auction in a developing 
country to date is a soil conservation PES in Indonesia (Jack et al. 2008b). Another paper 
points out the allocation of tree planting contracts by auction approach in Malawi (Jack 
Forthcoming). 
 
In contrast to other conservation instruments, PES promise improved efficiency (Wunder 
2007). These efficiency gains can, for example, be used to liberate resources for further 
conservation projects or to scale up existing ones (Engel et al. 2009). From a welfare 
economics perspective, additionality and conditionality are preconditions for an 
economically successful PES. Additionality means that the payment actually increases 
service provisioning versus a base line (see example below). Conditionality means that the 
payment is only made if the promised service is actually provided (Wunder 2005). 
 
The most promising scenario for PES application is when the profitability of agricultural 
land use is only marginally higher than under some desired conservation land use (Wunder 
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2005, Wunder 2007). In this case, a relatively small payment can induce a shift to 
conservation land use. If transaction costs of a PES are prohibitively high, however, land 
purchases may be a better option. Likewise, high opportunity costs may argue for 
mandatorily established protected areas from a taxpayer perspective (cf. Wunder 2007). 
From a societal cost-benefit perspective, little is gained in this case, as these opportunity 
costs must still be born by someone-i.e. the landholder.  
 
PES can either be designed with a fixed rate of payment per unit area (or per unit service 
provisioning) or with a payment that reflects direct costs and opportunity costs of the service 
provider. Traditionally, fixed-rate “flat-fee” contracts have been offered. Fixed-rate schemes 
have efficiency deficits compared to opportunity cost-oriented schemes (Wunder 2007). For 
example, farmers with high marginal production profits per unit area are difficult to attract 
although their land may be critically important (Wunder 2005, Engel et al. 2009). Likewise, 
farmers with low opportunity costs may provide the service even without additional 
payment (Wunder 2005). However, they may be eager to subscribe these lands to the 
scheme - and are paid a rather high fixed compensation rate (no additivity). Both problems 
could be solved if the buyer was able to offer land holders PES contracts that correspond to 
their opportunity cost. This issue is particularly important if opportunity costs are 
heterogeneous (Wünscher et al. 2008). Because of the information asymmetry between 
buyers and service providers, the principal either has to survey and/or estimate opportunity 
costs very diligently - or offer a competitive auctioning scheme for PES contracts (Latacz-
Lohmann & Schilizzi 2005). 
 
In addition to differentiated payments according to landholder opportunity costs, the 
efficiency of a PES is increased if payments can be differentiated in accordance with the 
intensity of ecosystem service provisioning per unit area (Engel et al. 2009). Such a spatial 
"targeting" (Wünscher et al. 2008, Pagiola 2008), however, requires tools and/or procedures 
to assess the absolute or at least relative importance of an area for service provisioning. This 
can substantially increase the overall transaction costs of a targeted PES.  
 
Two aspects that can additionally reduce PES efficiency are lack of permanence and leakage 
(Wunder 2005). In contrast to buying land or the establishment of a permanently protected 
area, PES do not regularly establish a permanent protection. Once the payments cease at the 
end of the contract period, the provision of the service may end. Leakage can occur although 
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the land holder abides to the contract for the land directly covered by the PES. With the 
additional cash resources paid and/or with saved labour, however, an undesirable land use 
may be implemented elsewhere compromising overall ecosystem delivery.  
 
2.2.  Distributional implications 
 
Distributional impacts of biodiversity policies have relevance when policies impose a cost 
on people (Bagnoli et al. 2008) or provide potential benefits (Zilberman et al. 2006). Such 
distributional issues are particularly important if advantages and disadvantages are unevenly 
distributed among 'rich' and 'poor' people (cf. Bawa et al. 2004). 
 
PES are certainly not a tool for poverty reduction per se as they were developed from an 
economic efficiency perspective (see section above). With PES becoming more and more 
popular conservation instruments, there is an urgent interest to assess their distributional 
impacts (Engel et al. 2008). This topic has high relevance for our case study area in southern 
Ecuador because the Andes are a “hot spot” of high conservation priority which coincides 
with a high incidence of poverty (Fisher & Christopher 2007). The Convention on 
Biological Diversity recognizes the potentially problematic conservation-poverty interaction 
and defined poverty alleviation as one of its goals (SCBD 2009). 
 
Adams et al. (2004) analyze four approaches addressing conservation vis-a-vis poverty 
alleviation: (i) poverty and conservation are separate policy realms, (ii) poverty is a critical 
constraint to conservation, (iii) conservation should not compromise poverty reduction, (iv) 
poverty reduction depends on living resources conservation. Given these potential 
interactions between conservation and poverty alleviation, an integration of these policy 
realms is highly necessary. In line with point (ii), Wunder (2007) regards the overall 
"fairness" of a conservation project as a precondition to its long-term success. For many 
developing countries, the type of interaction between poverty alleviation and conservation is 
furthermore complicated by weak governance issues (Roe & Elliot 2006).  
 
Several theoretical studies have revealed restricting and facilitating conditions for a "pro-
poor" impact of PES (FAO 2007, Zilberman et al. 2006, Wunder 2005, Pagiola et al. 2005). 
Factors generally influencing the impact are spatial distribution of poor households, property 
rights structure of the land, agricultural land productivity and spatial as well as the social 
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distribution of the provision of the ecosystem services (FAO 2007). Also PES design itself 
can induce different distributive effects (Pagiola 2010). Any potentially positive distributive 
impact can only by realized if poor land holders decide to participate. Participation decisions 
are influenced not only by mean opportunity costs but also by the transaction costs of 
participation, price fluctuations, and other production risks as well as insecure or unsuitable 
type of land tenure (Wunder 2007). 
 
The following phenomenon impacts of participation farmer pro poor is point out with 
restrictive and positive conditions.The following restricting conditions of a pro-poor impact 
are frequently cited: 
 
 land diversion programs e.g. enforcing strict no-use (Zilberman et al. 2008, Wunder & 
Alban 2008),  
4. access restrictions to non-agricultural land uses or to illicit agricultural land used by 
the poor who are not official land holders themselves ("encroachment") (Wunder 
2008), 
5. Negative local impacts on food prices, employment (Bond et al. 2009, Zilbermann et 
al. 2008), labor productivity or food supply (Jourdain et al. 2009). 
6. exclusion of mixed land use systems, e.g., agroforestry (Wunder 2008), 
 small size of eligible land from smallholders resulting in high transaction costs 
(Kollmair & Rasul 2010, Antle & Stoorvogel 2008, Wunder 2008, Pagiola et al 2008, 
Lipper & Cavatassi 2004, Gong et al. 2010, Kollmair & Rasul 2010), 
 high agricultural opportunity cost of more intensively farming smallholder 
(Sommerville et al. 2010, Gong et al. 2010, Porras et al. 2008), 
 investment constrains such as restricted access to credit or technical assistance when 
land use change is involved, e.g., to agroforestry, regeneration systems (Pagiola et al. 
2008), or afforestation (Lipper & Cavatassi 2004, Kollmair & Rasul 2010), 
 institutional preconditions: insecure land tenure (Börner et al. 2010, Gong et al. 2010, 
Kollmair & Rasul 2010, Wunder 2008), weakness of resources rights/land of 
communities or indigenous people (Bond et al. 2009), and poor governance 
(Sommerville et al. 2010), 
 risk and uncertaintly to adopt conservation practices (Graff-Zivin & Lipper 2008), e.g. 
afforestation (Porras et al. 2008), 
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 weak social capital of smallholders (Gong et al. 2010), or weak collective action 
(Corbera et al. 2007). 
 
Hypothesized facilitating positive distributional impact conditions include targeting 
beneficiaries (Bond et al. 2009, Wunder 2008, Uchida et al. 2007): The poor actually need to 
participate. Analyzing the influence of social targeting is one of the foci of this study as we 
use social targeting in the design of three of the seven conservation instruments compared 
(see section 3.4.5).  
 
The following positive conditions of a pro-poor impact are frequently cited: 
 
 non-positive correlation between ecosystem services supply and productivity of 
alternative land uses. Poor-people may offer high supply of ecosystem services in 
areas of low agricultural productivity (Zilberman et al. 2008, Pfaff et al. 2008), e.g. 
PES has significant effect on poor people when they are located in up-land areas, low-
density, high supply of ecosystem services, and low opportunity and transaction cost, 
and high willingness to pay by beneficiaries in some areas of Asia (Leimona et al. 
2009), 
 PES promotes the employment of smallholder labor (Zilberman et al. 2008), e.g. 
through agroforestry (Pagiola et al. 2008), or eradication of invasive alien plants to 
restore ecosystem functions (Turpie et al. 2008),  
 equitable land distribution (Zilberman et al. 2008), 
 high poverty rate (Pagiola et al. 2008), 
 possible low transaction cost as collective smallholder schemes (Wunder 2008, Bracer 
et al. 2007, Swallow et al. 2005), 
 access to credit and to technical information when land use change is involved, e.g. 
agroforestry systems (Pagiola et al. 2008), 
 multiple options of PES contracts (Pagiola et al. 2008, Bracer et al. 2007), 
 institutional preconditions: local institutions that empower conservation and reinforce 
personal motivation (Clements et al. 2010) such as: formal land title (Wunder 2008, 
Zbinden & Lee 2005), strengthen long term property rights 
private/communal/indigenous (Gong et al. 2010, Milder et al. 2010, Kollmair & Rasul 
2010, Corbera et al. 2007, Bracer et al. 2007), equitable access to land (Kollmair & 
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Rasul 2010), regulation of power dynamics by state and create scenario for 
participation process (Bracer et al. 2007), 
 reducing risk of payment for ecosystem services (Gong et al. 2010) and equality on 
payment levels and terms (Bond et al. 2009). 
 linking PES other develop programs (Kollmair & Rasul 2010), 
 
A recent review study of PES issues (Engel et al. 2008) indicates that there is little empirical 
verification for any general poverty alleviation effect of PES. In particular, the results of the 
few existing studies do not support the notion of a pronounced pro-poor impact. The 
Ecuadorian government PES “Socio Bosque” was specifically designed to integrate 
conservation success with poverty alleviation effects (Ministerio de Ambiente 2008, 2009). 
The program started in 2008, so performance data are not available yet.  
 
With respect to distributional issues, Grieg-Gran et al. (2005) drew some preliminary 
lessons from an analysis of several Latin American PES. They concluded that the 
investigated PES did contribute to landholder cash income but that the majority of financial 
benefits were not accrued by the poor. In fact, the only PES with a clear pro-poor impact had 
only a small number of participants and was short-lived. However, positive impacts on land 
tenure status, social capital, training in forest management, and on employment were 
frequently observed. Also, there was little evidence of negative impacts. To some degree, 
the lack of poverty alleviation impact could be attributed to PES contract conditions ruling 
out the participation of smallholders, e.g. because of informal land tenure or 'mixed' land 
uses (agroforestry, young secondary forest) that prevented participation. An example of a 
PES successfully addressing both, poverty and ecosystem service provisioning, is the “the 
working for water program" (WfW), a huge scheme sponsored by the government of the 
Republic of South Africa (Turpie et al. 2008). WfW generates employment for landowners 
who restore the land for the provision of water.  
 
With respect to PES design itself (e.g., fixed-rate versus individualized payments), 
distributive impacts are theoretically expected (Pagiola 2010). Empirically, there are 
conflicting results regarding the extent to which fixed-rate schemes have pro-poor impacts. 
Zbinden & Lee (2005) find that the majority of benefits is not conveyed to poor households. 
In contrast, Wunder & Alban (2008) report a good conveyance of benefits to poor 
participants.  
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With respect to determine PES on poverty impact, previous studies use GINI coefficients to 
show the distributional impact of PES are reported on Pascual et al. 2010, Uchine et al. 
2007.  
 
The above cited theoretical and empirical studies show that a high number of factors can 
influence the efficiency as well as the distributional impacts of different conservation 
instruments including PES. Three of the factors that can impact both aspects are (i) 
mandatory vs. voluntary participation, (ii) the level of the granted payments in relation to 
opportunity costs, and (iii) fixed-rate vs. flexible, opportunity-cost oriented payments. Very 
few empirical studies are available, however, that empirically assess the influence of these 
factors, and that investigate potential trade-offs between the two CBD policy targets of 
conservation and poverty alleviation (Börner et al. 2010).  
 
Unfortunately, the conservation instruments compared (see section 3.4) all use a strict non-
use approach. We assume that a deforestation ban for selective logging or Non-wood Forest 
Products extraction is not possible. Also, transaction costs are not investigated here 
(Wünscher et al. 2008). Thus, any influence of these factors cannot be investigated here.  
 
In this paper, we analyze the efficiency and distributional impacts of payments for 
conservation of the native forest in the Biosphere Reserve “Podocarpus - El Condor” in 
south of Ecuador. We use PES definition given by Wunder (2005), PES is a voluntary 
transaction, with definied ecosystem service (native forest land use), with buyer 
(government), with a provider (farmer), and ecosystem service provide secure ecosystem 
service provision (conditionality). We analyze and compare the efficiency in the forest 
conservation with “mandatory” versus “voluntary” PES schemes. The schemes are used to 
assess to which extent distributive impact is affected by how payments are made (Pagiola 
2010). Several “pro poor” PES are used to show the potential for PES to act as a tool for 
poverty reduction (Pagiola et al. 2005). Moreover, we calculate the PES impact on the total 
household income and discuss the trade-offs between conservation and poverty alleviation. 
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3. Methods  
3.1.  Research area 
 
The research area is located in the south of Ecuador in the Biosphere Reserve “Podocarpus-
El Cóndor” in the provinces of Loja and Zamora-Chinchipe (see Figure 1). The research 
area is part of the global biodiversity “hot spot” of the Andes Mountains (CIPRB 2005, 
Brummitt & Lughadha 2003). The majority of rural households are poor smallholders 
practicing pasture-based cattle ranching (Beck 2008). The protection area “Corazón de Oro” 
(Area de Bosque y Vegetación Protectora Corazón de Oro; ABVPC) was established to the 
north of Podocarpus National Park. It forms a part the buffer zone of the national park which 
is the core area of the biosphere reserve.  
 
In the ABVPC and a narrow corridor between ABVPC and the national park, a socio-
economic household and farming survey was conducted in the farming season 2008 (n=130, 
for details see Maza et al. 2010 Chapter I). About 24% of all local households took part in 
the survey. The survey villages were selected randomly and proportional to household 
numbers. The number of households per village roughly reflects village size. The selection 
of households in the villages could not be conducted using a fully randomized process. 
Because of the sensitive economic information to be disclosed during the interview, we 
relied on snowball sampling and information of key informants in order to approach as 
much a 'representative' sample as possible. The land use on each farm was surveyed by 
personal interviews; the location of the plots was independently delimited on aerial 
photographs (IGM 2003), and ground-truthed using GPS data.  
 
There is no communal property land used by the sample farms. All land is privately owned. 
53.7% (2795 ha) of the land of the surveyed farms is forest; 45.5% (2391 ha) is pasture.   
Most farmers produce milk and other dairy products (curd/cheese). Only a small portion of 
farms produces milk exclusively. Crop production is mainly for subsistence purposes and 
covers only 0.6% of the area. Arable crop plots are very small; additionally, there are small 
home gardens. Pasture-based production accounts for 70.4% of total household incomes, off-
farm income for 25.7% and arable crops for 3.9% of total household income.  
 
 125 
 
Figure 1: Research area in the Biosphere Reserve “Podocarpus-El Cóndor”, southern 
Ecuador 
 
For some of the households having access to more remote areas of forest, timber may also 
contribute to household income. As timber felling is an illicit activity in the ABVPC, the 
extent to which this is the case could not be quantified. The quality of many of the accesible 
mountain forest trees is low, however, and indicators for any large scale felling operations 
could not be found during fieldwork. This suggests that timber felling mainly contributes to 
subsistence consumption in the sample villages. We assume that there is some “commercial” 
timber extraction in the villages of the highest altitude, most north-eastern parts of the 
ABVPC, which were (by chance) not included in the sample. The importance of fuel wood 
extraction or of other forms of non-timber forest product utilization is small. Most 
households use domestic gas which is highly subsidized by the state. 
 
3.2.  Calculation of individual opportunity costs 
 
As a proxy for the opportunity costs of conservation measures to the individual household, 
we use the net profit of the pasture-based cattle production system. For details, please refer 
to (Chapter II). The selection of net profits is motivated by the conservation restriction we 
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intend to analyze: A ban on the conversion of forest land households already owning 
pastures. We assume leveraged upon that the additional land requires additional labor which 
must be remunerated at a wage rate at which local households work off-farm. Apart from the 
option to be converted, we assume zero economic value of the forest land. If income come 
from forest is zero, the opportunity cost of potential pasture is equal to the net profit of cattle 
production. In effect, we slightly overestimated opportunity cost on some forest utilization is 
likely to occur (see section 3.1.). 
 
First, we calculated gross income (amount of products sold plus amount of products 
consumed valued at market prices) for each farmer. In order to be able to project financial 
effects of PES application, based on stablished agronomic practice, we fitted a Cobb-
Douglas production function to predict household gross income. Land, labor, input 
expenses, altitude, ethnicity, utilization of technical assistance, access to formal credit, 
membership in local organizations, age as well as education of the household head, cost 
distance to the provincial capitals (i.e. major markets), and off-farm income were tested as 
explanatory variables with STATA 9.0. The factors printed in Italics yielded significant 
(p<0.1) predictors in a parsimonious regression model using log-transformed right hand side 
and left hand side variables ( Adj R
2
=0.42). Because of the heteroskedasticity, the 
significance of explanatory variables was cheking using robust regression.  
 
Second, surveyed variable costs were subtracted from predicted gross income for each farm 
to yield gross margins. Finally, net profits were obtained by subtracting fixed costs including 
household labor atributed to pasture-based production (Zeller & Schwarze 2006).  
 
3.3.  Conservation budget  
 
In order to be able to compare conservation effectiveness and distributional impacts of 
different conservation instruments, each of the instruments (see section 3.4) must be 
assigned the same amount of money to disburse. For designing a realistic budget scenario, 
we relied on two sources. First, a previous study had revealed that 30% (839 ha) of the still 
forested project area are at an immediate land conversion risk to pasture using Landsat ETM 
data at 30m resolution (Eichhorn 2009). The conversion risk was calculated by multiple 
logistic regression mainly considering market access and geomorphological aspects such as 
 127 
altitude and slope. For 30% of the forest pixels, the suitability for pasture was higher than 
for the average pasture pixel actually found in the research region.  
 
Second, the Socio Bosque program pays a maximum of 30 USD/ha/yr for existing forest in 
poor communities placed for 20 years under the a specific PES (Socio Bosque 2010a). We 
use the Socio Bosque payment rate to yield the conservation budget by multiplying the 839 
ha most endangered forest rate by 30 USD/ha/yr resulting in a budget of 25,170 USD/yr. 
This budget is assumed to be completely be paid to farmers, i.e. transaction costs are not 
accounted for (Wunder et al. 2008, Pagiola and Bosquet 2009).  
 
3.4.  Conservation instrument options (“PES”) 
 
We compare four conservation instruments which are either mandatory or voluntary, either 
fixed-cost or opportunity cost oriented. The fifth conservation instrument is designed as to 
provide maximal benefits to the poorest local farming households.  
3.4.1. Mandatory PES schemes 
 
The mandatory instruments represent a class of instruments for which the government 
imposes all rules and also determines the payment to the individual land owner (Engel et al. 
2008). In our examples, the crucial characteristic is that all farming households are required 
to participate in the conservation scheme. In particular, we stipulate that each farming 
household is required to subject the same proportion of its land to a forest conversion ban. 
These schemes do not include any form of spatial targeting, e.g., by levying the forest ban 
only on those 839 ha that were determined as being most in danger of deforestation. In a few 
cases in which the single household does not have a sufficient amount of forest left, the 
household is, nevertheless, required to idle the respective proportion of land and to allow for 
secondary forest development.  
 
For the mandatory fixed rate scheme, the compensation rate for land required to be placed 
under the scheme is set at the mean opportunity cost of the surveyed farming households (at 
159 USD/ha/yr). Thus, a conservation budget of 25,170 USD/yr can cover roughly 18.8% of 
the 839 ha threatened by deforestation. These 18.8% are distributed proportionally among all 
households according to woodland size. 
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If we stipulate that the opportunity costs of the individual households are known - and not 
just an estimate of mean opportunity costs -, individually differing compensation payments 
could be made to farming households. This gives rise to the mandatory opportunity cost 
scheme. At a given conservation budget, one needs to determine the share of the forest land 
of the farms that can be placed maximally under the conservation scheme without exceeding 
the budget. The share was found by a simple calculation: the individual opportunity cost 
multiplied by forest area under risk and multiplied by proportional share. The proportional 
share was adjusted until the total payments (n=130) did not exceeding the conservation 
budget.  This share is 16.17%.   
 
3.4.2.  Voluntary PES scheme 
 
For the voluntary instruments, we assume that an individual farming household opts to take 
part in an offered conservation scheme if and only if the payment/ha is higher than its 
opportunity cost/ha (see section 3.2).  
 
To determine participating households in a voluntary fixed rate scheme, first the maximum 
amount of forest land is determined that can be included while fully compensating land 
holders for their opportunity costs. If households are ordered according to opportunity 
cost/ha, participating households are determined by successively selecting more "expensive" 
land from this list until the budget is exhausted. In a fixed-rate scheme, adding the next 
household's forest land from the list does not only result in adding the respective costs to the 
expenditure for the scheme. Additionally, all land already included needs to be multiplied 
with the opportunity cost of the last added household. If this procedure is followed, the 
conservation budget of 25,170 USD/yr is exhausted at a fixed-rate of 102 USD/ha/yr.  
 
If a lower fixed rate would be offered, the budget could not be exhausted (reduced 
conservation effectiveness); if a higher rate was offered, the budget does not suffice to 
compensate all eligible households (oversubscription). If the analyst determining the rate, at 
which fixed-rate contracts are offered, does not know the actual distribution of opportunity 
costs, reduced effectiveness or oversubscription may easily occur. 
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In a Voluntary opportunity cost scheme, the forest land parcels of the farming households 
are simply included one by one from the ordered list (see above) until the budget is 
exhausted. Effectively, this selection of households would be the outcome of a competitive 
auctioning of PES contracts. In such an auction, farming households would have to make 
bids that exactly equal their opportunity costs.  
 
3.4.3.  “Pro-poor” PES 
 
An initial analysis of the above four PES options indicated that their distributional impact is 
problematic. A very large share of financial resources tends to end up with the relatively 
least poor households. Thus, we designed a specific "pro-poor" PES. The design process was 
guided by the consideration that the simplest way of achieving positive distributional 
impacts would be  
 
(i) to poverty-target payments, 
 
For 67% of our sample, total farming household income (sum of arable crop, cattle 
and off-farm income) is below the Ecuadorian minimum income (522 USD/month) 
necessary to subsist a family of five members in Ecuador (INEC 2009). Only these 
households should be eligible to participate in the scheme; and even within this large 
group of households contracts should be assigned in order of decreasing poverty; 
 
(ii) while compensation payments need to exceed opportunity costs.  
 
If payments do not exceed opportunity costs, participating households cannot be 
made substantially better off.  
 
A voluntary, poverty-targeted scheme with relatively high, fixed compensation payments is 
one straight forward way of incorporating both considerations. In particular, we analyse the 
impacts of three schemes with either 150, 200 or 300 USD/ha/yr as fixed rates. All 
households with opportunity costs below these rates are assigned contracts in order of 
poverty status until the budget of 25,170 USD/yr is exhausted. Poverty statement is 
approximated by total farm net income. 
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3.5.  Distributional Impacts 
 
For an analysis of the distributional impact of the five PES options, several variables were 
calculated. These variables either apply to the individual households or to the quintiles of the 
poverty distribution as approximated by the ex-ante total income distribution. The ex-ante 
income is the total income of the household which includes: agricultural and off-farm. The 
final income is total ex-ante income plus payments for forest conservation: 
 
 distribution of the total funds among poverty quintiles (=average payment 
received per household poverty quintile). 
 relative income impact per household and per poverty quintile (=payment received/ 
ex ante total household income).  
 number of households raised above the poverty line by the payment. 
 GINI coefficient measures the degrees of inequality in the distribution of income in 
a given society. 
 
The GINI coefficient varies between 0 (full equality; each individual receives the 
same income), and 1 (full inequality; one individual receive all income and the rest 
receives nothing). GINI coefficients were calculated with the command “ineqdeco” 
in the statistical computer package Stata 10. The formula of the GINI coeficient is:  
 
       
 
 
  
 
    
              
 
   
 
 
Where N is the number of households, Yi is the income of household i, and m is the 
mean total household income.  
 
Previous studies that use GINI coefficients to show the distributional impact of PES are 
reported on Pascual et al. 2010, Uchine et al. 2007.  
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3.6.  Trade-offs between poverty alleviation and efficiency in forest conservation  
 
Of the above measures of distributional impact, the number of households lifted above the 
poverty line by the payments as well as the GINI coefficient supply a single value to 
characterise poverty alleviation and/or distributional impact information. Thus, they are 
particularly suitable for an aggregated comparison of the trade offs between poverty 
alleviation and efficiency in forest conservation. As the same budget is used in all cases, 
efficiency is assumed to be only influenced by the hectares covered by the different 
schemes.  
 
4. Results  
4.1. Distributional Impacts 
 
The explanatory variables used to predict gross income are land (p<0.001), labor (p<0.001), 
input expenses (p<0.001), altitude (p<0.009), ethnicity (p=0.149), technical assistance 
(p=0.086), and access to formal credit (p<0.129). 
 
The average opportunity cost across all households is 160 USD/ha/yr in the sample, 
Moreover, the opportunity costs in the income distribution are: first quintile 100 USD/ha/yr, 
second quintile 131 USD/ha/yr, third quintile 166 USD/ha/yr, fourth quintile 162 
USD/ha/yr, and fifth quintile 235 USD/ha/yr. 
 
In terms of total funds spent for the farming households by poverty quintiles, the mandatory 
opportunity cost scheme results in the worst distributional result (Fig. 3). While the poorest 
households only receive about 30 USD/yr, the least poor households receive more than 500 
USD/yr. The mandatory fixed-rate scheme fares only slightly better. The voluntary fixed 
rate scheme has the relatively best pro poor performance. Still, for any of these PES options, 
the poorest quintile of households receives the lowest average payment per household.  
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Figure 2: Average of the opportunity cost of forest conservation by quintiles of the income 
distribution 
 
 
Figure 3: Average payments according to income quintiles 
 
With respect to the impact of the payments in comparison to total household income, exactly 
the same relative performance of the four schemes emerges (Fig. 4). The mandatory 
opportunity cost scheme has the worst and the voluntary fixed rate scheme has the best 
performance. The two voluntary schemes add roughly 6% to 10% to the income of the 
poorest farming households. They also add more than five percent to the income in the 
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second, and roughly 10% and 8% of the income of the third quintile - the latter still below 
the official Ecuadorian poverty line.  
 
 
Figure 4: Impact of PES payments relative to ex-ante household income 
 
Clear improvements with respect to distributional impact are evident for the three "pro-poor" 
PES (Fig.5, and Fig.6). If 300 USD/ha/yr is paid the forest of the poorest households, nearly 
500 USD are spent on average in the households of the poorest and second poorest quintiles 
resulting in an increase of household incomes of 37% and 20% respectively. At 200 
USD/ha/yr, average payments are already twice as high for the second quintile while the 
relative income impact for both quintiles rests at about 22-23%. Very little money is 
disbursed to the moderately poor third, and no money to the least two quintiles of the 
income distribution with the 150 USD/ha/yr scheme, already more money ends up with the 
third then with the first quintile. 
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Figure 5: Average payments of the “pro-poor” PES relative to the ex-ante income 
distribution 
 
Figure 6: Impact of the “pro-poor” PES payments on relative to ex-ante household income 
 
The numbers of households below the poverty line is not very sensitive to the payment 
schemes (Fig. 7). In the status quo as well as in the "Pro-Poor 300" PES, only 43 of 
households are above the poverty line. Even the "best" instrument by this variable-the 
voluntary opportunity cost scheme-can only lift five additional households above the 
poverty line.  
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Figure 7: Forest protected versus households over poverty line 
 
The GINI coefficient of the set of sampled households is about 0.487
20
 in the status quo 
(Fig. 8). With a mandatory opportunity cost scheme, the value remains virtually unchanged. 
Fixing the payment in a mandatory scheme at the average opportunity cost per farm leads to 
a small improvement (mandatory fixed-rate scheme). Further improvements can be achieved 
with the voluntary instruments (~0.477), and finally with the "pro-poor" PES. Supporting 
results from Figures 4 and 5, the "Pro-Poor 300" scheme performs best (0.462) followed by 
"Pro-Poor 200", and "Pro-Poor 150".  
 
                                                          
20
 This is close to the national Ecuadorian average; c.f. GINI coefficients of countries such as: Sweden 0.23, 
Ecuador: 0.46, Guatemala: 0.50, and Bolivia: 0.60.  
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Figure 8: Forest protected versus GINI coefficient 
 
4.2. Conservation efficiency and trade-offs 
 
In table 1, the protected area for each of the PES is listed. The smallest area protected is 
achieved with the "Pro-Poor300" PES with ~84 ha (10% of the threatened area). The other 
"Pro-Poor" PES reaches 15-20%. The two mandatory schemes do hardly fare better with 16-
19%. In contrast, the voluntary fixed-rate schemes are able to cover nearly 30% to ~36% 
(305 ha; voluntary opportunity cost scheme).  
 
Table 1: Forest protection and household participation 
Scheme Mean 
Payment 
(USD/ha/yr) 
Forest area 
(ha) 
Forest 
area (%) 
Households 
(number) 
Households 
(%) 
Mandatory Fixed-rate 159 158.07 18.84 124 95 
Mandatory Opportunity Cost Individual 
opport. cost 
135.67 16.17 124 95 
Voluntary Fixed-rate 102 247.34 29.48 53 41 
Voluntary Opportunity Cost Individual 
opport. cost 
304.98 36.35 46 35 
Pro-poor Fixed-rate 150 150 167.73 19.99 37 28 
Pro-poor Fixed-rate 200 200 126.14 15.03 37 28 
Pro-poor Fixed-rate 300 300 83.86 10.00 39 30 
 
Plotting the area protected against the number of households above the poverty line suggests 
a nearly perfectly linear positive relationship between conservation efficiency and poverty 
alleviation (Fig. 6). Plotting area protected against the more sensitive Gini coefficients, 
Mandatory Opp. 
Cost
Mandatory 
Fixed-rate
Voluntary Opp. 
Cost
Voluntary Fixed-
ratePro-poor 150
Pro-poor 200
Pro-poor 300
Status Quo
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
0.46 0.465 0.47 0.475 0.48 0.485 0.49S
h
ar
e 
o
f 
th
re
at
ed
 f
o
re
st
 p
ro
te
ct
io
n
GINI
 137 
however, substantial trade-offs become apparent (Fig. 7). Compared to the status quo, there 
is at least no substantially negative impact of any scheme. However, the two mandatory 
schemes that achieve 16-19% protection have hardly any positive distributional impact. The 
two voluntary schemes are highly efficient in terms of forest protection (up to 36%), and in 
fact, substantially improve the income distribution. Any further improvement in 
distributional impact is accompanied by a massive decline in conservation efficiency, 
though.  
5. Discussion 
 
Large knowledge gaps exist regarding the conservation effectiveness (Engel et al. 2009). A 
number of factors is either known or hypothesized to influence the efficiency as well as the 
distributional impacts of different conservation instruments including PES (section 2.2). In 
this study, we investigated three of these factors: (i) mandatory vs. voluntary participation, 
(ii) the level of the payments in relation to opportunity costs, and (iii) fixed-rate vs. flexible, 
opportunity-cost oriented payments. Before discussing the main results of the study, we 
briefly summarize a number of methodological issues. 
 
Firstly, we have to point out that study uses empirical data on a sample of typically 
concerned farms. However, this is a simplified ex-ante assessment (Börner et al. 2010). Real 
performance of any of the schemes presented will differ as we did not include transaction 
costs (Wünscher et al. 2008), and use a very simple model of how local farmers decide to 
participate in any of the voluntary schemes. With the inclusion of the opportunity cost of 
forest conservation, a critical element of PES performance was included, though. More 
alternative assumptions on decision making, e.g. including smallholder risk aversion (Fraser 
2002, Ozanne & White 2008) as well as the inclusion of (estimates of) transactions costs 
will improve the results in later analyses. 
 
Second, the sample is certainly only weakly "representative" for the universe of local 
farming households as a random sampling approach could not be used at household level. In 
this respect, the quantitative statements, for example on the changes of the precise Gini 
coefficient values, should be treated with caution. In combination with the background 
knowledge of the local assistants, the relatively high share of households that was sampled 
(24%) as well as the much more trustful interview setting somewhat offset the disadvantages 
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of the snowball sampling approach used. All investigated households had at least a small 
piece of land. If the snowball sampling had missed a number of very poor, landless 
households, the positive distributional impact of the "Pro Poor" PES would have been 
overestimated. 
 
Third, no spatial targeting was performed. Most certainly, the forests most in risk of 
conservation are not evenly distributed among all sampled households. A spatially-explicit 
treatment of the farming households to facilitate targeting is possible later-on, however, as 
the precise location of all households was surveyed. It is highly likely that spatial targeting 
will substantially improve on-the ground conservation efficiency. If spatial targeting would 
have an effect on distributional aspects, is difficult to prognosticate without a full-fledged 
investigation into the ownership of threatened forest along the household income 
distribution.  
 
Fourth, several further aspects that impact the performance of PES (property rights, payment 
to local communities vs. individuals, labour effects, and impact on the cost of living; Engel 
et al. 2008, Zilberman et al. 2006) are not included. Likewise, differences in compliance 
between different schemes have neither been analyzed nor potential leakage (Wunder 2005).  
 
Finally, we do approach the issue exclusively from a financial cost-effectiveness perspective 
ignoring wider environmental costs and benefits for the time being (Naidoo & Adamowiz 
2005). If such information was incorporated (see e.g., Hillmann & Barkmann 2009), it 
would allow (i) for the determination of an economically optimised conservation budget, 
and (ii) for additional spatial targeting options.  
 
This brief methodological discussion suggests that quite some room for improvement 
remains. Still, for no single issue it is apparent that it would - either alone or in combination 
- invalidate the following overall results.  
 
In discussing the following main results, we focus on a comparison of the PES instrument 
variants. Our two mandatory schemes are less cost efficient than the two voluntary schemes. 
This effect is caused by the fact that the mandatory instruments are designed as PES that 
provide a compensation payment for enforcing conservation land use. As all farming 
households are required to participate in the schemes regardless of their opportunity costs, 
 139 
many very "expensive" forest lands are included driving up average per ha cost at a fixed 
budget. 
 
With respect to cost efficiency, opportunity cost-oriented schemes do not have a clear 
advantage if participation is mandatory. In fact, the mandatory opportunity cost-scheme 
could enlist 3% less forest area than the fixed-rate scheme using the average opportunity 
cost per hectare across all farms as the compensation rate. At a slightly lower rate, it would 
have outperformed the opportunity cost-oriented variant. For the voluntary schemes, the 
advantage of an opportunity cost-oriented scheme is clearly apparent (Böner et al. 2010), 
though. In this combination, by far the highest amount of forest (36%) could be conserved 
with the given conservation budget. As predicted by a consolidated body of literature, this 
scheme results in exceptional cost effectiveness and can be approximated in a real 
application by an auctioning of conservation contracts (see Latacz-Lohmann & Achimilizzi 
2005, Jack et al. 2008b, Engel et al. 2007, Wooldridge 2009).  
 
Increasingly more expensive voluntary fixed-rate schemes (including the three "Pro-Poor" 
PES) become less and less cost efficient. Offering voluntary fixed rate schemes with a lower 
payment rate that used in the "traditional" voluntary fixed rate scheme (102 USD/ha/yr) is 
no solution, however. In this case of under-compensation (Jack et al. 2008a), so few farmers 
would accept the contract that the conservation budget was not fully spent. While relative 
cost efficiency could be boosted, the overall conservation effect would drop.  
 
With respect to distributional implications, a number of results could be obtained. Most 
importantly, the poverty alleviation impact of any scheme not assigning contracts according 
to poverty status is small. This supports recent review results that pronounced pro-poor 
impacts are rarely observed (Engel et al. 2008). This is true, for example for the otherwise 
much lauded PES in Costa Rica where most of the payments goes to better off households 
(Grieg-Gran et al. 2005, Zbinden & Lee 2005) or potential high transference of economic 
benefits to large landholders in the Brazilian Amazon (Böner et al. 2010).  
 
Jack et al. (2008a) as well as Zilberman et al. (2006) had suggested that PES may help to 
alleviate poverty when poorest potential providers have the lowest opportunity cost of 
ecosystem services supply. Interestingly, this is the case in our sample with an average 
opportunity cost of the poorest poverty quintile of 100 USD/ha/yr as opposed to 236 
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USD/ha/yr for the least poor quintile. Still, none of the PES was able to generate more than 
about 10% of additional income for the households below the poverty line; often 
substantially worse results were obtained. In terms of the absolute amounts of money 
disbursed, all schemes allotted the least amount to the poorest quintile. For the mandatory 
schemes, this holds even for the poorest two quintiles. This observation stresses the second 
requirement mentioned by (Jack et al. 2008a): The poorest providers must also be those with 
a high service provision potential. Along these lines, our results show the poorest 
households simply own critically little forest land that can be placed under any scheme in 
the first place. While the average forest size of the poorest quintile is 1.65 ha, the least poor 
quintile owns 13.3 ha on average.  
 
In addition to traditional efficiency-oriented PES, this study also investigates the likely 
performance of PES that have explicitly been designed to be an instrument to reduce 
poverty. At payment rates of 150-300 USD/ha/yr, income increases of 15-37% could be 
achieved for the poorest quintile of households, and increases of 16-23% for the second 
poorest quintile. In absolute terms, the scheme with a fixed rate of 300 USD/ha/yr disburses 
an equal amount of money to both quintiles. Already for the Pro-Poor PES with 200 
USD/ha/yr, twice as much money ends up with the second quintile, with the situation 
worsening for the pro-poor PES with 150 with 200 USD/ha/yr. For the Pro-Poor PES with 
150 USD/ha/yr. Still, by employing a voluntary mechanism that offers contracts to the 
poorest households first (cf. Ministerio del Ambiente 2009), a near perfect social targeting 
could be achieved by all three "Pro-Poor" PES if compared to the efficiency-oriented PES: 
The entire conservation budget ends up with households below the poverty line. Many 
households are so far below the poverty line, however, that even for the Pro-Poor PES, the 
number of households additionally moving above the poverty line is small. Still, the 
improveness achieved by the pro-poor PES appears substantial. 
 
The fixed-rate offer of the Pro-Poor300 PES is ten times as high per ha as the maximum 
payments allowed under the Socio Bosque project of the Ecuadorian government. The 30 
USD/ha/yr are roughly five times lower than average opportunity cost of the sample and 
roughly three times lower than the average opportunity cost of the poorest quintile. Still, 
several thousand hectares could be placed under Socio Bosque already (Ministerio de 
Ambiente 2009). This discrepency may stems from the fact that we used the actual net profit 
of pasture based agriculture as a opportunity costs of forest land actually under conversion 
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threat (30% of the total forest land). If we had 'allowed' also the other 70% without 
imminent deforestation threat to be entered into the schemes, local farmers would likely 
have accepted much lower offers as the expected opportunity costs are close to zero for the 
next few years. In this case, if the situation describes also the situation of much of the land 
under Socio Bosque program, its additively may be very low. 
 
Trade-offs between the double objectives of conservation efficiency and poverty alleviation 
were expected (Jack et al. 2008a). With the exception of the mandatory schemes that 
perform badly in both respects, such trade-offs are also apparent in our results. Specifically, 
very pronounced trade-offs exist among the five different voluntary instruments. Moving 
from "traditional" voluntary schemes (fixed rate or opportunity cost-oriented) to the "Pro-
poor" schemes by offering very high fixed payments to the poorest households, comes at 
high losses of cost efficiency. The amount of forest covered drops from 36% to 10% while 
the relatively worst distributional impact is traded for the best. In technical terms, the 
mandatory schemes are clearly suboptimal while the voluntary schemes represent members 
of a set of instruments with nearly Pareto-optimal performance.  
 
The two mandatory conservation instruments were designed to include a compensation 
payment. So the risk to actually impose direct cost in terms of overall income losses on the 
poor was lower than in other forms of 'command and control' conservation that do only 
impose land use restrictions (see, Engel et al. 2008). The amount of such costs can easily be 
assessed from our dataset, though. Because the opportunity costs of forest conversion were 
calculated from actual net profit data of local pasture-based agriculture, the payment data per 
farm approximate also the long-term loss per farm if no compensation was paid - or the 
immediate financial loss in case of a mandatory afforestation program with no subsequent 
forest use.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In sum, we found that the design of payment and contract attributes has a pronounced impact 
on the efficiency (cost-effectiveness) as well as on the distributional impact of PES-type 
conservation instruments (cf. Pagiola 2010). Voluntary instruments tend to be more cost 
efficient than mandatory ones if competitively low payments are offered. Such low offers - 
for example as aimed at though the auctioning of PES contracts – were found to be 
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incompatible with poverty alleviation goals. Pronounced pro-poor distributional impacts are 
possible, however, but the PES contracts will need rather high payments per unit area (up to 
300 USD/ha/yr) and will have to be offered exclusively to the poorest households. At the 
community level, the Ecuadorian Socio Bosque program achieves such a form of social 
targeting because the program is only implemented in particularly poor communities. Its 
acceptance in spite of its very low fixed payment offer of 30 USD/ha/yr suggests that forest 
lands with a low agricultural potential, i.e. with a low deforestation risk, may have been 
placed under the program. Thus, issues of additionality and spatial targeting should urgently 
be investigated here. With respect to the massive trade-offs between the goals of 
conservation efficiency and positive distribution impacts reported, it appears unlikely that 
these trade-offs can be avoided by additional 'innovative' forms of PES. In landscapes 
dominated by agricultural smallholders but also populated by a substantial share of larger 
farms, excluding larger, less poor farming households from participation is in many cases 
likely to exclude areas with low per area costs.  
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Chapter V 
General Discussion 
 
Ecuador is one of the countries with the richest biodiversity globally (Brummitt and 
Lughada 2003). 18% of the national territory is below protected area. Still, Ecuador has the 
highest annual deforestation rate (FAO 2005) in South America (1.7%; 198 000 ha/yr) with 
much land being converted to pastures and crop land. Land use change from natural 
ecosystem to agricultural land is one main threat of biodiversity in Ecuador (Wunder 2000). 
Sustainable forest protection versus alternatives land uses needs a deep knowledge of the 
ecosystem and socio-economic conditions of the users. In this way, DFG Research Unit 
(RU) 816 promotes the research of tropical mountain rain forest and its anthropogenic 
replacement systems in the south of Ecuador. Inside RU, the project “Human Drivers and 
land use system” focus in different sustainable management options in mountain rainforest, 
by investigating in the ecological and economic consequences of the different land use 
systems. Also, sub-project “Spatial explicit and institutional extended of ecosystem services 
C3.2” considers that the design and valuation of biodiversity conservation strategies 
(afforestation scenarios, biosphere reserve zoning, payments for ecological services) needs 
following elements: (i) empirical data on the global, regional and local benefits of 
conservation (demand side of ecosystem services) and (ii) financial data on smallholder 
production options (supply side ecosystem services). 
 
This study focus in the heterogeneity of different land use options of the peasant household 
in the area of Biosphere Reserve “Podocarpus-El Condor”. The research has three research 
questions i) What are opportunity costs of the farmers to conserve the native Andean forest?. 
One way to reduce negative externalities of land use conversion is to increment the technical 
efficiency. In this sense, the second question:  ii) Is current agricultural production working 
efficient?. Finally one special interest is: ii) What is the best conservation instrument in 
order to reach cost-efficiency and poverty alleviation?, The main findings with the research 
are: 
 
Profitability of smallholder agriculture 
 
Studies about profitability of agricultural production are given by Wunder (2000) for the 
Ecuadorian Andes, and by Knoke et al. (2009) for the local research area. There is a gap of 
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the information about of heterogeneity of farm agricultural profitability, however. In this 
study, we fill this gap information. We analyze the profitability of local arable crops and 
cattle production systems.   
 
Given the restricted resources of the study, the snowball sampling approach used has likely 
performed better than a random sampling approach. Peasant households  in the research area 
tended to exaggerate or understate their farm or production characteristics as a strategy of 
“personal protection” potentially leading to substantial strategic bias. In this sense, the 
snowball approach reduces strategic bias likely to be present when sensitivity information or 
financial information was to be disclosed. Still, statistical representativeness cannot be 
claimed for the sample. The non-random sampling requires that descriptive statistic 
presented needs to be treated with caution. Likewise, the representation of cattle income as a 
function of growth increments and sales of cattle, will need refinements that potentially 
affect the conclusions presented.  
 
The arable crop production represents 3.9% of the total household income and it is less 
profitable (-276 USD/ha/yr) on average than cattle production (160 USD/ha/yr). Arable 
crops are restricted to small plots near to houses mainly for auto-consumption. In other side, 
pasture-based production accounts for 70.4% of total household income. 
 
Family labour has a strong influence on profitability of arable crop and cattle production. 
The net profit calculations are reduced drastically when family labour valued at actual 
agricultural wage rates are included as fixed costs. The gross margin in arable crop switches 
from 79 USD/ha/yr to -276 USD/ha/yr. The gross margin in cattle switches from 245 
USD/ha/yr to 160 USD/ha/yr. As a consequence, some negative values on net profit of cattle 
production show up. The wage rate applied may have been too high as farmers actually 
report difficulties in finding off-farm employment.  
 
Our results show that cattle production is the more profitable land use. But it also has a 
substantial heterogeneity in the net profits. The average cattle ranching net profit is 160 
USD/ha/yr. This value is lower than net profit of 208 USD/ha/yr (adjusted for inflation
21
) 
                                                          
21 
The value was adjusted with the formula:  Future amount = Present value * (1+ % inflation) ^ number of 
years.  The reference adjusted value is for 2007 (Annex 7). The survey was conducted at the beginning of 2008 
and the data information corresponds to 2007. Ecuador adopted the dollar as official currency since 2000. 
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reported by Wunder
22
 (2000) for Ecuadorian Andes. Our values differ from values reported 
by Wunder (2000) because Wunder values are base on information given by experts in the 
field. Also, our value (160 USD/ha/yr) is higher than the ~100 USD/ha/yr net profit reported 
by Knoke
23
 et al. (2009) for research area. Our values may differ from values reported by 
Knoke et al. (2000) because Knoke et al. have a smaller sample, and have used a different 
algorithm to calculate income.  
 
Our main contribution is to show the huge heterogeneity present in our sample. For instance, 
70 USD/ha/yr (percentile 25), 123 USD/ha/yr (percentile 50) and 227 USD/ha/yr (percentile 
75). The heterogeneity of profitability of cattle production has biodiversity policy 
implications, for example in the distributional impacts and efficiency of payments for forest 
conservation (Details in chapter III) or alternative conservation measures (Wunder 2005). 
 
The cattle production analysis suggests that several factors influence profitability. Cobb-
Douglas production function determined significant factors that affect gross income which 
directly affects profitability. A farmer who lives in lowlands, is of “Mestizo” ethnic, has 
access to technical assistance and credit has higher gross margin than a farmer who lives in 
uplands, is of “Saraguro” ethnic, and without access to technical assistance and credit. One 
reason for differences on profitability may be that the “Mestizos” are more connected with 
the local markets in Loja and Zamora cities. On the contrary, the ethnic group “Saraguros” is 
located far from local markets.  
 
One hectare more arable crop land increases gross income by 148.6 USD/yr. Because of the 
problematic terrain, a substantial extension of arable agriculture may not be possible. One 
man-day more of labor increases gross income by 0.38 USD/yr. The marginal effect of labor 
is less that average wage (4 USD/day) reported for our sample. It means that there is too 
much labor available for arable crop production. One USD/yr of input expenses increases 
gross income by 2.12 USD/yr. It means that the investment on inputs appears very low.  
  
Marginal effect of one hectare more of pasture land is an increase in gross income by 4.75 
USD/yr. This is much less than for arable land. One man-day more of labor increases gross 
                                                          
22 
Wunder (2000) reports 125 USD/ha/year for cattle ranching, at 5% discount rate, in the fourth year of 
deforestation cycle. It is not explicit how was valued the labor. 
23 
It is not explicit how was valued and incorporated the labor. 
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income by 1.56 USD/yr. The marginal effect of labor is still less that the average wage rate 
paid (4 USD/day) for our sample – but it is much higher than compared to arable agriculture. 
One USD/yr of input expenses only increases gross income by 0.17 USD/yr. This means 
that the investment in cash inputs may already be high given the principle constraints of the 
current production technology.  
 
In the face of severe nature conservation concerns in the area coinciding with severe 
poverty, it is a challenge to improve the profitability of local peasant households per hectare 
(intensification). Contrary to the ideas expressed by Adams (2009) who argues for an 
intensification of the land use system, our results indicate only limited room for successful 
intensification with the current production technologies. The relatively best results may be 
achieved if some of the pasture land could be converted to arable agriculture without 
inducing additional resource conservation concerns. Also a higher cash investment into 
arable agriculture appears promising with rate of return potentially in excess of 100% p.a. 
Furthermore, access to technical assistance and to formal credit may improve cattle 
production. Using robust standard errors, the significance of predictors is closer to and in 
excess of 0.1 that below 0.05, however. 
 
Technical efficiency and determinants of cattle production 
 
This study outlines the technical efficiency level and its determinants in the cattle production 
based on farm level data sampled in farming season 2008. A total of 130 farming 
households were considered for the analysis. The translog stochastic frontier production 
function was found appropriate for the dataset used for the investigation. 
 
The snowball sampling approach is a better than a random sampling approach in the 
research area. Peasant households exaggerate or minimize their ownership as strategy of 
“personal protection” (strategic bias). There is a reason: They have unfulfilled promises or 
bad experiences from politicians, governmental institutions, or past researchers. In this 
sense, the snowball approach reduces strategic bias likely to be present when sensitivity 
information or financial information was to be disclosed.  
 
The production frontier models reveal that size of pasture, labour and costs of production 
monotonically increased cattle production in the sampled farms. Also, the technical 
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inefficiency model shows that location of the farms (lowland), ethnicity (Mestizo ethic) and 
access to technical assistance increased the technical efficiency of cattle farms in the study 
area. 
 
The farmer localization has a positive impact on efficiency. The big difference is not 
capturated with the current variables, that is the market access variable. A road between 
“Sabanilla” and “Tibio” (inhabitat by Saraguros ethnic) is planned. Saraguros will enable a 
dramatically market access which is according to our results. In other hand, Eichhorn (2009) 
suggests that there is high probability of the pasture land increment (deforestation) with the 
new road. 
 
For the institution of public and private policy design, we suggested that policy relevance of 
the provision of technical assistance should be seriously looked into in the cattle production. 
Farmers would like to receive technical assistance mainly on management reproduction 
cattle, pasture management, and work conservation practices. Although we are aware from 
our survey that rudimentary (low technology) system characterized cattle production in the 
sample, nonetheless, increased technical assistance from both public and private 
stakeholders in the cattle production in Ecuador will go a long way in repositioning the 
industry in the country and in the Latin American region at large.  
 
Efficiency and distributional impacts of Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) 
 
Large knowledge gaps exist regarding the conservation effectiveness (Engel et al. 2009). A 
number of factors is either known or hypothesized to influence the efficiency as well as the 
distributional impacts of different conservation instruments including PES (section 2.2). In 
this study, we investigated three of these factors: (i) mandatory vs. voluntary participation, 
(ii) the level of the payments in relation to opportunity costs, and (iii) fixed-rate vs. flexible, 
opportunity-cost oriented payments. Before discussing the main results of the study, we 
briefly summarize a number of methodological issues. 
 
Firstly, we have to point out that study uses empirical data on a sample of typically 
concerned farms. However, this is a simplified ex-ante assessment. Real performance of any 
of the schemes presented will differ as we did not include transaction costs (Wünscher et al. 
2008), and use a very simple model of how local farmers decide to participate in any of the 
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voluntary schemes. With the inclusion of the opportunity cost of forest conservation, a 
critical element of PES performance was included, though. More alternative assumptions on 
decision making, e.g. including smallholder risk aversion (Fraser 2002, Ozanne & White 
2008) as well as the inclusion of (estimates of) transactions costs will improve the results in 
later analyses. 
 
Second, the sample is certainly only weakly "representative" for the universe of local 
farming households as a random sampling approach could not be used at household level. In 
this respect, the quantitative statements, for example on the changes of the precise Gini 
coefficient values, should be treated with caution. In combination with the background 
knowledge of the local assistants, the relatively high share of households that was sampled 
(24%) as well as the much more trustful interview setting somewhat offset the disadvantages 
of the snowball sampling approach used. All investigated households had at least a small 
piece of land. If the snowball sampling had missed a number of very poor, landless 
households, the positive distributional impact of the "Pro Poor" PES would have been 
overestimated. 
 
Third, no spatial targeting was performed. Most certainly, the forests most in risk of 
conservation are not evenly distributed among all sampled households. A spatially-explicit 
treatment of the farming households to facilitate targeting is possible later-on, however, as 
the precise location of all households was surveyed. It is highly likely that spatial targeting 
will substantially improve on-the ground conservation efficiency. If spatial targeting would 
have an effect on distributional aspects, is difficult to prognosticate without a full-fledged 
investigation into the ownership of threatened forest along the household income 
distribution.  
 
Fourth, several further aspects that impact the performance of PES (property rights, payment 
to local communities vs. individuals, labour effects, and impact on the cost of living; Engel 
et al. 2008, Zilberman et al. 2006) are not included. Likewise, differences in compliance 
between different schemes have neither been analyzed nor potential leakage (Wunder 2005).  
 
Finally, we do approach the issue exclusively from a financial cost-effectiveness perspective 
ignoring wider environmental costs and benefits for the time being (Naidoo & Adamowiz 
2005). If such information was incorporated (see e.g., Hillmann & Barkmann 2009), it 
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would allow (i) for the determination of an economically optimised conservation budget, 
and (ii) for additional spatial targeting options.  
 
This brief methodological discussion suggests that quite some room for improvement 
remains. Still, for no single issue it is apparent that it would - either alone or in combination 
- invalidate the following overall results.  
 
In discussing the following main results, we focus on a comparison of the PES instrument 
variants. Our two mandatory schemes are less cost efficient than the two voluntary schemes. 
This effect is caused by the fact that the mandatory instruments are designed as PES that 
provide a compensation payment for enforcing conservation land use. As all farming 
households are required to participate in the schemes regardless of their opportunity costs, 
many very "expensive" forest lands are included driving up average per ha cost at a fixed 
budget. 
 
With respect to cost efficiency, opportunity cost-oriented schemes do not have a clear 
advantage if participation is mandatory. In fact, the mandatory opportunity cost-scheme 
could enlist 3% less forest area than the fixed-rate scheme using the average opportunity 
cost per hectare across all farms as the compensation rate. At a slightly lower rate, it would 
have outperformed the opportunity cost-oriented variant. For the voluntary schemes, the 
advantage of an opportunity cost-oriented scheme is clearly apparent, though. In this 
combination, by far the highest amount of forest (36%) could be conserved with the given 
conservation budget. As predicted by a consolidated body of literature, this scheme results in 
exceptional cost effectiveness and can be approximated in a real application by an 
auctioning of conservation contracts (see Latacz-Lohmann & Achimilizzi 2005, Jack et al. 
2008b, Engel et al. 2007, Wooldridge 2009).  
 
Increasingly more expensive voluntary fixed-rate schemes (including the three "Pro-Poor" 
PES) become less and less cost efficient. Offering voluntary fixed rate schemes with a lower 
payment rate that used in the "traditional" voluntary fixed rate scheme (102 USD/ha/yr) is 
no solution, however. In this case of under-compensation (Jack et al. 2008a), so few farmers 
would accept the contract that the conservation budget was not fully spent. While relative 
cost efficiency could be boosted, the overall conservation effect would drop.  
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With respect to distributional implications, a number of results could be obtained. Most 
importantly, the poverty alleviation impact of any scheme not assigning contracts according 
to poverty status is small. This supports recent review results that pronounced pro-poor 
impacts are rarely observed (Engel et al. 2008). This is true, for example for the otherwise 
much lauded PES in Costa Rica where most of the payments goes to better off households 
(Grieg-Gran et al. 2005, Zbinden & Lee 2005).  
 
Jack et al. (2008a) as well as Zilberman et al. (2006) had suggested that PES may help to 
alleviate poverty when poorest potential providers have the lowest opportunity cost of 
ecosystem services supply. Interestingly, this is the case in our sample with an average 
opportunity cost of the poorest poverty quintile of 100 USD/ha/yr as opposed to 236 
USD/ha/yr for the least poor quintile. Still, none of the PES was able to generate more than 
about 10% of additional income for the households below the poverty line; often 
substantially worse results were obtained. In terms of the absolute amounts of money 
disbursed, all schemes allotted the least amount to the poorest quintile. For the mandatory 
schemes, this holds even for the poorest two quintiles. This observation stresses the second 
requirement mentioned by (Jack et al. 2008a): The poorest providers must also be those with 
a high service provision potential. Along these lines, our results show the poorest 
households simply own critically little forest land that can be placed under any scheme in 
the first place. While the average forest size of the poorest quintile is 1.65 ha, the least poor 
quintile owns 13.3 ha on average.  
 
In addition to traditional efficiency-oriented PES, this study also investigates the likely 
performance of PES that have explicitly been designed to be an instrument to reduce 
poverty. At payment rates of 150-300 USD/ha/yr, income increases of 15-37% could be 
achieved for the poorest quintile of households, and increases of 16-23% for the second 
poorest quintile. In absolute terms, the scheme with a fixed rate of 300 USD/ha/yr disburses 
an equal amount of money to both quintiles. Already for the Pro-Poor PES with 200 
USD/ha/yr, twice as much money ends up with the second quintile, with the situation 
worsening for the pro-poor PES with 150 with 200 USD/ha/yr. For the Pro-Poor PES with 
150 USD/ha/yr. Still, by employing a voluntary mechanism that offers contracts to the 
poorest households first (cf. Ministerio del Ambiente 2009), a near perfect social targeting 
could be achieved by all three "Pro-Poor" PES if compared to the efficiency-oriented PES: 
The entire conservation budget ends up with households below the poverty line. Many 
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households are so far below the poverty line, however, that even for the Pro-Poor PES, the 
number of households additionally moving above the poverty line is small. Still, the 
improveness achieved by the pro-poor PES appears substantial. 
 
The fixed-rate offer of the Pro-Poor300 PES is ten times as high per ha as the maximum 
payments allowed under the Socio Bosque project of the Ecuadorian government. The 30 
USD/ha/yr are roughly five times lower than average opportunity cost of the sample and 
roughly three times lower than the average opportunity cost of the poorest quintile. Still, 
several thousand hectares could be placed under Socio Bosque already (Ministerio de 
Ambiente 2009). This discrepency may stems from the fact that we used the actual net profit 
of pasture based agriculture as a opportunity costs of forest land actually under conversion 
threat (30% of the total forest land). If we had 'allowed' also the other 70% without 
imminent deforestation threat to be entered into the schemes, local farmers would likely 
have accepted much lower offers as the expected opportunity costs are close to zero for the 
next few years. In this case, if the situation describes also the situation of much of the land 
under Socio Bosque program, its additively may be very low. 
 
Trade-offs between the double objectives of conservation efficiency and poverty alleviation 
were expected (Jack et al. 2008a). With the exception of the mandatory schemes that 
perform badly in both respects, such trade-offs are also apparent in our results. Specifically, 
very pronounced trade-offs exist among the five different voluntary instruments. Moving 
from "traditional" voluntary schemes (fixed rate or opportunity cost-oriented) to the "Pro-
poor" schemes by offering very high fixed payments to the poorest households, comes at 
high losses of cost efficiency. The amount of forest covered drops from 36% to 10% while 
the relatively worst distributional impact is traded for the best. In technical terms, the 
mandatory schemes are clearly suboptimal while the voluntary schemes represent members 
of a set of instruments with nearly Pareto-optimal performance.  
 
The two mandatory conservation instruments were designed to include a compensation 
payment. So the risk to actually impose direct cost in terms of overall income losses on the 
poor was lower than in other forms of 'command and control' conservation that do only 
impose land use restrictions (see, Engel et al. 2008). The amount of such costs can easily be 
assessed from our dataset, though. Because the opportunity costs of forest conversion were 
calculated from actual net profit data of local pasture-based agriculture, the payment data per 
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farm approximate also the long-term loss per farm if no compensation was paid - or the 
immediate financial loss in case of a mandatory afforestation program with no subsequent 
forest use.  
 
In sum, we found that the design of payment and contract attributes has a pronounced impact 
on the efficiency (cost-effectiveness) as well as on the distributional impact of PES-type 
conservation instruments (cf. Pagiola 2010). Voluntary instruments tend to be more cost 
efficient than mandatory ones if competitively low payments are offered. Such low offers - 
for example as aimed at though the auctioning of PES contracts – were found to be 
incompatible with poverty alleviation goals. Pronounced pro-poor distributional impacts are 
possible, however, but the PES contracts will need rather high payments per unit area (up to 
300 USD/ha/yr) and will have to be offered exclusively to the poorest households. At the 
community level, the Ecuadorian Socio Bosque program achieves such a form of social 
targeting because the program is only implemented in particularly poor communities. Its 
acceptance in spite of its very low fixed payment offer of 30 USD/ha/yr suggests that forest 
lands with a low agricultural potential, i.e. with a low deforestation risk, may have been 
placed under the program. Thus, issues of additionality and spatial targeting should urgently 
be investigated here. With respect to the massive trade-offs between the goals of 
conservation efficiency and positive distribution impacts reported, it appears unlikely that 
these trade-offs can be avoided by additional 'innovative' forms of PES. In landscapes 
dominated by agricultural smallholders but also populated by a substantial share of larger 
farms, excluding larger, less poor farming households from participation is in many cases 
likely to exclude areas with low per area costs.  
 
